There are five conclusions that can already be drawn from the early days of the war between Hamas and Israel.
1. The first is self-evident: This was a colossal intelligence failure for Israel. The fact that it came virtually on the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War — also an intelligence failure — is astounding.
Assessing blame for this failure will have to wait for after the war. Like 1973, it appears it was a failure to believe that the enemy would act, so intelligence was ignored. A commission of inquiry modeled on the Agranat Commission, which followed the Yom Kippur War, will need to be established. Though Egypt’s early success in the Yom Kippur War changed the dynamic of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a bold peace overture from Hamas is not likely.
2. This war has created a dramatically new paradigm. Hamas brought the fight to Israel, by land, air, sea and rockets. Ground fighting in Israel creates a seismic shift. Israel’s defenses were pierced and its billion-dollar high-tech wall suffered multiple breaches. Even after 48 hours, the border was not fully secured and terrorists were still entering Israel.
Hamas has inflicted grave damage to the Israeli civilian population (as well as to the army and police) and to its psyche — over 700 dead and rising, over 2,200 injured, over 100 taken hostage and an unknown number missing. The country is demanding a massive and definitive response. Massive it will be. Definitive is more elusive — but this is uncharted territory.
There will be unprecedented bombing in Gaza, which means tremendous collateral damage and civilian casualties. Since its withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, Israel has studiously avoided a prolonged and widespread ground campaign there. Now a substantial and prolonged ground offensive by Israel is likely to try to take out Hamas and Islamic Jihad strongholds and target their leaders throughout Gaza. That creates its own problems due to Gaza’s population density and the Israeli hostages captured and taken there. Will Israel have the stomach for both the Israeli and Palestinian casualties it will incur on the ground — possibly resulting in the death of hostages as well?
Israel’s northern border could also become a conflagration point, depending on both the amount and type of rockets coming from Hamas and/or Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. How far will Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, go? So far, the group’s activity has been more symbolic than of strategic concern. But a wider conflagration is certainly possible, especially if the West Bank also erupts after what will sure to be deliberate provocations by Israeli settlers.
3. Perhaps the most important conclusion is that the political catalyst for the Hamas invasion was not the storming of the Temple Mount near the al-Aqsa mosque by Israeli settlers last week — as vile and disgraceful as that was. The sheer breadth and timing of the Hamas operation demonstrates it was well planned for months and was unlikely to be undertaken without Iranian approval.
Israel-Saudi normalization was moving rapidly to conclusion, along with possible defense cooperation, with benefits for all parties, including the U.S. — except for the Palestinians. Iran and Hamas sought to derail the normalization process.
4. Israel will likely enter into an emergency national unity government, akin to when conservative Menachem Begin entered Labor Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s cabinet on the eve of the Six Day War. As opposition leader Yair Lapid aptly put it, Israel needs to be “led by a professional, experienced, and responsible government” during this time of crisis. The current Netanyahu government is neither serious nor responsible.
A high-level security cabinet will most likely include Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and possibly Avi Dichter (the former head of Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service) from Likud; Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot, both former military chiefs of staff from the National Unity Party; and Yair Lapid and Elazar Stern/Orna Barbivai from Yesh Atid, who would provide reasoned and experienced leadership and demonstrate national unity in a time of peril.
5. Republican presidential candidates will mistakenly try to blame Joe Biden for this war, demonstrating a lack of understanding of the region and its dynamics. This war was brought on for two reasons.
First, the chaos in Israel was caused by Netanyahu’s judicial coup attempt, which was opposed by the majority of the country. But Iran and Hamas conflated protests against the government with an unwillingness to defend the country against an external enemy. The dichotomy between government and country is lost on Hamas and Iran. Widespread casualties, hostages and fear have galvanized the Israeli public. The people of Gaza will bear the burden of that miscalculation.
Second, as indicated, Iran sought to derail Israel-Saudi normalization. While the normalization process may be delayed, it is inevitable.
The strategic interests of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel are all at stake in this war. We can only hope those strategic interests will prevail. It is, however, too early to draw that conclusion.
Jonathan D. Strum is an international lawyer and businessman based in Washington D.C. focused on the Middle East. From 1991-2005, he taught the Israeli legal system at Georgetown University Law Center.