News media networks are busy telling us everything that’s going on in Ukraine — reacting, providing insight, but telling us what we just saw. As a former commander once said in frustration, “I don’t need a history lesson; I need to know what the enemy is going to do next.” Decision-makers need analysis and insight on potential future events, and how they can affect or shape the outcomes. They need predictive analysis.
Intelligence officers provide the commander enemy courses of action to consider when formulating a plan, alerting the decision-maker to possible outcomes and advising them on indicators that confirm or deny an enemy’s course of action. Generally, two courses of action are developed: the most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) and the most likely course of action (MLCOA). When time is available, a “Red Team” perspective — an alternative course of action (ACOC) — must be considered. In this case, how would Russian President Vladimir Putin achieve his objectives with limited resources? What does a cornered Putin believe he can get away with?
Most experts agree the most dangerous outcome for a post-conflict Ukraine is further Russian aggression against its non-NATO neighbors. Moldova, Georgia, Sweden and Finland top this list, and now Putin has warned Bosnia and Herzegovina not to join NATO. This most dangerous scenario could become more likely if the United States and NATO continue sending the message to Putin that they will defend every inch of NATO territory but will not fight in Ukraine. When President Biden utters phrases such as “Let me be clear: Our forces are not engaged and will not engage in conflict with Russian forces in Ukraine,” he green-lights aggression against non-NATO countries. All Putin hears is that anything non-NATO is in play.
The most likely outcome for a post-conflict Ukraine has Russia consolidating its gains in Ukraine, establishing a puppet government, fighting a prolonged U.S.- and NATO-supported insurgency, while reconstituting its dilapidated military. It can quickly transition into the most dangerous outcome if the U.S. and NATO end support to the insurgency fighting to replace any puppet government Putin installs.
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But what about a course of action that does neither? That would be an ACOA in which Putin simply abandons Ukraine after destroying it. No puppet government installed, no nation building, no counter-insurgency fight, only the loss of Russian national prestige, a battle weakened Russian military, tremendous loss of life on both sides, and the crippling economic impact of Western sanctions on Putin’s Russia. In this course of action, Putin turns his attention back to Russia, to address internal security concerns that could lead to his removal from office. Putin understands his weakness at home, to the point that he has resorted to extra-constitutional paths, not seen since the Stalin era, to make those who stand in the way disappear.
The Russian Parliament passed a law on March 4 making public actions aimed at “discrediting” Russia’s army illegal and banning the spread of fake news, or the “public dissemination of deliberately false information about the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” and now Putin has stated that his country will undergo a natural and necessary “self-purification” of “traitors.”
In our Red Team analysis, Putin declares “victory” after leveling the Ukraine capital of Kyiv and announces the “special military operation” has succeeded in defending the Russian-speaking people of Donbas and prevented their genocide. He also states the Russian military has defeated “the Nazis” and can bring home Russia’s patriots and liberators.
He likely would maintain possession of the Donbas region, the Crimean peninsula and the remaining land mass extending west to Moldova (Zaporizhzhya, Kherson, Mykolayiv and Odessa) to essentially landlock, and further punish, Ukraine.
This course of action plays out more and more as each day passes. What if Putin’s goal was to simply declare victory and leave behind a destroyed country that would serve as an example of what happens when a neighbor does not submit to his demands?
Putin is capable of implementing a scorched-earth policy. He did it with the battles of Grozny and Aleppo; now, the destruction of Kherson, Kharkiv and Maripoul are examples of what he will do without hesitation in Ukraine.
By the time Kyiv is “captured,” if that happens, most of Ukraine will lay in waste — its infrastructure destroyed, its power grid decimated, and most of the nationalist Ukrainian population relocated to neighboring countries. The cost to rebuild would be beyond anything Russia would be willing or capable of financing.
And the wildcard would be Putin’s exit strategy. He could create unprecedented environmental damage by releasing nuclear waste or persistent chemical agents into population centers, water sources or agricultural areas, rendering much of the country uninhabitable — and blaming it all on Ukrainian resistance fighters in a false-flag operation.
Putin could just leave Ukraine and put its future to the willingness of its allies (in name only) to come in and rebuild the country. He is capable, and willing, to lay waste to cities and countries when he sees weakness from the U.S. and NATO — when he perceives a permissive environment.
Putin’s end state will be to claim victory, attempt to return to “normal,” and prepare for the next invasion, believing he has at least until January 2025 — the next U.S. presidential inauguration — to complete his goals of forcefully reunifying breakaway former Soviet republics.
Message sent. Russia’s nuclear weapons constrain the West; nuclear weapons give you carte blanche to do what you want. Iran, China and North Korea are paying attention.
Jonathan Sweet, a retired Army colonel, served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. His background includes tours of duty with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and the Intelligence and Security Command. He led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012-14, working with NATO partners in the Black Sea and Baltics.
Michael Pregent served as an Army intelligence officer with multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. After leaving the military, he was a subject matter expert for the Defense Intelligence Agency. He is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, where he focuses on threats and national security strategy.