Since the Korean War, whenever U.S. ground forces have heard the roar of jet planes overhead, they could safely assume those were American aircraft. In fact, our air power has so dominated the skies that no U.S. ground troops have been killed by enemy aircraft in over 65 years.
But in the coming years, that record could be in jeopardy in the Indo-Pacific region.
American air supremacy relies on technological primacy, of course, but it also relies on something more fundamental — the ability to refuel.
If we cannot refuel our front-line fighters and bombers that provide air cover for U.S. forces on the ground and at sea, we will be stymied in our efforts to support and defend our allies and partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific.
Refueling is critical in the Indo-Pacific region because the distances there are so vast. Traveling to Taipei, a jumbo jet takes almost 11 hours from Honolulu, over nine hours from Anchorage, and almost four hours from Guam or the main islands of Japan.
But as our land- or sea-based forces approach the Chinese coast, the risk of loss from Chinese ballistic missile barrages increases. If China tries to deny our forces access to our allies and partners, our air assets will be essential to breaking through.
Accordingly, it’s critical for the United States to have sufficient capability to defend its interests from the air, even if China has home-field advantage.
That is possible only by offloading fuel to fighters and bombers at vast ranges. The longer our tankers can stay on station and keep fuel in our planes, the more our aircraft can sustain the air cover that allied ground and sea forces will require.
Unfortunately, we have neglected reconstituting our tanker fleet for decades. As a recent Hudson Institute report says, “What had been a U.S. strategic strength now risks becoming a major weakness.” Indeed, since the Cold War — even as tankers have been in constant demand — the Department of Defense shrank the U.S. tanker fleet from 701 to 473 tankers.
The KC-135 remains the backbone of our tanker fleet. Many have been flying since the Eisenhower administration. The last one was built in 1965. The KC-10 is also decades-old and in line for retirement. The average age of a U.S. tanker is 52 years. Accordingly, the maintenance costs for both these venerable relics increases while readiness decreases.
An effort has begun to turn this situation around. However, the replacement tanker —the KC-46 — is plagued with quality issues, including debris, faulty door trim, and a troubled remote vision system for the boom not expected to be fixed before 2025.
Currently, the KC-46 represents our great hope for the modernization of the tanker fleet. However, the problems with the aircraft also highlight a potential single point of failure in a mission-critical program. The KC-46 is also limited in size and engine power such that any future mission growth is likely to degrade the priority mission of aerial refueling.
Hope is not a strategy, which is why the KC-Y or bridge tanker program is so clearly warranted as a bridge to a future clean-sheet design tanker down the road.
Amazingly, some in Washington seem hesitant to pursue a competition for a bridge tanker. Yet it would be foolish to shelve a tanker competition during this “decisive decade” while we stare down the daunting challenge in the Indo-Pacific. A tanker competition presents little downside and considerable upside.
In this case, a version of the Boeing KC-46 would square-off against the Lockheed Martin LMXT. The LMXT is based on the Airbus MRTT, which has proven successful around the world with 14 of our partners and allies. A tanker competition would help the Air Force determine which design is better-suited for the future needs of the force, with particular attention to how each aircraft’s capabilities align with our needs in the Indo-Pacific.
There is another factor at play. A competition for a KC-Y or bridge tanker demonstrates to China that America is serious about maintaining air superiority in the western Pacific. Indeed, it could alter China’s risk calculus as it contemplates a move for Taiwan. That, in a nutshell, is deterrence.
Conversely, a failure to conduct a tanker competition signals quite clearly to China — and to our allies and partners — that we remain unserious about the threat. Instead, we will stand idly by, leaving viable alternatives unexamined as our tanker fleet ages and our ability to project air power at range atrophies.
Time is not on our side in the Indo-Pacific. China knows this. It is urgent and imperative that we conduct a full competition for a bridge tanker.
Gen. (Ret.) John D.W. Corley was the U.S. Air Force vice chief of staff and commander of Air Combat Command.
Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jon T. Thomas recently retired as the Air Force deputy commander, Pacific Air Forces, and previously served as deputy commander, Air Mobility Command.
Both have been consultants to the defense sector, including Lockheed Martin.