When Dwight Eisenhower assumed the presidency in 1953, he had one immediate policy objective: to end the Korean War.
In July of 1953 the war came to an end, with an uneasy stalemate. That the war did not liberate North Korea from the grips of communism pained Eisenhower, but it did not cloud his strategic vision of the situation.
Speaking to the nation from the White House, late at night on July 26, he put it this way: “Tonight we greet, with prayers of Thanksgiving, the official news that an armistice was signed almost an hour ago in Korea….And so at long last the carnage of war is to cease and the negotiations of the conference table is to begin.”
Eisenhower was not afraid of conflict, yet he weighed the devastation of war alongside the potential good that could come from victory. He surveyed Korea and correctly concluded that a stalemate was the best plausible outcome.
That conviction is what drove him to end the war quickly. Continued fighting was not going to change the strategic outcome, but it would kill more people, deprive more families of seeing their loved ones again, and prevent alleviating the starvation that had set in on parts of the Korean peninsula. To Eisenhower, knowing when to stop a war was as important — both morally and strategically — as fighting a just war to total victory.
There are two lessons Americans ought to absorb from the Korean War when thinking about today’s conflict in Ukraine. The first is that seeing a situation as it truly is, not as we would like it to be, is the foundation of good decision-making. Secondly, there is honor in bringing a war to a close, once you have accomplished the best plausible outcome.
The goal for the U.S. now should be to help Ukraine achieve a lasting, even if imperfect, peace. It won’t feel like victory, but the alternative will be an ongoing disaster that will ensure ongoing suffering for the indefinite future.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is once again requesting permission to use American weapons to strike deep in Russian territory. The argument is that such permission is all that stands between Ukraine and final victory.
Unfortunately, this is bad strategic calculus. As Lloyd Austin said last week: “There’s no one capability that will in and of itself be decisive in this campaign.”
The conflict has arrived at a stalemate. The precise territory each side controls will continue to shift, but the fundamental nature of the war has settled in, with neither side strong enough to win outright or become weak enough to collapse. This war, like many modern conflicts between two well-equipped and determined foes, could drag on for years, without any meaningful strategic change in the balance of power.
What would this mean, in real terms? It would mean skyrocketing civilian deaths, long-term economic decimation, trillions of dollars in military expenses, and a strategic opportunity cost for both Ukraine and the United States.
Ukraine has the opportunity to translate a hard-earned stalemate into a newly robust national identity. Peace for Ukraine can allow the country to focus its attention on rebuilding its economy and on expanding on its already strong civic culture. An imperfect peace in Ukraine would also allow the United States to turn its attention toward the Pacific, which is the most important area for American interests going forward for the next several decades.
The U.S. cannot end the war on its own. It is ultimately a Ukrainian and Russian responsibility to decide what agreement will end the war. The U.S. can, though, use its considerable leverage to persuade both Ukraine and NATO allies that now is the time to push for peace.
The U.S. could provide short-term economic aid to Ukraine but stop formal military aid by the end of the year. Both Russia and Ukraine could withdraw to January 2022 boundaries. The United States would not support Ukraine joining NATO, but would not give up the ability to assist Ukraine again in the case of a future conflict.
This plan would provide Ukraine a stronger level of strategic security than it has had in a decade.
Russia has spent nearly three years, tens of thousands of lives and billions of dollars on the war, and suffered an incursion into its own territory. Vladimir Putin will spin a peace agreement as a victory, but it will be a clear strategic defeat. The U.S. would be able to refocus military and diplomatic resources in more pressing areas, while extinguishing the risk that American troops will be deployed to fight in Ukraine.
A return to Korea shows us an example of the kind of peace that is possible in Ukraine. Like in Korea, making peace with Russia would require Ukraine to give up some of its territory.
By late 1952, an imperfect divide was the best plausible outcome in Korea, and it is now the best plausible outcome in Ukraine. Ultimately, Ukraine must make this decision for itself, but the way for America to be a true ally to Ukraine is to use our influence to push for the best deal Ukraine is likely to get.
John Kitch is assistant professor of instruction in the political science department at Texas State University.