The 2022 National Defense Strategy characterizes the global security environment as a “great power competition,” pitting a rising China and resurgent Russia against the United States and its allies. The U.S. recently deployed significant forces to Europe and the Pacific in response to malign actions by Russia and China, signaling our embrace of the strategic competition construct. One important lesson is already clear: Combatant commanders need more forward-based/forward-deployed forces to support their strategies for global military competition.
The Marine Corps has unwisely elected to cut structure and capability to achieve Force Design 2030 (FD2030) targets at a time when the demand signal from combatant commanders for flexible, balanced forces is increasing. Commanders need more forces to execute tasks across the spectrum of competition and on both sides of the violence threshold. Common missions include forward presence, bilateral training and exercises, security cooperation, capacity building, deterrence, crisis response and contingency operations (high-, mid- and low-intensity).
Marine Corps forces are particularly well suited for capacity building and security cooperation missions. However, the Corps has been reluctant to offer high-demand active component forces and often relies on its Reserve to fill these requirements. Eliminating five infantry battalions and focusing III Marine Expeditionary Force on the employment of specifically tailored and narrowly defined stand-in forces for the Indo-Pacific Command further limits the pool of available forces to support capacity building and security cooperation. One can conclude that fully supporting combatant commanders’ requirements undermines the FD2030 implementation plan.
FD2030 directs significant cuts in infantry, cannon artillery, armor, engineer and aviation capabilities to self-fund smaller, lighter, more specialized forces for employment by the Navy. Nearly a third of the Corps will be organized, trained and equipped to support maritime campaigns — making them less suitable for operations in other operating environments. Divestments in close combat capabilities render FD2030 forces more vulnerable and less capable for mid- and high-intensity ground combat during crisis response and contingency operations.
The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) has been the force of choice for combatant commanders for nearly 40 years because of its utility, flexibility, agility and offensive “punch.” It is arguably the Corps’ most successful innovation; yet its future viability is uncertain. While the current inventory of seven units will be retained in 2030, the organization, composition and deployment frequency are still to be determined.
The Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept states: “The 2030 MEU will operate from a combination of amphibious shipping, alternative platforms and shore basing. It will not be exclusively tied to the three-ship Amphibious Ready Group.” The Marine Corps and Navy are working on a joint concept for the 2030 MEU. The traditional MEU is an infantry-centric, combined arms task force equally capable of operating from the sea or ashore. The 2030 MEU will have no standard task organization or table of equipment and will be optimized for maritime operations. An asset once viewed as the commanders’ most versatile capability for forward presence and crisis response may become an afterthought.
One of the Commandant’s first priorities was to set the Corps on a path of closer integration with the Navy. Naval integration fundamentally changes the nature of Corps operations by placing forward-deployed forces under Navy command. This approach, while appropriate in specific instances, will be detrimental to both the Marine Corps and Marine Air Ground Task Forces if universally applied.
The FD2030 task organization specifies six Marine Service Components; five assigned to COCOMs and one assigned to a Sub-unified Command (Korea). In his initial planning guidance, the Commandant stated: “Our MARFORs are intended as administrative headquarters that advise their respective commands on the Marine Corps. In a functional component construct, we will complement and augment the [Joint Force Maritime Component Command].” Although he did not elaborate on how the composition and mission might change, his comments suggest the service components will play a less important role after Navy and Marine Corps forces are fully integrated.
Service componency is complex; there are no true experts in the field. In reality, only a few Marines will ever serve on a MARFOR staff — and those who do face a steep learning curve. Having served on the battle staff at the Division, MEF and MARFOR, we learned that the MARFOR operates somewhere between the boundaries that separate “warfighting” from “administrative.” During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Marine Service Component for U.S. Central Command (MARCENT) deployed to Bahrain with a three-star commander and staff; retained OPCON of all Marine Corps forces in three sub-theaters (Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan/Central Asia and the Horn of Africa); exercised OPCON/TACON of Marine Logistics Command and Combined Joint Task Force Consequence Management; completed dozens of preparatory tasks that helped set the theater for offensive operations; and served as executive agent and mayor of Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.
At the end of these wars, MARCENT coordinated the redeployment of Marine Corps forces and equipment from Iraq and Afghanistan with multiple theater agencies and the Marine Corps Supporting Establishment and exercised OPCON/TACON of the Special Purpose MAGTF conducting Maritime Prepositioned Force regeneration operations in Kuwait.
The variety and complexity of these tasks required far more leadership and staff experience than would be resident in an administrative staff or component liaison cell envisioned by the commandant. The MARCENT staff was organized to perform operational — not warfighting — functions appropriate to its role as the Marine component to U.S. Central Command during contingency operations. We won’t have the luxury of choosing where or when we fight, nor what tasks we are given. Reducing capabilities during great power competition has little upside and makes Marine Corps forces less visible — and therefore, less relevant to the combatant commanders.
Combatant commanders engaged in great power competition will need Marine Corps forces more than ever before. A smaller, more specialized Corps will find it difficult to meet this growing demand. A Corps overly reliant on the Navy to fulfill its promises may fall victim to another “Guadalcanal moment” and become operationally irrelevant.
Stephen Baird is a retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel and career artillery officer. His experience includes command of a direct support artillery battalion; assistant chief of staff, G-5 Plans for I MEF; chief of staff, 1st Marine Division; and chief of staff, Marine Forces Central Command during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
Timothy Wells is a retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel and career infantry officer. His experience includes command of the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center; assistant chief of staff, G-3 for Marine Corps Forces Central Command during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom; lead MAGTF planner for I MEF; and command of Marine Corps Embassy Security Guard Forces, Near East and South Asia.