How Europe is quietly putting ‘strategic autonomy’ into practice

When Ursula von der Leyen last traveled to Washington in November 2021, the European Commission president’s agenda was full of issues that today seem quaint: COVID-19 vaccination rates and a migration crisis in Belarus. On Friday, President Biden will host one of the leading figures of a profoundly transformed European bloc. This time, the agenda will be dominated by the security of the European continent, and von der Leyen will represent a bloc at its most cohesive and powerful in decades.

While the EU’s unity today is a clear response to Russian aggression, the tools Brussels has used were not developed overnight. In fact, in a way few observers may realize, the shadow of another conflict hangs over the Ukraine war and impacts how the bloc views its tools and its roles: the Syrian civil war. Of course, the war in Ukraine is of larger magnitude for Europe than was the Syrian conflict. Many consider the former to be the first total war since the Iran-Iraq war and the most violent state-to-state war on European soil since World War II. Yet, the two crises share some similarities in the way they tested — and are still testing — Europe’s resolve and democratic and social model. More importantly, looking back, Syria constituted a formative experience for Europe.

Although Europe — and the United States— failed to prevent the “Long Syrian Night,” in the words of France’s former ambassador to Damascus, Michel Duclos, the old continent seems to have since gained confidence in its own strength and is responding in an unparalleled way to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, per European standards. It took war on European soil to finally bring to life the much-decried concept of “strategic autonomy” put forward by French President Emmanuel Macron — the ability of Europe to defend itself and decrease its reliance on the United States.

Too little, too slow

Months after Syria’s popular uprising against Bashar al-Assad began in 2011, the EU adopted individual and sectoral sanctions and deployed diplomatic efforts to support the Syrian opposition in exile and the field. The bloc provided humanitarian aid starting in 2012, a support that has reached 24 billion Euros to date. But fall of 2013 marked a turning point. The U.S. then failed to implement the “red line” it had set — that any use of chemical weapons by the regime would be met by military action. Combined with the rise of ISIS, the West’s focus on the Syrian civil war drifted and its strategy unraveled. Meanwhile, the Russians applied the opposite strategy — doubling down on the Syrian conflict and ignoring ISIS. Later, the refugee crisis in Europe constituted a test of solidarity with which Europe struggled. This was coupled with war fatigue and a lack of long-term resilience.

In short, aside from the migration crisis, Europe’s response to the Syrian crisis seemed good in substance but by no means in size, speed and duration. Mostly, member states lacked political unity, a central factor of any decisive European action. This disunion was the main obstacle to the supply of weapons to the Syrian opposition and, frankly, to any substantive support. The European allies of the rebellion were careful and did things only half-way, and Moscow by comparison provided full-fledged support to Assad’s regime. Syria represented a defeat for the West, and for Europe in particular. Nonetheless, Brussels already showed the wide panel of tools the EU had at its disposal, the result of decades of patient European integration.

Better, faster, stronger 

So far, Ukraine in many respects is the polar opposite of the Syrian civil war. Brussels adopted its first package of sanctions hours after Moscow recognized the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. One year later, the EU is at its tenth sanctions package. Beyond sanctions, the EU has used the whole palette of tools at its disposal: deploying a military advisory mission, providing military aid and training, implementing airspace restrictions, and providing macroeconomic support and humanitarian aid. In addition to EU institutions, individual governments have supplied military equipment to Kyiv. To date, the overall financial, military and humanitarian assistance provided to Ukraine by EU institutions and European governments amounts to $73 billion.

In some cases, the European response went further than that of the United States. Indeed, Brussels acted to prevent energy companies trading Russian oil from using European shipping and insurance services, measures that sparked fear in Washington about the impact on oil prices. The Biden administration tried to tone  down the move with the adoption of a price cap. In sum, Brussels and governments used many tools they sometimes were reluctant or slow to use in the past. Consequently, the outcome of the invasion of Ukraine remains undecided, and Europeans are united in standing up to revisionist Russia, with crucial support from Washington.

The practical application of strategic autonomy  

Ukraine and Europe remain fundamentally dependent on American support, in the war in Ukraine and in other fields. But this newfound assertiveness from Brussels and other European capitals reflects Macron’s concept of “strategic autonomy,” which he formulated in a speech at the Sorbonne University in 2017. The idea that Europe might fly on its own, in terms of defense and key strategic domains, had been much debated. The main opponents to the idea mocked the stammering EU defense policy and raised concerns that such a policy could overlap with NATO. Perhaps the problem of this concept is that it was put forward in a theoretical vacuum and in peacetime. Today, with war on the continent, the EU is putting “strategic autonomy” into practice.

These efforts will intensify in the coming months. Brussels is exploring the possibility of jointly procuring ammunition for Ukraine. Besides, far from competing with NATO, the EU’s action has proved complementary to that of the North Atlantic Alliance. In fact, NATO has not played a leading role in the Ukrainian crisis aside from an enhanced military posture and patrolling. This is partly because the Alliance does not want to validate a posteriori the Russian narrative that this is a conflict between NATO and Moscow. But to a larger extent, this is because NATO is not fully equipped to react to the scenario where Russia is attacking a third party. The Alliance is focused on defense of its members and can hardly fund military equipment for third parties. It certainly is not designed to provide macroeconomic assistance, adopt sectoral sanctions or ban Russian airline companies from operating in European airspace.

Moreover, the EU’s de facto embryonic “strategic autonomy” is trickling down to matters beyond Ukraine. On Feb. 20, the EU adopted its fifth human rights-related sanctions package against Iran in less than five months. Beside freezing assets and imposing travel bans, those sanctions are a way to demonstrate support for anti-regime demonstrations in Iran.  

A somewhat unnoticed element is the speed and scope of Brussels’ action. With these sanctions, the EU adopted more human rights designations against Iran than in the past 11 years combined. The bloc also moved swiftly, compared to previous occurrences; after the crackdown of the late 2000s in Iran, Brussels adopted sanctions years after the protest movement, in April 2011. A further sign of newfound assertiveness is the adoption of restrictive measures targeting three Iranian generals and the manufacturer of Shahed drones. The bloc had vowed only 10 days earlier to respond to Russia’s use of Iranian drones to bomb Ukrainian civilian targets. Not long ago, Brussels officials would have only dreamed of such a rapid response.

Of course, Europe’s unintended pursuit of strategic autonomy comes with challenges, and there is a long way to go before Europe turns from an economic and cultural power to a “great power” in the Western camp. Unity among member states remains key to progress within the union. There are avenues the bloc should explore, such as creating a European agency similar to  the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to enforce its burgeoning list of economic sanctions. Projects, mostly in the defense field — such as the Future Combat Air System or within the Permanent Structured Cooperation — need to be completed.

Nonetheless, this emerging force in Europe is good news. It should be embraced by European states with calm confidence, rather than vitriolic reactions. It should be welcomed and encouraged by Washington. If this trend continues unhampered, Europe may come out of the Ukraine war stronger than it was before Feb. 24, 2022. In the long run, the United States could possibly afford to devote more resources in Asia, a region where the palette of non-military tools developed by Europe, coupled with a more robust European defense, could help to effectively address the systemic challenges posed by China.

Louis Dugit-Gros is a visiting fellow with The Washington Institute and a diplomat with the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. The views expressed here are strictly personal. Follow him on Twitter @Louis_DG.