Paul Revere meets Putin’s paradox

The stark and continuing warnings emanating from the White House about the certainty of a Russian attack on Ukraine are eerily reminiscent of those sounded before. Could this be 1775 and Paul Revere crying “the Redcoats are coming”? Revere was correct. Or is this 2003 with mushroom-shaped clouds threatening to explode over Washington that did not?

Whether the Biden administration’s alarms will prevent a Russian military onslaught into Ukraine or prove prescient in predicting one will, at some stage, be revealed. And this Paul Revere-like White House strategy could prove to be a win-win — unless it is trumped by Putin’s paradox.   

If Russian President Vladimir Putin does not strike Ukraine with his powerful military massing on the borders, the administration will understandably claim Russia was deterred. But if Putin does unleash his forces, the administration will claim it did all it could in advance and now will act with NATO to isolate and punish Russia within the alliance’s power.

The flaw, perhaps fatal, is that this strategy does not recognize or appreciate Putin’s paradox. That paradox is likely to convince Putin that the most effective way to achieve his goals is by not invading or using his military to attack Ukraine. Why?

Putin has conflated three vital Russian national security interests into four demands that cannot succeed because of the inherent contradictions and conflicts he has created in each. The leading demand in Europe is for a security framework that returns to pre-1997 status in which NATO would be required to remove substantial forces from its eastern nations. His next demand is for a legally binding, enforceable agreement that NATO will cease its “open door” policy and all further expansion.

Regarding Ukraine, Putin demands that it never enter NATO or have nuclear weapons stationed in it. And last, Putin wants to exert sufficient influence on Ukraine to prevent it from becoming an unfriendly neighbor, drawing it closer to Moscow. These demands are riddled with enough contradictions to delight any confirmed Marxist or Leninist.

First, a pre-1997 framework would require Russia to remove its forces from several locations, including Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave on the Baltic separated from Russia by Poland and Lithuania. 

Regarding a legally enforced agreement preventing NATO expansion, Putin, trained as a lawyer, knows that is nonsense. The litany of abrogated treaties – including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM), Open Skies and Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreements – are sufficient evidence of the failure of  binding arrangements.

Putin also knows that the chances that Ukraine will join NATO for a very long time are less than his of landing an astronaut on the sun. Putin understands that if he sends Russian armies into battle, he will not only fail to achieve his main aims. He will provoke the exact opposite of what he is trying to prevent. And finally, Putin knows that under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, as long as Ukraine remains a non-nuclear state, its integrity and independence are guaranteed. 

NATO may not be as unified as it now appears. But an attack will harden its resolve and will. Sanctions and other punishing actions will hurt Russia. Cancellation of Nord Stream 2, despite the lobbying of former German Chancellor and Rosneft board member Gerhard Schroeder, will dent its economy. NATO will up its defense spending, move to develop new weapons, including lower yield nuclear warheads, and station more air, land and sea forces closer to Russia.

None of this is in Russia’s or Putin’s interest. The costs of a war in Ukraine in blood and treasure would be most unwelcome in Russia given its struggling economy and the memory of the Afghan experience in which many Russian boys came home in body bags. And by not invading, he would achieve his main objectives through negotiations as NATO members react to what will have been a gross exaggeration of threat and listen more closely to Putin’s proposals.

What actions should the Biden administration take? First,  every shred of intelligence and data it has must be harshly scrutinized and challenged to assure another Iraqi WMD intelligence fiasco does not occur. Second, it should ensure complete plans for every contingency are in place, ranging from various attack scenarios; a prolonged standoff; and Putin following through on his word and not launching an offensive.

Third, it should turn the rhetoric off. It has loudly transmitted its message. It is time to let diplomacy work. Paul Revere has met Putin’s paradox. Now it is up to Putin to tell us whether or not the Russians are coming.

Harlan Ullman, Ph.D, is senior adviser at Washington, D.C.’s Atlantic Council and the primary author of “shock and awe.” His latest book is, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and that World at Large.”