A tale of two ‘Stans’

One month into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it seems clear that Vladimir Putin has overplayed his hand. By underestimating the level of Ukrainian resistance and extent to which the West would coordinate a response, Russia has become a pariah state.

Amid unprecedented sanctions and international condemnation, this is not the time for a nearby leader to hitch his wagon to Moscow. However, it appears that is just what Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is doing since he and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko are beholden to Putin for their positions. In a March 11 meeting between Putin and Lukashenko, this was made clear when the Belarusian strongman said: “The Kazakhs were helped and everyone […] well, we need to somehow gather in the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization], we need to gather in the Eurasian Economic Union, unite together.”

Indeed, especially since the “Bloody January” protests, Kazakhstan under Tokayev increasingly is looking to Moscow for support and deviating from its international path and self-branded multi-vector diplomacy. Henry Kissinger’s 1994 prediction that “the dominant geopolitical thrust [in Eurasia will be] Russia’s attempt to restore its preeminence in all territories formerly controlled by Moscow” seems to be becoming a reality, at least toward Kazakhstan.

This wouldn’t be the first time that the West needs to bring a Central Asian country in from the cold. In May 2005, mass protests broke out in Andijan, Uzbekistan. Fueled by resentment of the government and dire economic conditions, thousands gathered in Babur Square to demand the resignation of then-President Islam Karimov, who led Uzbekistan at the time when it was one of the world’s most repressive regimes.

One evening, the Uzbek government launched a major offensive on the square without warning, killing hundreds. While the official death toll remains contested, international news sources estimate up to 800. Other insiders claim it could be double that.

Karimov blamed the violence on Islamic terrorist groups and foreign Western powers attempting to instigate a color revolution. The Chinese and Russian governments supported Karimov and his account of events.

If this sounds familiar, that is because history repeated itself in Kazakhstan this year. After the Kazakhstani government deregulated the price of liquefied petroleum, mass protests swept the country, fueled by a similar resentment of the government and economic inequality that had animated the Uzbek protests 17 years earlier.

Tokayev responded by issuing a shoot-to-kill order on protestors, without warning, resulting in over 200 deaths officially. The Kazakhstani authorities arbitrarily arrested over 9,000 people and began a purge of senior figures, either as scapegoats or because they were dissenting voices, most notably former Prime Minister Karim Massimov.

Tokayev blamed the violence on Islamic terrorists and western powers attempting a coup on his regime — a page taken straight from Karimov’s playbook. There are important lessons to be drawn from how the U.S. and the West handled Karimov’s regime, if we are now to engage successfully with Tokayev.

Following the events of Andijan, the U.S. government called for a United Nations investigation, even though doing so risked the loss of the Karshakanabad “K2” airbase, a strategically important staging post for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In response, Karimov notified Washington that all U.S. troops would have to depart from the leased airbase — a decision that alienated Uzbekistan and deprived it of millions of dollars in revenue.

Isolated from the world’s largest economy and biggest provider of development aid, Uzbekistan’s economy suffered significantly, leading to brutal repression of civil society. Paradoxically, this created the conditions for Karimov’s successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, to initiate reforms on the home front and improve Uzbekistan’s relations internationally, leading Uzbekistan to be named The Economist’s “Country of the Year” in 2019.

Uzbekistan’s reformist drive is a means to reestablish Tashkent’s standing with Washington and the West after more than a decade of isolation. It pushed Mirziyoyev to release political prisoners, cease forced labor for cotton harvests, and tackle corruption.

If the lessons of the past teach us anything, it is that just as we pivoted from Tashkent to Astana following the Andijan massacre, after Bloody January so, too, should we look to Uzbekistan as a key partner in Central Asia until these issues in Kazakhstan are resolved.

While there are some positive signs — Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian country to deny Russia any direct military or other assistance in Ukraine — Tokayev’s close relationship to Putin is a reason for maintaining our distance. By my count, prior to the January crackdown in Kazakhstan and the February invasion of Ukraine, from December 2021 to February 2022, Tokayev held at least 11 executive-level meetings and phone calls with Russian authorities, and Tokayev repeatedly thanked Putin publicly for sending in the CSTO forces, calling him a “comrade.” 

In contrast, Uzbekistan is emerging as the more reliable regional strategic partner, as it also broke ranks with Russia but then went further, urging Russia and Ukraine to resolve the conflict “by diplomatic means.” At a joint news conference with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, Uzbekistan Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov even added that Uzbekistan recognizes Ukraine’s “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” but not the Luhansk and Donetsk republics.

Until Tokayev pulls back from Moscow and allows a transparent investigation into Bloody January — guaranteeing victims their rights in accordance with international law — and releases those arbitrarily detained, we must press for accountability for what happened and isolate Kazakhstan. This includes reviewing our trade ties and reducing our dependence on Kazakhstani uranium, stopping financial aid, renewing discussions on a trans-Caspian pipeline to reduce Russian control of Turkmen and Kazakh oil and gas, and ending transfers of technology and information.

Ironically, if Kazakhstan does choose to continue down its path towards isolation alongside Russia, it may inadvertently sow the seeds for reform in future generations just as Uzbekistan did.

Let’s hope that the people of Kazakhstan don’t have to suffer years of waiting for change, as was the case with their Uzbek neighbor.

David A. Merkel is an associate fellow for geo-economics and strategy with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs at the State Department, and at the National Security Council as Director for South and Central Asia.