How should the Israel-Saudi normalization deal consider Palestinians? 

U.S. officials confirmed this month that America and Saudi Arabia are discussing the specifics of Israel-Saudi normalization. Yet even as the Biden administration now insists that any such deal must include the Palestinians, many worry they will get left behind.

This is an especially important point as Israel and Saudi Arabia forge ahead in building their relationship. There’s been a lot of will-they-or-won’t-they speculation about normalization, but the fact is that where Saudi Arabia and Israel are now in terms of informal business and travel, clandestine security ties, and technology transfers mirrors the development of previous de facto relationships between Israel and Arab states that later turned official. Thus, Israel-Saudi normalization is not a question of if, but when and how. If the Biden administration is serious about going beyond lip service on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there are a number of steps it can take to ensure that an eventual Israel-Saudi normalization deal yields benefits for everyone between the Mediterranean and the Jordan.

The priority for the United States needs to be clear asks from the Saudis and Israelis and tangible results. To start, Washington can encourage Riyadh to swap cryptic comments for clarity. Until now, the Saudis have leaned on vagaries like references to a “pathway to peace” between Israel and the Palestinians when discussing normalization. Indeed, Saudi calculus on this process is influenced by a number of complex domestic, regional, and international factors, and where the Palestinians fit in the kingdom’s priorities remains unclear even as it professes concern over the issue. The U.S. should ask Saudi Arabia to articulate its specific conditions for Israel.

What specific asks from Saudi Arabia would have the most impact? To start with, Riyadh can push for Israel to transfer parts of Area B of the West Bank to Area A, and parts of Area C to Area B, with a phased roadmap for more transfers over time. This will not only give Palestinians control over policing and governing their own towns and population but will also give the Palestinians more control over their towns and villages in the realm of planning and building. In the framework of a deal with Israel, the Saudis can also be proactive in restoring assistance to the West Bank and Gaza, which was slashed by 80 percent when the Trump administration cut U.S. aid. 

These clear requests are only part of the equation. The United Arab Emirates famously made a public appeal to Israel to cancel plans for West Bank annexation in advance of the Abraham Accords. The commitments Israel made to the UAE in 2020 are essentially a dead letter. Thus, the United States needs to ensure that what Israel and Saudi Arabia discuss goes beyond verbal commitments. To this end, Riyadh and Washington should also consider guarantees for the steps described above. 

Of course, all of this will be a tall order when presented to an Israeli government that includes ministers like Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich who are hostile to even the most circumscribed form of Palestinian sovereignty. But putting out precise Saudi conditions for normalization and associate guarantees into the Israeli public discourse can spark a debate in the country about the benefits of a deal and build pressure on Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s coalition. 

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is just one consideration among many that the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel may address in normalizing ties. NATO-style security guarantees for Riyadh, U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear energy program, deepening Saudi ties with China are all important topics that have already come up and which policymakers on all sides will need to carefully assess. If the Biden administration decides that what the Saudis want aligns with U.S. interests, then they will also have their work cut out for them when it comes to fitting in the Israeli-Palestinian piece. Whether an agreement comes in five months or five years, the U.S. needs to be ready with a plan — and one that ensures that Arab-Israeli normalization doesn’t come at the expense of a viable two-state solution. 

Evan Gottesman is an advisor and Shira Efron is the Glazer Foundation senior director of policy research and at Israel Policy Forum.