Is Israel’s pager attack prelude to a full invasion of Lebanon?

In its operations targeting Hezbollah’s communication infrastructure, Israel has disrupted the militant group’s ability to effectively coordinate attacks, sending a powerful message to the fighters entrenched along its northern border. However, this recent campaign raises crucial questions about Israel’s broader strategic goals.

Is this focused assault — through strikes on Hezbollah’s pagers, walkie-talkies and other means of communication — a prelude to a larger ground offensive, or is it simply an attempt to reestablish deterrence without escalating to full-scale war in Lebanon?

Hezbollah relies on relatively rudimentary but critical communication technologies to coordinate military activities across its network of fighters and command centers. By targeting these communication channels, Israel effectively crippled Hezbollah’s command-and-control structure, making it increasingly difficult for the group to execute coordinated attacks and weakening its operational effectiveness.

From one perspective, these strikes may be interpreted as an early stage of a larger, more expansive Israeli military campaign. In modern warfare, disrupting the enemy’s ability to communicate is often the first step in preparing for a ground offensive.

By rendering Hezbollah’s leadership less capable of issuing real-time orders and coordinating responses, Israel could be preparing for a potential invasion of southern Lebanon. A ground operation would be much less risky with Hezbollah’s command-and-control systems in disarray. Without effective communication between field units and high-level commanders, Hezbollah’s ability to resist a concentrated military push would be significantly compromised.

Alternatively, the strikes could be seen as a means of reinforcing deterrence rather than a precursor to all-out war. Israel has increased its pressure on Hezbollah over the past year without fully committing to a ground war, demonstrating its ability to severely damage the group’s infrastructure while avoiding the costs of prolonged ground operations.

From this viewpoint, Israel’s actions signal that it is willing and able to escalate if provoked, but would prefer not to if Hezbollah stands down. By hitting these communication targets, Israel might be issuing a strong deterrent warning: Hezbollah’s continued provocations will come at an increasingly unsustainable cost.

The theory that Israel’s campaign is paving the way for a ground offensive is bolstered by its history of carefully orchestrated military strategies. Disabling Hezbollah’s communications serves a clear tactical purpose if a large-scale invasion is on the horizon.

Recent Israeli military activities lend further weight to this interpretation. Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force leadership, as well as increasing military preparations in the northern region, signal a strategic shift. Senior Israeli officials have openly discussed the need to deal with Hezbollah, and the mobilization of Israeli paratroopers and commandos to the northern front suggests that ground forces are being readied for potential escalation.

Moreover, Hezbollah’s stockpile of precision-guided missiles poses a significant threat to Israel’s civilian and military infrastructure. Disabling the group’s communications could be a necessary step before launching a preemptive ground campaign aimed at neutralizing these missile sites. Without the ability to effectively communicate and coordinate responses, Hezbollah would find it exceedingly difficult to deploy these weapons in any coordinated counterattack.

On the other hand, Israel’s strikes may simply reflect a strategy aimed at restoring deterrence without further escalation. By severely compromising Hezbollah’s communication systems, Israel could be sending a message that it has the capability to dismantle the group’s operational infrastructure while still avoiding the massive risks that come with a ground war in Lebanon.

Israel has been engaged in a delicate balancing act, carefully managing its military actions to avoid provoking Hezbollah into a larger conflict. In targeting Hezbollah’s communication networks, Israel may be reasserting its dominance in the region without crossing the threshold into a politically and militarily costly all-out ground offensive. This approach allows Israel to inflict damage on Hezbollah, disrupt its ability to mount further attacks and demonstrate the costs of continued aggression.

This strategy of calibrated deterrence has been a cornerstone of Israel’s approach to Hezbollah for years. While Israel frequently targets weapons transfers and key Hezbollah operatives, it has largely refrained from engaging in the kind of massive ground operations that could trigger a broader regional war. By focusing on Hezbollah’s communications infrastructure, Israel could be sending a clear message that it will escalate if necessary, but prefers not to if Hezbollah backs down.

This restrained approach is also aligned with Israel’s desire to keep the conflict contained. Despite the significant damage inflicted, Israel has been careful not to provoke a full-scale response from Hezbollah, which still possesses the capability to launch precision-guided missiles deep into Israeli territory. By focusing on Hezbollah’s communication infrastructure rather than its missile sites or other critical assets, Israel may be signaling that its goal is deterrence, not total destruction.

What makes Israel’s current campaign particularly noteworthy is the strategic ambiguity that surrounds it. By focusing on communication systems, Israel is keeping both options open.

The crippling of Hezbollah’s command and control could certainly facilitate a future ground invasion. But these strikes also serve as a potent demonstration of Israel’s military superiority and its capacity to escalate the conflict at will, thereby reinforcing deterrence without immediate further escalation.

This ambiguity allows Israel to maintain maximum flexibility in its response to Hezbollah’s actions. If Hezbollah continues its cross-border attacks, Israel can argue that it has already demonstrated restraint and may decide to escalate to a ground offensive. If Hezbollah reduces its aggression, Israel can claim victory in reestablishing deterrence without having to endure the costs and risks of a full-scale war.

Whether this campaign is a prelude to a ground offensive or simply a means of reinforcing deterrence ultimately depends on the actions of Hezbollah and the evolving dynamics along the Israeli-Lebanese border. For now, Israel’s strategy appears to be one of deliberate ambiguity, keeping its adversary off balance while maximizing its own strategic options.

Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minn., a senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, and a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities in Washington, D.C.