International politics is the art of the possible. In that light, Israel’s problem is that it cannot reach the war aims it has set out. It can only win if it narrows its aims, matching ends with means.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has plainly spelled out what Israel wants to achieve. It wants to recover hostages held by Hamas; secure its borders with Gaza and destroy the Hamas organization. A fourth aim has been added: It wants to create a situation where Israelis forced by Hezbollah bombing to evacuate their homes in northern Israel can return home.
Israel is not achieving its war aims against Hamas. So far, it has only obtained a handful of the hostages. Some have been killed. The fate of many is still unknown.
Second, Hamas has not been destroyed. The destruction of a terrorist organization is difficult to measure. Some point to leadership decapitation, but the attrition of terrorist leaders seldom brings about these organizations’ collapse. Factors such as popular support, ideology and organizational structure play bigger roles in deciding these groups’ fates.
When Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran, widely assumed by Israel, for example, Yahya Sinwar, the alleged mastermind behind Oct. 7, succeeded Haniyeh. It is not clear what price Hamas paid with Haniyeh’s death.
Another measure used to determine if a terrorist group has been destroyed is if its territorial sphere has been reduced or removed. Israel has failed to deprive Hamas of the territory it governed. Hamas has been battered in Gaza, but it is still a political force to be reckoned with. Unaffiliated Palestinian clans have refused to join in a postwar reconstruction effort for fear of retaliation by Hamas.
Third, Israel has not been able to secure its own borders. Although Israel has regained control over some border crossings, the underground infrastructure that allowed Hamas to engage in smuggling weapons and carrying out attacks is still in place.
Some argue that peace is not possible if Hamas stays in power. However, overthrowing Hamas will not make Israel safer.
Israel has potent incentives to overthrow Hamas, starting with the group’s inability to make credible commitments to peace. It may also seem cheaper for Israel to overthrow Hamas than to deter it in the future. These factors overlook the dismal failures of foreign-imposed regime changes.
Any post-Hamas governing entity will face a legitimacy problem. A state has a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within a particular territorial domain. New regimes must satisfy both domestic and international audiences. A post-Hamas regime’s proximity to a foreign patron (in this case, Israel), would make it look like a Trojan Horse to its domestic audience, robbing it of the legitimacy needed to govern.
Second, foreign-imposed regime changes seldom bring about the changes they were intended to make. Regime change “often fails to improve relations between interveners and targets.”
As with the Taliban in Afghanistan, regime change in Gaza will not eliminate Hamas’s membership. Hamas’s members can go into hiding, opportunistically capitalizing on grievances from Palestinian anger over the new government’s inefficiency or misbehavior by Israeli settlers. Or they could stir up trouble whenever it suits them or their foreign patrons.
In Lebanon, Netanyahu wants to avoid another decade-plus quagmire (a la Menachem Begin) as much as he wants to steer clear of being seen as capitulating or backing down to Hezbollah, like Ehud Barak or Ehud Olmert.
Israel’s military aims toward Hezbollah are narrower than its aims toward Hamas but they may prove to be just as costly. Israel is diverting resources from Gaza to fight Hezbollah. The 98th Division, which had been fighting in Khan Younis, has been redirected to the Lebanese border.
Netanyahu’s government believes it can reach a deal with Hezbollah by increasing the costs of conflict through air strikes and taking out senior commanders.
While the Biden administration is “extremely concerned” about an all-out war, it also believes military pressure could force Hezbollah to back down. Lebanon has now seen its worst day of conflict since the 2006 war, with an estimated 492 killed.
Some believe Israeli decision-makers chose to strike pagers and walkie-talkies for fear Hezbollah would discover the hidden explosives. These attacks occurred near-simultaneously with an air assault on Hezbollah targets. These strikes killed Ibrahim Aqil and 15 other leaders of the Radwan Force.
On Sunday, Hezbollah fired 100 rockets, 85 of which targeted Haifa. Netanyahu pledged that Hezbollah would “get the message,” saying, “Over the past few days we hit Hezbollah with a string of strikes that it didn’t imagine.”
Netanyahu promised to “do whatever it takes” to win, while deputy Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem ominously stated that the conflict had entered “a new phase.”
Three variables stand in the way of a deal.
First, Hezbollah continues to insist on an end to the fighting in Gaza. While the Biden administration continues to push for a cease-fire-for-hostages deal, a senior administration official conceded, “No deal is imminent. I’m not sure it ever gets done.”
Second, Hezbollah would suffer reputational consequences if it gave in to Israel’s demands. Some argue that strong states face difficulties compelling weaker opponents to change their behaviors. A relatively weaker actor could thus easily cultivate a reputation for debility, inviting further aggression in the future.
Third, Netanyahu could face a similar political fate as Olmert if he does not follow through on his threats against Hezbollah.
During the 34 Days War, Olmert issued a series of explicit, public threats demanding the Shiite militia return Israeli soldiers captured in an ambush and disarm, or face severe military punishment until it capitulated.
Olmert ultimately backed down on his threat. His approval numbers collapsed as a result. Failure to carry out public threats damaged the nation’s reputation for resolve and revealed a leader’s inability to manage foreign and military policy.
Israel is not winning the war against Hamas, and it could be headed toward another disaster in Lebanon unless it adjusts its aims.
Albert B. Wolf is a postdoctoral global fellow at Habib University in Karachi.