Washington’s best play in the Sahel is cooperating with the juntas 

Following months of negotiation between the U.S. and Niger’s junta, the U.S. recently agreed to withdraw more than 1,000 troops from the West African country. The junta’s ascent to power, starting in July 2023, is just the most recent example of a string of coups that have affected Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea in West Africa’s Sahel region.  

In response to these coups, some argue that the U.S. should take a principled stance in defense of constitutional democracy by refusing security cooperation and exerting maximum pressure on ruling juntas to facilitate their return to civilian governance. However, the complex realities in the Sahel necessitate a more pragmatic approach.  

As it stands, the juntas need support and engagement now for any chance of democratic rule later. By working with these juntas, Washington has the opportunity to help attenuate and improve the security situation — a critical step toward dismantling key barriers currently obstructing a path to democracy. Engagement will require Washington to make difficult concessions, but it’s worth the risk.  

The juntas all face growing terrorist influence in the Sahel. Jihadist groups like Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, the Islamic State Sahel Province, and the Islamic State West Africa Province control large swaths of land and are conducting increasingly deadly attacks. Recent analysis shows that across the Sahel, conflict fatalities from political violence increased by 38 percent and civilian deaths by 18 percent from 2022 to 2023. At a recent summit on terrorism, United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed indicated that the Sahel now accounts for almost half of all deaths from terrorism globally. 

The foundation of any democracy rests on the trust citizens place in their government institutions. However, the juntas’ blueprint for fighting the growing jihadist threat — primarily by increasing state violence — is eroding trust and leading to radicalization. The juntas often target ethnic communities, notably the Fulani, on the unfounded grounds that they support the jihadist groups. The recent influx of Russia’s Wagner Group has only exacerbated this violence, as the Wagner mercenaries and the juntas’ security services have abused civilians numerous times. 

Participation is another pillar of democracy that is pivotal in advancing the rule of law, social inclusion and economic development. The juntas inhibit avenues to participation, such as voting, as a result of the weakened security landscape. During Mali’s recent constitutional referendum, election observers noted voting centers didn’t open in multiple regions outside the capital due to “insecurity” from terrorist threats. In Burkina Faso, the junta stated that improving security is more important than hosting elections. By helping the juntas mitigate regional terrorism, Washington can help remove this excuse for disenfranchising voters.  

The poorly trained soldiers of the Sahel are in no position to improve the security situation to a suitable level that allows democracy to take shape. Washington had previously established security ties with Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Guinea but has suspended all collaboration per Section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act. Section 7008 prohibits significant American assistance to governments established through military coups. But little evidence links American military support to the Sahel’s coups, meaning Washington shouldn’t hesitate to restart regional cooperation.  

Rather than sitting back and hoping for democracy in the Sahel to suddenly appear, Washington must be proactive and reestablish its security relationship with the juntas. To do so, the U.S. needs to be prepared to offer significant concessions that may appear to reward the juntas’ behavior. Unfortunately, this is the only way for Washington to get its foot back in the door.  

Wagner offers the ruling juntas an enticing transactional relationship wherein it doesn’t condition its assistance on things like democratic governance and human rights. The juntas receive much-needed assistance but don’t have to commit to relinquishing power. As such, to get the juntas to break with Moscow and accept American assistance, the U.S. must offer them a deal they can’t refuse.  

The U.S. should break from its policy of requiring strict conditions on the security assistance it provides. The juntas may be wary of any excess linkage of conditions to assistance — such as setting deadlines for a return to constitutional rule — as a possible bid to impose and maintain foreign influence. Moreover, American assistance must be more than just “boots on the ground” support in the fight against terrorism, and offer serious investment in training and education for local security forces. Large lump-sums of cash for defense and weapon transfers are insufficient to improve regional security. 

While it may appear the U.S. would be handing the Sahel’s putschists a get-out-of-jail-free card, it’s far from the case. In order to give democracy a chance in the Sahel, Washington must do all it can to make the conditions right. 

Jonah Brody researches issues related to violent extremism in the Sahel and littoral states region.