For the US, being No. 2 might be good for business

Dwight Eisenhower had it right when he warned of a “defense-industrial complex” but not for what most people thought or understood at the time or since. The president was fearful that putting too many resources into that complex to overemphasize national security would have the opposite effect. The drain, he believed, on the private sector economy would damage the nation.

Today, we are facing a near-permanent adversarial set of relations with our principal opponents, China and Russia. Iran could also fit this description. North Korea, with its unpredictable dictator, is another class entirely.  

Why is this today’s condition? Chinese and Russian policies and actions are perceived as malign and threatening. Russian assaults on Georgia, Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine are unmistakable evidence. Likewise, China poses hostile intent beyond Asia.

Can this cycle be broken in part to heed Ike’s concerns about draining the economy and neglecting the private sector? 

Here is a radical idea. Why must the U.S. always be No. 1?  

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has called itself the leader of the free world and, later, the indispensable power. Why? The Cold War was perceived as a potentially existential struggle between freedom and democracy and monolithic, Godless communism. After much of Eastern Europe was isolated by the Iron Curtain and Soviet control after the war, the U.S. took it upon itself to lead the fight against this wartime ally gone rogue.

China, despite recent hiccups, is on a course to have the largest economy in the world. While Russia is trapped in Ukraine where it has lost a huge amount of its army and military capability, it is forgotten that Russia possesses the world’s largest amount of oil and gas reserves. That means the long-term outlook for Russia may be far more positive than many in the U.S. and the West believe.

So suppose China eclipses the U.S. in gross domestic product (GDP). And Russia exploits its advantage in natural resources. What should the U.S. do?  

The answer is to challenge its past assumptions of the advantages of retaining No. 1 status. That will not be achievable without a profound shift in mindsets, attitudes and most importantly understanding of China and Russia.  

In a fully rational world, what extra benefits accrue from having the world’s largest economy? Not much. From a U.S. perspective, maintaining the central reserve currency is vital. Beyond that, we must realize that being No. 2 makes no real difference as long as we understand that China has many problems and constraints that cannot be overcome even by possessing the world’s largest economy.

As for Russia, no matter what is happening in Ukraine, it probably will not implode as the USSR did. Russia is doing better economically despite sanctions than many thought was possible. And assuming the war in Ukraine will end without escalating, Russia’s giant energy reserves can only drive economic growth.

With these realities, will the United States need to maintain a permanently adversarial relationship with China and Russia, and if so, why? Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has needed external threats in part to constrain the many centrifugal forces dividing the nation. Hence, the engagements in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan would follow.

Consider if the No. 2 status was acceptable. Might that begin by changing this adversarial nature of foreign policy and shifting instead to a pragmatic, interest-based foundation? The U.S. would not abandon its internationalism and neglect its genuine international responsibilities. But it would exploit the unique comparative advantages the U.S. possesses beyond the size of a free market economy.

China and Russia do not have economies that accommodate even a remotely equivalent entrepreneurial capacity. U.S. private sector creativity and innovation surpass any others, including China. Why not put more faith in it and reinforce and strengthen this entrepreneurial advantage?

That doesn’t mean shedding our defenses and assuming good behavior on the part of others. But it does mean, as Eisenhower argued and no one fully grasped, recognizing the real danger of the so-called military-industrial complex. As Ike said, putting too many resources in that base would weaken the civilian economy, placing the nation in great jeopardy. Maintaining a permanent adversarial construct could do that.

Being No. 2 and moving toward an interest-based foreign policy would revert from the traditional enemy and threat-focused constructs. 

But do we have the capacity for such a bold leap? Ike would have said yes.

Harlan Ullman, Ph.D., is a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” military doctrine. His 12th book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD:  How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.