Meetings with China, without deterrence, will not stop its aggression against Taiwan  

Jake Sullivan’s visit to Beijing last month was the first by a U.S. national security adviser in eight years. The purpose of the trip was to address rising tensions between the United States and China over Beijing’s increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea and toward Taiwan, as well as China’s ongoing support for Russia’s war on Ukraine.  

Sullivan said his discussion with Gen. Zhang Youxia of the Central Military Commission was a “very important meeting,” and the White House affirmed that it was “to prevent competition from veering into conflict.” 

Zhou Bo, a retired senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army, said, “Any talks at any level between China and the US are always welcome….The key is to avoid a conflict and the way forward is to keep open lines of communication wherever possible.”

But over the past three and a half years, there have been multiple U.S.-China talks with military and civilian officials at various levels, up to and including President Biden and General Secretary Xi Jinping. Not long after each meeting, China has taken some action — military, economic or diplomatic — that has precipitated a U.S. response and begun a new cycle of deteriorating relations that require renewed meetings or phone calls to lower tensions. 

China and its sympathizers argue that dramatic Chinese actions, such as the firing of missiles over Taiwan and the obvious rehearsal for a blockade of the island, followed provocative Taiwanese and/or American actions, such as U.S. House Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022.  

But China considers any normal commercial, diplomatic or security interaction between Taiwan and the U.S. (or other countries) as encouraging Taiwan’s separation and independence from China. As Zhang told Sullivan, “The core of the U.S.-China conflict is the Taiwan issue. The U.S. must refrain from interfering in Taiwan for a constructive relationship between our countries. We demand that the U.S. halt its arms sales to Taiwan and stop spreading false narratives about the issue.”  

Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 to counter the devastating effect of President Jimmy Carter’s sudden switch of U.S. diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing. It states that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, [is] a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” 

The act mandates two roles for the U.S. in Taiwan’s security: first, to provide weapons “of a defensive nature” to Taiwan, and second, “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion … [against] … the people on Taiwan.”  

The act also contains a potential bombshell for U.S.-China relations: “to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” That means that if China “resorts to force or other forms of coercion” against Taiwan, the U.S. is justified in breaking diplomatic relations with Beijing — a much more drastic outcome than economic decoupling. 

Zhang also emphasized, “Opposing Taiwan’s independence and promoting reunification is the mission and responsibility of the Chinese military. We will firmly counter any provocations from forces supporting Taiwan’s independence.” 

The United States constantly seeks to assuage Beijing by declaring “We do not support Taiwan independence.”  

But the China-U.S. problem over Taiwan is much deeper and more intractable than discouraging Taiwan from declaring formal independence, which is what the U.S. disclaimer is generally taken to mean. Beijing just as vehemently opposes Taiwan’s de facto independence, which is what Taiwan presently enjoys. The normal, daily political intercourse between Taiwan and the U.S. and other countries demonstrates Taiwan’s ongoing practical independence, and that is a bone in Beijing’s throat. 

China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law reflects its absolutist approach to the Taiwan question. It arrogates to itself the prerogative to use force against Taiwan if it simply takes too long to submit to unification. Henry Kissinger endorsed China’s ultimatum when he warned Taiwan in 2007 that “China will not wait forever.” (He delivered that advice from the Asia Society in New York, having never found time in his century on earth to visit Taiwan.) Shortly after taking power in 2014, Xi Jinping reinforced the message of the law, and Kissinger’s warning, by declaring that the Taiwan question “cannot be passed from one generation to the next.” 

Did the Sullivan-Zhang meeting help lower Washington-Beijing tensions in the region or ameliorate Beijing’s behavior? China not only continued but escalated its naval and air incursions around and through Taiwan’s waters and Air Defense Identification Zone. It deployed a Chinese aircraft carrier, accompanied by two destroyers, through waters northeast of Taiwan, and for the first time entered Japan’s contiguous zone. Yet, since 2007, the United States has not dared to send one of its own carrier battle groups through the international waters of the Taiwan Strait. 

Nor has China stopped funding and arming Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Outgoing NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said last week, “China has become a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine. China is the one that enables production of many of the weapons that Russia uses….I call on China to stop supporting Russia’s illegal war.” 

Hopefully, Sullivan gave an equally strong message in Beijing. 

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He is a nonresident fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies and a member of the advisory board of the Global Taiwan Institute.