Attempts to end Venezuela’s years-long political crisis took a major step this week after the United States reportedly agreed to a long-sought deal with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.
According to public reports, the U.S. will partially lift sanctions on Venezuela’s dilapidated oil industry in exchange for several political concessions from Maduro’s government, including scheduling a fixed date for the 2024 presidential elections, allowing opposition candidates to run in those elections and permitting international observers to monitor the entire process. In tandem, talks between Maduro and the Venezuelan opposition will resume after a nearly year-long hiatus.
Even with this good news, celebrations are far too premature.
There are a number of ways the deal could unravel during the implementation stage, Maduro’s tendency to stonewall the strongest among them. But assuming the deal is implemented in full, the fairly straightforward trade between Washington and Caracas will go a long way toward alleviating the intense economic hardship millions of Venezuelans have been experiencing even before Maduro ascended to power in 2013.
It would also serve as an important lesson to U.S. policymakers: economic pressure can achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives if the U.S. is willing to ditch maximalism for incrementalism.
While successive U.S. presidents have selectively sanctioned Venezuela for human rights abuses and corruption, the Trump administration threw the kitchen sink at Maduro’s regime. Venezuela’s oil exports were cut off, as was the country’s access to the U.S. financial system. U.S. oil conglomerates like Chevron were now legally prohibited from drilling operations, let alone exporting Venezuelan oil into the international market. In January 2019, Trump designated opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate leader, partly to penalize Maduro for organizing and winning a fraud-laced poll the previous year. Months later, Venezuela’s assets and property inside the U.S. were frozen, amounting to a virtual economic blockade of the South American country.
The objective of all this economic pressure was not only to penalize Maduro’s usurpation of democracy but to oust Maduro from office entirely and pave the way for the resumption of democratic rule. Although regime change wasn’t explicitly declared by U.S. officials at the time, this is precisely what the Trump administration hoped to accomplish. By tightening the purse springs of the Venezuelan state and cutting off Maduro at the knees financially, the logic went, he would have no choice but to leave or negotiate his own surrender. And if he didn’t leave, the Venezuelan security services would force the issue.
The strategy, however, failed in more ways than one. An ill-fated, amateurish coup attempt led by Guaidó was thwarted by the Venezuelan security forces in less than a day. Guaidó, who is no longer recognized as Venezuela’s legitimate president, was from that point on forever tainted by his affiliation with Washington. Maduro used the attempt against him as an excuse to crack down against his opponents even more. All challenges to his rule were painted as challenges to the Venezuelan state, and dissenters were labeled as sympathizers doing America’s bidding.
The sanctions, meanwhile, did nothing to remove Maduro from power or compel a change in his calculus on the viability of a political resolution to the country’s political paralysis. Despite Venezuelan crude exports decreasing exponentially, Maduro found a way to maintain his position with the help of foreign partners like Russia, China and Cuba. The Venezuelan people, however, weren’t as lucky; U.S. officials were in the awkward position of pledging support for Venezuelans in public even as U.S. policy made their lives even more difficult.
President Biden kept Trump’s sanctions in place. The U.S., however, no longer saw Maduro’s removal as a prerequisite to sanctions relief or even as an end-state. Instead, the goal was to reinstitute a system of competitive elections.
The Biden administration was also willing to negotiate with Maduro’s representatives directly, overturning the previous strategy of complete and total isolation. In October 2022, the U.S. and Venezuela agreed on a prisoner exchange. In November 2022, Maduro and the opposition signed a humanitarian accord that would use over $3 billion in overseas assets locked up by U.S. sanctions to fund imports of medicine and food as well as finance public health and electricity programs. Maduro’s decision to re-enter negotiations with his political opponents nearly a year ago earned him some modest U.S. sanctions relief on Chevron’s Venezuela operations. While Venezuela hawks inside Washington criticized engagement as akin to appeasement, the fact is that engagement produced far more concessions from Maduro than isolation ever did.
Of course, nobody should assume the latest political agreement with Maduro will solve Venezuela’s problems. There are simply too many of them. Maduro has proven himself to be a prolific survivor but a horrible statesman. Nearly 8 million Venezuelans have fled the country, and 90 percent of Venezuelan households are living in poverty. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports a significant shortfall in medicines, medical supplies and equipment. There is always a possibility of Maduro backtracking from the commitments, in which case U.S. sanctions will continue to keep the country locked into destitution.
But even with those caveats in mind, the lesson for the U.S. is clear: sanctions have a much better chance of meeting goals if the goals are realistic and attainable in the first place. Because if they aren’t, sanctions become nothing more than a symbolic gesture at best and collective punishment at worst.
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.