What will it take for Ukraine to ‘win’? 

As the U.S. considers its next steps in the Russia-Ukraine war, it is worth remembering that wars rarely end with moral clarity, with the aggressor state justly punished for its crimes. This is the reality that the U.S., its allies and Ukraine are likely to face in any effort to resolve the ongoing conflict.  

For some time now it has been obvious that Kyiv is not going to hold a victory parade in Moscow, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is not going to be hauled off to the Hague to face a war crimes tribunal. Indeed, as most Western governments now acknowledge privately if not publicly, Ukraine is not likely to drive Russian forces from all the Ukrainian land they have seized since 2014. Even Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has conceded that the territorial issue will not be decided on the battlefield but at the negotiating table, even if he has not abandoned the goal of regaining all the lost land.

The hard truth is that, whenever the fighting stops, Russia will undoubtedly occupy some Ukrainian territory, and likely a sizable amount. 

Putin will spin such an outcome as a victory for Russia, despite the huge cost in lives and equipment, and many in the West and Ukraine will agree. Putin will have proven that aggression pays, even if he falls short of the goals he set when he launched the war: Ukraine’s demilitarization and “denazification” (that is, installment of a pro-Russian regime in Kyiv).

But few, if any, Ukrainian or Western leaders will argue that failing to achieve those last goals spells the strategic defeat they hoped to inflict on Russia. Quite the contrary: Russia will remain a major, and fearsome, power on the global stage and a looming challenge to Europe.  

Russia’s “winning,” however, does not mean that Ukraine and its Western allies must lose.  

That depends on how a territorially reduced Ukraine develops in the years ahead. Does it revert to the poor, corrupt, oligarchic country of little interest to the West that it was before the war began? Or does it emerge as a strong, prosperous, democratic, independent country firmly anchored in the Euro-Atlantic community? The former outcome would be an unmitigated defeat. The latter would mark a major victory for Ukraine and the West, one that would honor the enormous sacrifice Ukraine has made in the war.  

While the destruction Russia has wreaked will certainly complicate the task, the fact is that achieving the better outcome lies primarily in Ukraine’s and the West’s hands. Three tasks have to be accomplished.   

First, Ukraine must have sufficient military resources to defend the line of contact and prevent any further Russian advance westward, should Moscow decide to renew military operations against Ukraine in the years ahead. Ukraine must also develop an aerial defense system capable of providing security for its critical infrastructure and major cities. That is essential to creating the conditions in which Kyiv and its partners can begin the socio-economic reconstruction of Ukraine in earnest, first with public money but eventually with private investment.  

The results could be dramatic: At the end of the conflict, Ukraine will still have a well-educated population, significant industrial potential, and vast fertile agricultural lands. Ukraine could thoroughly modernize its infrastructure as it rebuilds.   

Second, the European Union and Ukraine need to press ahead on accession talks. The path is likely to be long and arduous, but it is critical to Ukraine’s future. The process will encourage the socio-economic reforms that Ukraine needs to prosper in the future, bolstering the underpinnings of a free-market economy. It will encourage further investment.  

It will also spur the renewal of genuine politics after years of martial law and promote the consolidation of a genuinely democratic polity. In particular, it will guard against the resurrection of a corrupt oligarchy, which impoverished Ukraine from the time it gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. 

Third, the West needs to provide Ukraine with credible security guarantees. NATO membership, which Kyiv ardently seeks, is off the table, no matter what pronouncements to the contrary NATO officials and Western leaders might make. Building consensus among the now 32 allies needed to admit Ukraine is difficult to imagine, as is producing the necessary two-thirds majority in the U.S. Senate.  

The security guarantees will have to be grounded in the bilateral security agreements, which nearly two dozen countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany, have signed with Ukraine. These represent commitments to provide military, financial and humanitarian support to Ukraine for the next decade. They provide for assistance in modernizing and expanding Ukraine’s defense-industrial complex, and they promise close security cooperation. To have the desired effect, these agreements will have to be fully resourced in the years ahead, which they are not at the moment. 

Whether Ukraine and the West can accomplish these tasks is far from certain. It will require political will and resolve for an extended period. But it is the only way to ensure that Russia’s territorial aggrandizement does not spell strategic defeat for Ukraine and the West. 

Thomas Graham, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, was the senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff under George W. Bush. His latest book is titled “Getting Russia Right.”