When will Putin finally go?

Old soldiers may fade away, but dictators usually have ignominious ends or die unmourned. We know that, Kremlin propaganda to the contrary, Vladimir Putin will not rule Russia forever. But when might he be expected to leave his bunkers and palaces — whether feet first or in handcuffs?

A usually astute Russian democratic analyst named Valery Solovey predicts that Putin is deathly ill and won’t make it past the fall of this year. Indeed, says Solovey, he may not even make it past October. That could be wishful thinking, as many of his critics contend. Or it may be some clever secret-police plot intended to disarm Putin’s opponents and lull them into a sense of complacency about Russia’s future.

Or, as Solovey insists, it may be true. Inasmuch as he’s effectively staked his entire reputation on Putin’s early death, it’s hard not to conclude that Solovey really, really means it.

Solovey, a former professor at the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Relations, lives in Russia’s capital, claims to have access to insiders in the corridors of power, speaks dismissively and insultingly of Putin, and talks openly about the reformist plans he and his colleagues will implement when they come to power. These unnamed higher-ups not only provide him with privileged information, but also protect him from Putin’s wrath.

Solovey also insists that Putin has several doubles and that most of his recent public appearances and conversations with some foreign leaders actually featured a double, and not the real Putin. When Putin dies, the double will assume his role until the elites decide it’s time to reveal the truth to the world, presumably after some group has gotten the upper hand in the post-Putin power struggle. The double may then face an unhappy future.

Solovey understands that all of this sounds “phantasmagoric,” but, as he says, this is today’s Russia.

We don’t have to agree with Solovey’s diagnosis of Putin and Kremlin politics to know that all is not well, politically and physically, with Russia’s erstwhile strongman. The hesitation and confusion he evinced on June 23-24 during the coup attempt by Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin was lamentable. Elite dissatisfaction with his handling of the disastrous war with Ukraine has been confirmed by multiple sources. And regardless of whether or not Putin suffers from Parkinson’s or cancer, it’s clear that someone who resides in bunkers, greets guests from across huge tables, travels only by train, and truly believes that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is a Nazi has serious psychological and/or cognitive problems that may disqualify him from an effective leadership role.

There is thus no way that his henchmen don’t know that Putin, the former macho man and black belt, is losing it. They must also know that he is the main obstacle to a resolution of the war. Hardliners think he’s too soft and should immediately decree a mass mobilization of soldiers, declare martial law, and nationalize oligarch assets. Softliners believe he’s too committed to waging a suicidal fight and is therefore incapable of making concessions and reaching some kind of peace with Ukraine and the West. Ordinary Russians who get their information from state-run televisions still appear to admire Putin, but they have no say in the fascist system he’s constructed and so don’t matter, at least not now.

Analyses of the war that don’t take Putin’s precarious position into account are thus incapable of evaluating the true state of affairs. If Putin dies tomorrow, Russia’s ability and desire to wage war will certainly be affected and probably diminished. If Putin’s physical, mental and political health continues to decay, Russia’s ability to make important decisions will deteriorate. If Putin either magically revives or is proven to be in perfect political and physical health, Russia will continue fighting, and its soldiers will continue dying, in very large numbers.

Solovey’s prediction of Putin’s imminent death may be foolhardy and soon proven wrong, but we would be remiss to think that Russia’s tyrant will remain as vigorous tomorrow as he was on the day he assumed power in 1999. Policymakers are uncomfortable with hypothetical questions — such as “What will you do when Putin goes?” — but there is no alternative to reminding ourselves of Putin’s physical and political mortality, and perhaps of the mortality of his system and state.

If Putin goes, so too will his regime, of which he’s the linchpin. And if the regime goes, so too might the Russian Federation, especially if some disgruntled nation — the Chechens, perhaps — decides to make a great leap forward and declares independence. Many Russian analysts and commentators predict a “time of troubles” in Russia’s near future, as Putin’s departure or incapacitation sparks a systemic crisis that, regardless of outcome, will prove to be deeply destabilizing and bloody.

Such a moment may be good or may be bad, but it’s high time for the world to prepare for both the hopes and fears that Putin’s inevitable exit will generate.

Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.”