The events of last week bring home the twin tragedies of the Titanic’s sinking and the loss of the submersible Titan, designed to view the remains of that once great ship. The strategic metaphor is clear. Is the United States a 21st-century Titanic embarked on a collision course with a Chinese iceberg?
Both are behemoths. Both are seen as unsinkable. But are the U.S. and China capable of changing course, or will they suffer the Titanic’s fate?
A collision does not inevitably mean war. It does, however, suggest major disruptions in the international order, trade, economics and what passes for the geostrategic balance.
Why?
In the first instance, neither the U.S. nor China share similar perceptions of each other and the nature of the competition and clash between the two. Nor does each recognize shared interests sufficiently well enough to engage in cooperative measures beneficial to both and the international community. Meanwhile, Washington groupthink is coalescing around the very real likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, possibly within this decade.
From Washington’s perspective, China aims to challenge the rules-based order established and maintained by the West. It seeks military superiority to support its expansive ambitions, particularly regarding Taiwan. And through the Belt and Road and Global Development and Security Initiatives (GDI and GSI), it is growing its influence and access worldwide, focusing on the so-called Global South.
Further, one problem with China is the absolute control exerted by the Communist Party and by Xi Jinping, whom President Joe Biden has called a dictator. Xi has presided over major human rights abuses against Chinese minorities, particularly the Uyghurs. Intellectual property theft and spying have always been points of friction between the U.S. and China, whose new base in Cuba exacerbates the latter.
From China’s perspective, the U.S. is attempting to curtail China’s economic growth and its international influence. Tariffs and technology controls are examples of that policy. The U.S. is also attempting to contain China by establishing and reinforcing partnerships with Asian states. The Quad with Australia, India and Japan, and the AUKUS deal to provide Australia with nuclear submarines are indicative of means to contain China.
Each has a polar opposite view of the other. Can this be reconciled? At least as important, how could a process of reconciliation be started? Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit may have been the first step. Unfortunately, whatever progress may have been made, Biden’s statement about Xi being a dictator was unhelpful. And, surely, from Beijing’s perspective, questions were raised about how seriously the U.S. takes improving relations with China.
The U.S. National Security and Defense Strategies (NSS and NDS) call China the “pacing threat” and Russia the “acute threat.” The aims of both are to compete, deter and, if war comes, defeat (prevail is the current art form expression) China and Russia, followed by lesser adversaries. Suppose the Chinese (or Russian) strategy were to compete, deter and, if need be, defeat the U.S. How would the U.S. react?
Can this mutual suspicion and distrust be reduced, and how? How are mutual understandings of what drives each to be implemented? And how are misperceptions to be corrected?
That Xi welcomed Elon Musk, J.P. Morgan’s Jamie Dimon and Bill Gates to China before the Blinken visit was an obvious signal that the White House should not have missed. China is undergoing economic difficulties, and it is seeking help.
Successive U.S. administrations believed that by supporting China’s economic growth, a more liberal society would follow. That would never happen. Hence, the first action is for Washington to accept that the Chinese may not want a Western form of liberalism for China. Second, Washington must understand that the Trump-imposed sanctions are not only strategically and economically counter-productive. U.S. consumers are the bill payers.
Third, as this column has argued, the threat of a full-fledged Chinese invasion of Taiwan is one of the least likely of Beijing’s options. Thus, to avoid a collision, the U.S. should signal an intent to change course. How? Through further dialogue.
Perhaps the visits of the secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce could begin sotto voce diplomacy, followed by a discreet meeting be the countries’ respective national security advisors. But if not, sound the collision alarm.
Harlan Ullman is a senior adviser at the Washington, D.C., Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” doctrine. His 12th book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.