Former President Donald Trump’s approach to foreign affairs is dominated by an extreme “America First” stance that often manifests itself as isolationism. His intrinsic thin-skinned paranoia makes him view any engagement with other countries or international organizations as a potential attempt to take advantage of America, and this has shaped his policy on Ukraine.
He has also long had a starstruck admiration for Vladimir Putin, describing the Russian as a “genius” and “pretty savvy.”
As a result, Trump declared last year that, if elected, he would bring an end to the war between Russia and Ukraine before he was even inaugurated for his second term as president in January 2025 and stop the “endless flow of American treasure to Ukraine.”
During last week’s debate against Vice President Kamala Harris, moderator David Muir asked Trump if he wanted Ukraine to be victorious in the conflict. “I want the war to stop,” Trump replied. “I want to save lives. I think it’s in the U.S. best interest to get this war finished and just get it done.”
Commentators have read a great deal into Trump’s unwillingness to explain the terms on which he would end the conflict. But a few days ago, his running mate, Sen. JD Vance, appeared on The Shawn Ryan Show podcast and was more forthcoming. Vance’s explanation revealed an astonishing willingness to abandon Ukraine and award a huge geopolitical win to Russia and Putin, fulfilling the worst fears that many had sketched into Trump’s evasions.
“What it probably looks like is the current line of demarcation between Russia and Ukraine, that becomes like a demilitarized zone,” Vance told Ryan.
That simple statement is sweeping and catastrophic for the government in Kyiv. Effectively, Trump’s peace plan would cede Crimea, annexed in 2014, and the 20 percent of Ukrainian territory currently under occupation, to Russia. The message is clear: If you invade a neighboring country and maintain a military advantage, Trump’s America is content to see you steal as much territory as you can grab.
Ukraine would likely be forced into more concessions. To accommodate one of Putin’s principal demands, it would have to agree to abandon its application to join NATO and not to become a member of what Vance called “allied institutions” — presumably the European Union, which recognized Ukraine as a candidate country in June 2022.
This would be nothing short of a Russian veto on Ukrainian foreign policy. A nation that cannot choose its allies is a vassal state.
Compelling Ukraine to make this kind of diplomatic surrender would have implications beyond the current conflict. Closing off NATO membership would tear up the declarations made by the alliance in Washington this year, that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO,” and in Vilnius last July, which reiterated the commitment made in Bucharest in 2008 that Ukraine should become a member of the alliance.
It would also completely undermine NATO’s “open door” policy, derived from Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stipulates that the signatories can “invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this treaty.” The open door would be slammed shut.
Finally, we need to imagine the clear message such a settlement would send to America’s allies around the world that they cannot count on U.S. support. No treaty or agreement, no public declaration of solidarity has any value if Washington just decides not to honor it.
This would change strategic thinking profoundly in Taiwan, rendering worthless the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and its defense guarantees. If Russia can seize one-fifth of Ukraine and face no sanctions, what stops the People’s Republic of China from annexing Taiwan?
It would also call into question America’s 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and South Korea, signed in 1953, giving a Trumpian thumbs-up to Beijing in its expansionist claims in the South China Sea, and to North Korea’s Kim Jong Un as he covetously eyes his southern neighbor. The Japanese government would see its strategic and military situation very differently if the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the U.S. was no longer reliable.
What conclusion would America’s NATO allies in Eastern Europe draw? The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) have suffered under Russian occupation within living memory, and Putin regards their independence as a threat to his country’s security. They know what Moscow’s hegemony means: autocracy, repression, deportations and mass murder. If the U.S. is content to surrender parts of Ukraine to a similar fate, what protects them?
The vision set out by Vance would amount to the biggest unilateral betrayal of an ally since the Munich Agreement in 1938, when Britain and France abandoned Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany. It would broadcast to the world that a commitment by the U.S., written or spoken, had no weight or meaning. It would not be “America First” but “America Only” — and everyone else must look after themselves.
Eliot Wilson is a freelance writer on politics and international affairs and the co-founder of Pivot Point Group. He was senior official in the U.K. House of Commons from 2005 to 2016, including serving as a clerk of the Defence Committee and secretary of the U.K. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.