The Quad is more hype than reality

President Biden met virtually with the leaders of India, Australia and Japan in mid-March. This semi-official coalition is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad,” a loose partnership that is meant to form “a counterweight to China.” Or at least that is what the media and foreign policy observers are saying.

In a Washington Post op-ed, with the names of each of the four leaders on it, China does not come up. Rather, the piece speaks in generalities on issues such as respecting international law and tackling climate change. The first major joint project by the group is to work together to produce and distribute 1 billion doses of coronavirus vaccine.

When one scratches beneath the surface, there is little indication that any real balancing coalition is forming against China. In fact, the trend is towards more integration between Beijing and its neighbors. From that perspective, the fanfare about the Quad looks more like allies going along with a public relations stunt by the Biden administration than it does an actual alliance that will work together against China.

Just last November, 15 countries in the Asia Pacific, including China, Japan and Australia, joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a free trade agreement. India was originally supposed to be a member but withdrew under the Modi government. Unlike the Quad agreement, which contains little in the way of actual commitments, the RCEP slashes tariffs and creates common rules for intellectual property.

According to Derek Grossman of the RAND Corporation, the recent meeting has shown members of the Quad “have the willingness and resolve that they should work together on China, even if they don’t mention China in their respective statements.” Yet if the group won’t mention China out of fear of angering Beijing when forming an organization meant to counter China, on what basis are we to expect decisive action in the realm of security or economic policy? 

An Asia-Pacific alliance to check a rising China has been a dream of American leaders since at least the Obama administration. Back then, it was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that would solidify the “pivot to Asia.” When President Trump came into office, his administration tore up the TPP, but Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in later years would talk about a civilizational struggle against China and the need for an “alliance of democracies” in response. Even the idea of the Quad itself is not new; the concept dates back to 2007, but the effort fell apart as the other countries of the region showed little interest in the project. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in early 2008 when asked about the Quad, “India is not part of any so-called contain China effort.”

Will this time be different? Perhaps. Recently, India and China had a clash along the border that killed 20 Indian troops and relations have deteriorated over the last year. Nonetheless, the same structural factors that prevented Asia-Pacific countries from joining an anti-China effort a decade and a half ago still apply today. Geography determines that China will always have deeper trade relations with its neighbors than the U.S. does and therefore more influence over them. And aside from the western transplants of Australia and New Zealand, the countries of the region also have little interest in the human rights issues surrounding Hong Kong and Xinjiang that animate many in Washington.

The RCEP is the clearest sign that no balancing coalition is likely. If countries truly feared China, they would not be seeking deeper economic integration. And they would not need Washington to pressure them into a response. While the countries of the Asia-Pacific have their own differences with China, there is little indication of them seeing the issue in the same way American leaders do. To them, China is not an existential threat to the world order; nor is it an aggressive power that threatens their way of life and poses an ideological or military threat to other countries in the way that the Soviet Union did. 

The Quad as a counterweight to China is more hype than reality. The foreign policies of other nations will always be determined by their own perceived interests, as determined by culture, geography and economics, filtered through the process of domestic politics. The sooner American leaders realize that, the sooner they can stop wasting time and energy on projects that are doomed to fail and instead focus on realistic objectives in the region that increase the security and prosperity of the United States.

Richard Hanania is the president of the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology and a research fellow at Defense Priorities. He holds a PhD in political science from UCLA and JD from the University of Chicago. Follow him on Twitter: @RichardHanania.