Iran’s diminishing returns on enriching uranium

Iran’s enrichment of uranium has led to renewed tensions in the Middle East. Recent reports indicate that Iran has achieved an enrichment level of around 84 percent; it would need to reach only 90 percent and then would be within reach of a nuclear weapon. But, as Iran inches closer to having enough material for a weapon, it enters a period of diminishing returns. 

If the regime is using uranium enrichment to blackmail the West into some sort of concessions, it very soon will cross a point of no return, because it can only keep enriching so much material toward no end. On the other hand, if its intention is to actually build and test a nuclear weapon, it also soon will reach a point where it has to make this fundamental decision. Both scenarios put Iran’s mullahs in an awkward spot. 

For several years, the U.S. and Israel have warned that Iran was believed to be several weeks or months away from being able to have sufficient material to develop a bomb. These warnings are complex because they relate to the time needed to produce the enriched uranium, not the time that might go into building and testing an actual weapon. Israel has often warned that there is a “red line” beyond which Iran would be endangering the region by trying to build a nuclear weapon. CIA Director William Burns has indicated that, although Iran’s nuclear program is moving forward at a “worrisome pace,” it is not clear whether Iran has decided to proceed with “weaponization” that leads to a bomb.  

Iran’s supply of drones to Russia for its war in Ukraine, its crackdown on protesters in Iran’s streets, and its emerging ties with China mean the West is more concerned than ever about Iran’s regime. In addition, the West appears to have less leverage than in the past, since the regime appears to have put most of its hopes in its ties with Moscow and Beijing. 

This creates an interesting set of circumstances. Iran used to hold up uranium enrichment as a threat to achieve concessions and a new “deal” with the West. If it can’t use enrichment to threaten the West, then what is the point of more enrichment? Iran must consult with its partners in Russia and China about whether those countries actually back a nuclear Iran. Iran recently said it could supply air defenses to Syria, and it is rumored to be asking Russia for warplanes. If it’s offering air defenses to other countries, it doesn’t seem to be husbanding those resources at home to defend against airstrikes on its nuclear facilities. Similarly, without a relevant air force and with drones being exported to Russia, it appears more vulnerable than in the past. 

This creates a problem for the Iranian regime. As it nears the 90 percent enrichment mark, it knows that it reaches a kind of “red line,” where it will have enriched too much to not proceed toward making a weapon. However, if it isn’t ready to “weaponize” the enriched uranium, it can’t continue to enrich for no reason. This is a diminishing return of enrichment. What’s the point of getting to 89.9 percent and not doing more? On the other hand, if Iran is concerned that its own partners will dissuade it from building a bomb and destabilizing the world, and if Iran is concerned about sparking a war over its weapons program, it runs into fewer choices in the future. Basically, it will have checked the enrichment box and now has to move on to some new stage. 

For countries that are concerned about Iran’s nuclear program — including Israel, the U.S., European countries, Russia and China — there will be a lot of spotlight on what Iran does next. In addition, Iran may provoke Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others into a potential nuclear arms race. Clearly, Iran faces more difficult choices the more it enriches uranium. On the other hand, countries that oppose Iran acquiring a weapon will need to now work more closely together and be clear about how they intend to deter Iran from reaching the next stage. 

More is now known about Iran’s nuclear program and, if enrichment no longer is a major issue, countries could send a message to Iran that any weaponization of uranium would be the new “red line” not to cross.

Seth J. Frantzman has spent 15 years covering security, refugees and conflict in the Middle East, including in areas now affected by the earthquake. He is the author of “Drone Wars” and “After ISIS.” He is executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis. A former assistant professor of American Studies at Al-Quds University, he covers the Middle East for The Jerusalem Post.