Why a ‘military first’ strategy isn’t enough when it comes to China 

On Aug. 2, nearly 30 nations will complete the U.S.-led military exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). Only 13 participating countries are located in the Indo-Pacific region, with the remainder coming from Europe and the Americas. RIMPAC’s overarching goal is to improve combat effectiveness and interoperability between allies and partners in the region. Against whom? China of course.  

However, Washington makes a mistake in continuing to rely on military power as the primary tool for U.S.-China relations. The United States must focus more on non-military means to achieve its China-related interests. 

Washington’s military-first approach toward China has failed. Despite U.S. security guarantees to Japan and the Philippines to defend rocks and reefs in the East and South China Sea, China continues to press its claims. In fact, Beijing has doubled down on its military activity as the United States increased its own. And President Joe Biden’s numerous statements that Washington will defend Taipei if attacked have not stopped Beijing’s military exercises or coercive activity in the Taiwan Strait. 

Beijing, already believing U.S. presence and alliances in Asia are directed at China, would find the continued expansion of U.S. military partnerships — basing rights and troop rotations, security guarantees or other commitments, and new treaty alliances — to be significant escalations. As seen with China’s efforts in response to growing U.S.-Philippine and U.S.-Taiwan ties, Beijing would be expected to enhance its assertive activities to defend its territorial claims and sovereignty. Such an act, like a limited Taiwan blockade or seizing more shoals in the South China Sea, could test U.S. resolve and lead to conflict. 

Attempting to form a containment coalition, formal or informal, will likely enflame regional tensions. Expansion of NATO or a series of new, Japan-driven Indo-Pacific defense pacts (underwritten by the United States) are potential avenues.  

NATO has been desperate to find its next boogeyman to further justify its mission creep and, since 2021, China is its top target for out of area operations. Likewise, Japan has sought to boost defense ties with U.S. treaty allies — the Philippines, South Korea and Australia — penning defense agreements with Canberra and Manilla in 2022 and 2024, respectively, and achieving a diplomatic breakthrough with Seoul in 2024. In response, Beijing, with the Century of Humiliation engrained in the Chinese people’s psyche, uses these activities to justify its military buildup and regional activity. Enhanced or formalized regional agreements targeting China would see the arms race deepen and increase the risk of war, or even see China openly assist Russia with even deeper support in Ukraine. 

Moreover, instead of waiting for a containment coalition to form or for opposing military forces to amass, Beijing would be incentivized to achieve its foreign policy goals in the Indo-Pacific region through coercion first. Seizing South China Sea islets from Vietnam and Malaysia, both without U.S. security guarantees, could be on the table, as well as an invasion of Taiwan. Through the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, Beijing legally declared that if the possibility for a peaceful “reunification” is ruled out, it will use “non-peaceful means” to secure its territorial integrity — which it believes includes Taiwan. 

Instead of focusing on the military-first approach, rigorous, results-oriented diplomacy is needed, which begins with a revision of U.S.-China bilateral relations.  

First, Washington should reorient its diplomatic efforts from attempting to resolve global and regional issues to focus on their respective vital interests. In official readouts of bilateral meetings, these are sparingly discussed when they should form the crux of the conversations. After all, vital interests are the foundations of Washington and Beijing’s foreign policies. Only by defining and understanding one another’s red lines can meaningful cooperation be possible. 

Beyond vital interests, the United States should focus its diplomacy on its direct, China-related interests. This means making a resolution to the fentanyl crisis killing over 100,000 Americans a paramount concern, not prioritizing the issues of U.S. allies and partners. This means addressing Chinese espionage in the United States — state, corporate, cyber and offshore — in every meeting, not emphasizing China’s domestic issues we know will remain. This means enforcing the Phase One Trade Agreement and working toward Phase Two to benefit U.S. workers and companies, not a series of unenforceable trade statements with little tangible benefit to the U.S. economy. 

Finally, Washington must also approach Beijing with respect. The United States does not have to like or accept China’s form of government, policies or interests, but Washington must acknowledge China for what it is: an ancient civilization with a significant history, the second largest economy in the world and a great power. 

To best protect ourselves and our vital interests, the United States should build and maintain the most powerful military in the world. But emphasizing the military aspect alone in the Indo-Pacific will not secure our interests with China. Pursuing interests-based and respectful diplomacy is the most effective way to deliver on U.S.-China relations for the American people. 

Quinn Marschik is a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities.