Integrating Israel into Middle East security involves opportunities and pitfalls

Growing defense cooperation between Israel and the Persian Gulf states is one of a few promising security developments in the troubled Middle East. In his testimony this week, Army Lt. Gen. Michael Kurilla, nominated to lead U.S. Central Command, mentioned cyber and missile defense integration, in particular, as areas he may focus on.     

There is solid support in Congress for bringing Israel deeper into the region’s security architecture. Nearly every member of the Senate Armed Services Committee who asked Kurilla a question about Israel and threats from Iran supported moving in this direction.

The question going forward is not whether, but how. Kurilla noted that the various Gulf states have different capabilities and priorities and that he would visit each country before deciding upon a way ahead. What he did not say is that these countries are divided and distrustful of one another, and that Israel’s military role in the region remains complicated and perilous. There will be many opportunities, but also pitfalls.  

The opportunities

The potential for overt engagement between the Gulf states and Israel promises to bring Tel Aviv’s pursuit of its own security, not to mention its extraordinary reach and capability, into closer alignment with governments in the region that face similar threats from Iran and its proxies. There will be opportunities to gradually deepen defense cooperation and interoperability across a range of sectors.

Decades of political isolation in the region and imminent and existential threats from nearby militaries has led Israel to act unilaterally as a matter of course. Nonetheless, Israeli operations against Iranian weapons proliferation and militia networks, as well as chemical and nuclear weapons sites in Iraq and Syria, have benefitted regional governments, especially the vulnerable Persian Gulf states. 

The Israeli Defense Force is among the most capable and professional militaries in the world, particularly in areas such as air power, precision strike, intelligence and special activities. Other regional militaries tend to significantly underperform, despite substantial material investments and cutting-edge equipment.

Israel also has demonstrated unsurpassed political will to confront Iran. Israeli forces have taken the lead in direct action against Iran’s destabilizing activities, especially its weapons smuggling and militia-building operations in Syria. Israel has carried out hundreds of airstrikes against arms depots and weapons convoys linked to Iran and Hezbollah. These strikes have not led to significant retaliation or escalation by Iran. 

The U.S. military, including naval forces in the Persian Gulf, can cooperate openly with Israeli forces with less risk to relationships with regional partners. U.S. forces may for the first time bring Israel into multilateral exercises and planning efforts, subject to the political sensitivities of individual partners. It will be complicated, and difficult at times, to make this work; nothing in the Middle East is ever easy. 

The lifting of political taboos against cooperation with Israel will open the door to interoperability and even outright integration with advanced Persian Gulf militaries, particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), but also Saudi Arabia, possibly, at some point. Many of Israel’s most advanced capabilities are American made, chief among them the F-35, as is much of the Gulf states’ weapons inventory. The UAE eventually may buy the F-35, despite recent hiccups. Doing so would open many opportunities to improve interoperability with Israel. 

The Gulf States now can consider purchasing Israeli air defense platforms and other systems, which was inconceivable just a few years ago. Cooperation on missile defense could greatly improve Persian Gulf security, given the enormous shortfalls in this sector. Unlike U.S.-made platforms, Israel’s Iron Dome and David’s Sling air defense systems were designed to counter the short-range missiles, rockets, and UAVs that plague the region.

Israeli air defense systems are reportedly more cost effective and therefore can be purchased in greater quantities by wealthy Persian Gulf states facing a growing quantity of missile and UAV threats from multiple trajectories. Gulf States that operate Israeli systems one day may share data with Israeli forces, and vice versa, contributing to a more integrated and resilient air defense architecture.

The pitfalls

Iran may begin holding the Gulf states responsible for aggressive military actions and intelligence operations by Israel, now that there is overt cooperation or even the perception of such in the minds of Iranian leaders. Tehran might retaliate against countries such as the UAE or Bahrain to coerce them into limiting cooperation with Tel Aviv, or simply because the Gulf countries are soft targets compared to Israel.

Either way, governments in the region that choose to recognize Israel or merely cooperate behind the scenes may find themselves assuming risk for Israeli activities from which they long have benefitted for free. 

Bringing Israel into multilateral exercises and other forums could prove controversial with countries that have yet to recognize Israel diplomatically, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Israel’s participation could create divisions or cause certain countries to withhold support or behave with greater caution. Iran likely would react with extreme prejudice to the idea of Israel operating in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, which would complicate multilateral exercises and joint operations.

U.S. interlocutors will have to anticipate these sensitivities — for example, which countries in the region may be reluctant to discuss Israel’s role openly, or at all — and be prepared to quietly advise Israeli officials to either remain on the sidelines or keep their involvement secret. 

Israel is a small country that faces enormous threats to its security. It has limited capacity for cooperative endeavors and little leeway for compromise when it comes to unilateral operations against imminent threats from Iran and other actors. 

Too much cheerleading and too little realism could lead to disappointment and misunderstanding that inhibits further cooperation. Governments in the region, for example, might interpret continued Israeli unilateralism as cavalier disregard for regional security, or even as a cynical ploy to draw the Gulf states into a war with Iran. U.S. policymakers should enable Israel’s gradual integration into regional security arrangements but avoid making too much of these developments.  

The implications 

The benefits of regional cooperation with Israel largely outweigh the risks, many of which seem manageable. Yet, tensions will continue and views on regional security will diverge in various ways, which will constrain cooperation and create new risks. U.S. officials should take it slowly and follow a measured, pragmatic approach to Israel’s involvement in the region that will not fall victim to unrealistic expectations.

Jerry Meyerle is a principal defense analyst at CNA, a nonprofit research institute. He has served as an embedded adviser in the U.S. Central Command, with U.S. Marine and Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, and on the USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group in the Persian Gulf. The views in this article are those of the author alone and do not reflect those of CNA or the Department of Defense.