Ending Africa’s longest and deadliest war

The ongoing conflict in eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, now 30 years old, is a silent tragedy in global affairs.

The war has directly killed many hundreds of thousands and caused as many as several million deaths indirectly, due to the breakdown of healthcare and agriculture in much of the conflict zone. Today, some 7 million are displaced from their homes in the broad region of eastern Congo due to the multidimensional fighting that involves rebels supported by Rwanda and various ethnic or criminality-based militias. Rivalries between Uganda and Rwanda contribute further to the mayhem.

The stakes include mineral resources; control of some of the continent’s richest (and most beautiful) farmland; and the ongoing risk of genocide, an affliction that has hit the region hard over the last few decades.

As an international community, we need to do better by Congo. Diplomatic processes based in Angola and Kenya are not getting the job done. Nor has a longstanding UN peacekeeping force, which is in the process of leaving the country over the next year or so anyway. Neither has an effort at personal diplomacy launched by Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi, when he visited Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Kigali in 2019; nor have subsequent meetings over the past three years.

It is time for a new approach, even if there is no silver bullet that will quickly and definitively end the war.

The path forward involves putting pressure on Rwanda. Ten years ago, President Kagame was persuaded — that is, economically coerced — by donor nations to reduce his material support for a deadly March 23 Movement resistance group. Rwanda was given little choice in the matter if it wanted crucial foreign assistance to continue to flow.

The strategy (partly) worked. The conflict eased, at least for a time.

Donors still have considerable leverage over Rwanda. They should use it, as scholar Jason Stearns has persuasively argued.

Thirty years ago, Rwanda deserved sympathy; its people, especially its Tutsi population, had just suffered a terrible genocide, and many of the perpetrators wound up running away to Congo, where they hid in the lush and deep forests. The new Rwandan government, led by Kagame, having just ended the genocide, had reason to want to pursue the heinous murderers across the border.

But things have changed. Rwanda is now stable and strong; the genocide threat has receded. Alas, that has not stopped Kagame from interfering in Congolese affairs — partly for financial reasons at this point, some believed. Beyond Rwanda’s material support for the M23, a recent UN investigation has found that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwanda troops have been directly deployed in the East, working in concert with M23 fighters.

Rwandan involvement has also contributed to the splintering of regional cooperation between Uganda and the DRC, which historically has been crucial in the fight against the ISIS-backed Allied Democratic Forces. Uganda has shifted its strategic calculus somewhat, and is also providing elements of support to the March 23 Movement. The tacit support has allowed the group to envelop vast swaths of territory, seizing key logistical hubs and threatening major regional cities.

The notion of pressuring Rwanda will be unappealing to some, given the country’s stability, economic success, trade reliability and contributions to counterterrorism campaigns across the continent. Pressuring Rwanda requires a recalibration of the current rather rosy relationship with the West, requiring a careful balancing act. But it is not an insurmountable challenge. Indeed, it is a necessary part of any promising policy approach to the conflict in the Congo.

More is needed in other realms, as well. As underscored by panelists at a recent Brookings forum (which one of the authors of this piece moderated), the Democratic Republic of the Congo needs a stronger, more disciplined and less corrupt military if it is to secure its east. Fortunately, we know some of the tools required to build such militaries. It is never an easy thing when corruption is entrenched and incompetence is rife. But several steps, pursued patiently and doggedly, can make a huge difference.

Donor nations should be willing to provide the necessary military trainers as well as the materiel and financial support.

They should raise salaries for most in the military, and provide bonuses for good performance. With donor aid, and Congo’s growing GDP, this should be possible (indeed, it has already begun). If necessary, make the military and police somewhat smaller in numbers so as to focus resources on quality.

They should also use electronic payment systems for salaries and equipment to reduce the possibility of corruption.

Third, they must retire corrupt and incompetent officers gradually and quietly, allowing them pensions to reduce the chances of resistance or coup attempts. Only arrest and punish the most extreme or violent.

Fourth, deploy Western trainers to Congo — not only in military academies and training facilities, but even in the field. America’s security force assistance teams, developed in Iraq and Afghanistan, can provide one model. There are some risks to trainers so deployed, but the stakes justify taking the risk.

As we saw at the recent Brookings event, President Tshisekedi, just elected to a second term, seems inclined to work with the U.S. on the development of his country, and he knows how important it is to mitigate the conflict in the east.

It is a good time for a big idea in America’s policy towards Africa. Congo, the continent’s second biggest and third-most populous country, is a great place to look for it.

Michael O’Hanlon is the Phil Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy at the Brookings Institution and author of “Military History for the Modern Strategist: America’s Major Wars Since 1861.” John Reece is an intern at Brookings and a graduate of St. Lawrence University.