Biden’s sanctions on Sudan aren’t working — here’s what he needs to change

On April 15, conflict broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by Gen. Abdul-Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces, led by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, who is known as “Hemedti.”

The conflict has so far killed close to 1,000 people, injured more than 5,000 and forced nearly 1 million to flee. This is happening in a country that was already hosting 1.3 million refugees and more than 4 million internally displaced people, and which now faces further imminent humanitarian disasters.

President Joe Biden has since signed an executive order authorizing the government to sanction Sudanese individuals and entities involved in the conflict. It contains expansive power to target perpetrators of the war by blocking their assets and business dealings. 

But it will remain an empty gesture unless the administration starts listing the perpetrators behind the escalating violence in Sudan.

If targeted effectively, these sanctions can increase the costs of the war and hasten its resolution. U.S. Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland testified before the Senate this month that Biden’s executive order is specifically designed to hold those responsible for stealing Sudan’s future to account — making Burhan and Hemedti prime candidates. But the administration’s failure to list a single Sudanese official under the order is a continuation of its longstanding failed approach towards Sudan, which seeks accommodation over action. 

Executive orders on sanctions are critical foreign policy tools to respond to ongoing conflicts, imminent threats and humanitarian disasters in real time. But they will remain empty frameworks if not implemented. In the time since Sudan’s 2021 military coup, the U.S. has sanctioned only one entity, the Central Reserve Police. This contrasts sharply with the more than 3,000 sanctioned Russian individuals or entities. Worse, a failure to implement the Biden executive order undermines U.S. credibility.

A program of targeted sanctions would also work toward reversing the harms inflicted by past blanket economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. upon Sudan, as well as its state-sponsor of terror designation between 1993 and 2020. By sanctioning the generals, the U.S. would send a clear message to the people of Sudan as to whose side it’s on, recognizing the true bearers of democracy as the civilian-led movement. 

The U.S. has yet to act on this executive order, apparently in hopes of giving the generals space to work out a ceasefire and political settlement. But to quote Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) in the Sudan Senate hearing, “Hope is not a foreign policy strategy.” For two decades, the generals have openly rejected diplomacy in favor of a long record of violence and mass atrocities, going back to the genocide in Darfur. The current situation clearly demands a shift in U.S. policy toward accountability. 

More than half the population of Sudan, comprising 25 million people, is in need of humanitarian aid and protection. This is the highest number ever recorded by the UN in the country, resulting in an appeal for $2.6 billion in funding. This does not account for the further untold destruction being wrought on civilian infrastructure, which will require massive reconstruction.

The logical policy response is to make the principal perpetrators pay for the widespread damage and destruction inflicted.

The effectiveness of targeted sanctions is well understood by Sudan’s de facto ruler, Gen. Burhan. He himself recently issued a decree freezing the bank accounts of the rival Rapid Support Forces and all its affiliates. The move was intended to cut off the RSF from its funding sources, thereby limiting its ability to continue the war.

The U.S. can do the same to pressure both sides to lay down their arms.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced countries around the world to turn to more effective, common-sense sanctions mechanisms. These include targeting key perpetrators and beneficiaries driving war and repurposing their sanctioned assets for reconstruction and compensation. There is now ample precedent to do so. Canada has passed a law allowing for confiscation of sanctioned assets for these purposes, while the U.S. has begun to transfer assets seized from Russian oligarchs to Ukraine through its KleptoCapture task force. 

In Sudan, the U.S. response must include putting pressure on Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Libya, the main regional players funding the two clashing armies. To stop the ongoing conflict, the U.S. and its allies must target the networks of the two groups and cut them off from the financial networks funding the war.

In addition, as is in the case of Ukraine, the sanctioned assets should be repurposed to reconstruct Sudan and compensate victims. 

The U.S. should end its policy of unconscionably deferring to the military factions to resolve the conflict and protect civilians, and instead prioritize saving lives and empowering pro-democracy groups. The U.S. should proactively make conflict more costly and hold the perpetrators accountable. Now is the time to act to prevent impending catastrophic loss of life.

Mutasim Ali is a legal advisor at the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights (RWCHR), specializing in targeted human rights sanctions. Yonah Diamond is an international human rights lawyer specializing in atrocity prevention at the RWCHR.