A Russia-Ukraine endgame inches closer

It was a shocking Russian spectacle, blowback from Vladimir Putin’s failing war as Ukraine’s counter-offensive advanced: an open military mutiny by the Wagner mercenary forces that with little resistance seized a major military base and drove to within 120 miles of Moscow.

Yet the chaos was over in 48 hours, as a brokered deal granted amnesty to Yevgeny Prigozhin, who will move to Belarus, and to the Wagner mercenaries, who will be allowed to join the Russian military forces. Thus was the weakness of Russian President Vladimir Putin and his beleaguered military forces exposed.

Perhaps most significantly, the Russian episode appears to have moved the Ukraine war closer to an endgame. The unprecedented turmoil in Russia also brings a new urgency to NATO’s upcoming July 11-12 summit, which will try to resolve the question of Western assurances of Ukraine’s security, current and future.

Samuel Charap of the Rand Corporation argues that the most likely outcome is a ceasefire and armistice, and that the U.S. should “develop a vision for how the war ends.” Ukraine assurances are an important tool of diplomacy needed to do so.

There is a strong push by East Europeans, led by Poland, to bring Kyiv into NATO now, if not later at its July summit. Other, less legally binding options, such as Israeli-type security guarantees, are also gaining traction. There appears to be a consensus that some credible, enduring security guarantees are needed now.

As with many vexing foreign policy issues, the problem is that there are few options that are not problematic. From the start, President Biden and NATO allies have been clear that they have no interest in directly fighting Russia in Ukraine.

Yet fast-tracking Kyiv into NATO during the war could result in exactly that. Escalation risks as Russia faces more losses can’t be dismissed. Once sober Russian intellectuals are writing of likely nuclear conflict, a reflection of the desperation and vulnerability displayed in Wagner’s attempted mutiny.

Offering NATO membership to Ukraine when the war ends is another matter. A critical question has to do with how the war ends. A total Ukrainian victory or a negotiated ceasefire and a permanent armistice, similar to the result of the Korean War in 1953, are the two most probable outcomes. In either case, permanent enmity with a broken, isolated nuclear Russia would not bode well for the stable environment Ukraine needs to rebuild its nation.

Nonetheless, there appears a sensible argument that the West needs to move beyond the current ad hoc support for Ukraine to a firmer, long-term security commitment. Security is foundational and such assurances would facilitate a much-needed parallel economic reconstruction effort.

At a recent pledging conference for Ukraine economic reconstruction, Secretary of State Antony Blinken underscored this point: “Make no mistake. All of these reform and recovery efforts depend on Ukraine having the capacity to deter and defend against future attacks by Russia.”

One option that appears to be gaining currency is a kind of formalizing of current Western military and economic aid, intelligence, training and supplies for the long term, similar to the guarantees the U.S. gave to Israel in the aftermath of the 1973 Middle East war. The concept, likely to surface at the NATO summit, involves commitments by a “European Quad” — the U.S., UK., France and Germany. The goal would be to help Ukraine build a “porcupine defense” without provoking Russia by institutionalizing a NATO defense obligation. It would be less than a formal treaty, yet an ongoing, clear commitment.

To do so would at once offer reassurance to Kyiv and signal to Moscow that dragging out the war will not result in the West walking away from Ukraine.

But ultimately, whether Ukraine recovered all its sovereign territory or reached a compromise leaving areas like Crimea under Putin’s control, Russia would still be its separate and disconnected neighbor. Moscow would still have the capacity to be a continued threat to Ukraine.

Conversely, a well-armed Ukraine would also be able to threaten any remaining Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine, and as Kyiv’s military has already shown, could also do considerable damage to targets inside Russia. But would that make for a stable equilibrium?

This is the “whither Russia?” problem that remains the elephant in the room of European security discussions. Putin has defined Russia as apart from, and in opposition to, the West. 

There is a compelling moral case for making Moscow pay for its brutal, barbaric attacks on civilians and Ukraine’s infrastructure. Former U.S. Trade Representative and ex-World Bank President Robert Zoellick and former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers proposed in a Foreign Affairs essay that the U.S. and allies confiscate $300 billion in frozen Russian assets and use it to rebuild Ukraine.

Apart from the precedent such a move might set for a fragmenting world financial system and the future of the U.S. dollar, history suggests that war resolutions heavy on punishment and retribution may lose the peace and incentivize the next war even in a total Ukraine victory.

In a recent essay entitled “How Wars Don’t End,” historian Margaret MacMillan suggests the retributive 1919 Versailles treaty  ending World War I – another unexpected, long, grinding conflict – may be a “dark warning for Ukraine.” If like Germany, she writes, “Russia is left in turmoil, bitter and isolated, with many of its leaders and people blaming others for its failures, as so many Germans did in those interwar decades, then the end of one war could simply lay the groundwork for another.”

Moscow must pay a price for its savagery. Regardless, barring an unlikely popular uprising, there is scant reason to expect that Moscow will change its trajectory anytime soon.

In a world of bad choices, how to calibrate retribution, ensuring a secure Ukraine with adequate resources to rebuild may mean sustaining deterrence. But as the West prepares to ensure Ukraine’s future, don’t discount the Russia factor.

Robert A. Manning is a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center. He previously served as senior counselor to the undersecretary of State for global affairs, as a member of the U.S. secretary of state’s policy planning staff and on the National Intelligence Council Strategic Futures Group. Follow him on Twitter @Rmanning4.