The West, including Israel, should help Ukraine fight Russia in Syria

Since mid-2024, Ukraine has launched a series of targeted strikes against Russian military assets in Syria. Building on this momentum, Ukraine has the potential to further weaken the Russia-Iran alliance in the region by continuing to disrupt Moscow’s entrenched military presence. 

To maximize these efforts, the West, along with Israel, should increase financial and military support for Ukrainian operations in Syria, enabling it to erode Russia’s influence and military capabilities, further crippling this modern axis of evil.

Russia’s involvement in Syria stretches back to 2015, when it intervened to support President Bashar al-Assad’s regime during the civil war, establishing a permanent military presence with thousands of troops. However, following the escalation of the war in Ukraine, Moscow began redeploying some of these forces to reinforce its front lines, particularly in the latter half of 2023. 

This shift has potentially weakened Russia’s grip on Syria, leaving strategic vulnerabilities that Ukraine with greater support from the West can exploit. Russia already had to give up critical naval support to Syria because of the war in Ukraine, and further attacks could reduce their ability to provide air support against militants.

There are many benefits for the West to assist in expanding Ukrainian operations against Russia in Syria.

First, Western governments are currently trying to counter Iranian geopolitical maneuvering in the region, and the Assad regime is a critical Iranian ally. Degrading Russian support would hurt both. 

Second, Russia is so well entrenched in Syria that it is likely to expend significant resources to keep its strategic position in the Middle East. Such operations make it more likely Russia will divert needed resources from the primary battlefield in Ukraine. This would not only shift resources, but force Russia to manage another front, detracting from its focus on the Ukrainian theater and reducing its ability to coordinate and concentrate military efforts in Ukraine.

Third, the psychological factor cannot be discounted. A strike on Russian assets in Syria would demonstrate Ukraine’s ability to project power beyond its immediate borders, signaling that Russian forces are vulnerable in multiple theaters. This could lower morale within the Russian military and among Russian leadership. 

Finally, the benefits to the West would be Russia’s ability to project power and support its regional allies, potentially damaging its standing in the Middle East and allowing Western powers to reassert their position in the region. 

Ukrainian military operations targeting Russian interests in Syria could also serve as a powerful deterrent against future Russian provocations, such as efforts to further destabilize the Middle East by supplying anti-ship cruise missiles to Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi militias.

Ukraine’s military intelligence has already started engaging Russian assets in Syria. For instance, in June, Ukrainian special forces attacked Russian positions in Syria’s Golan Heights, as Ukraine attempted to undermine Moscow’s military footprint in the region. It was also reported that Russia used its outposts in the Golan Heights to monitor Israel’s use of Western weapons in Syria to learn how to more effectively counter similar Western arms in Ukraine.

 By September, Ukraine’s Khimik group successfully struck a Russian base on the southeastern outskirts of Aleppo, where Russia was reportedly developing and testing strike drones.

There are a number of possible targets in Syria for Ukraine to neutralize that would harm the Russian war effort and its strategic position in the region. To start, one consequence of Russia’s entrenched presence in Syria has been the creation of recruitment centers for Syrian mercenaries, many of whom have been sent to fight in Ukraine on behalf of the Kremlin. Another major target set would be Russian air bases, the primary mechanism for supporting Assad.

Although there are strategic benefits to Ukraine targeting Russia outside of Europe, this may be politically necessary. The Biden administration secured military aid and security support in late September, but former President Donald Trump could win reelection. Trump’s administration reportedly might end aid to Ukraine. 

Clandestine operations are much cheaper than military hardware and can be done with less funding. That might be Ukraine’s best alternative to a lack of further military aid from the United States.

Ukrainian special forces not only targeted Russia in Syria but also in other regions, including reports of Ukrainian special forces targeting pro-Kremlin Wagner mercenaries in Sudan and other parts of Africa. 

Ukraine is gradually dismantling the perceived invincibility of Russian imperialism in the eyes of the West. Maj. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov said that Ukrainian intelligence is focused on conducting operations “aimed at reducing Russian military potential, anywhere where it’s possible.”

If there is any doubt about HUR’s ability to handle expanding operations, one need only look at the events in Mali. 

In July, Tuareg insurgents launched a devastating ambush in northern Mali, killing 84 fighters from Russia’s Wagner mercenary group and 47 Malian soldiers, delivering a crushing blow to Russia. The BBC reported that not only did Ukraine provide intelligence to the insurgents, but that the “Ukrainian special forces had trained the separatists in the use of attack drones.” 

In the aftermath of the attack, Russian military bloggers began bickering among themselves, reflecting the internal strain. The impact was further felt when Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated, “Unable to defeat Russia on the battlefield, the criminal regime of Volodymyr Zelensky has opened a second front in Africa.”

Targeting Russian assets throughout the Middle East and Africa would be beneficial over the medium term. Still, it remains the most plausible and useful approach would be to expand on Ukraine’s existing campaign against Russian military assets in Syria. 

As Russian forces face mounting pressure across multiple fronts, its death by a thousand cuts will proceed apace.

Treston Wheat, Ph.D. is an intelligence research specialist with a private geopolitical risk consultancy and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank.