As questions arise around the United States’ aerial engagements against several unidentified aerial phenomena in the past week, it’s key to note that both the Chinese spy balloon and the recent octagonal object were spotted over Montana — a state that normally doesn’t receive much domestic attention. But for foreign adversaries, Montana may be particularly interesting, as it is home to a significant portion of America’s nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. In the context of current policy discussions about nuclear deterrence, we are seeing debates over the fact that China now has more missile silos than the U.S. and Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric about nuclear weapons in response to Western support of Ukraine.
As these nuclear concerns are growing, at the end of January, the State Department declared Russia in violation of New START, the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia.
Recent statements by Russian and American officials are raising concerns that the treaty may be doomed.
Entering into force in 2011 and extended to 2026, the treaty places limits on the number of strategic (long range) nuclear warheads, delivery vehicles, and launchers that the U.S. and Russia are allowed to deploy. While allowing some leeway in how each side shapes its nuclear deterrent, it limits the total number of heavy nuclear bombers, and nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles to 1,550 total for each side. It also allows the U.S. and Russia to physically inspect each other’s nuclear arsenals, to create transparency, reduce suspicion, and verify adherence to the treaty. This includes the ICBM sites in Montana.
We have come a long way from the days of “duck and cover” and fears of nuclear annihilation in the 1950s, thanks to the efforts of cooler heads on both sides of the Cold War to enact limits and create reassurances on the numbers of nuclear weapons available to both sides.
But the risk hasn’t disappeared.
With New START being the only remaining nuclear treaty between the world’s two largest nuclear powers, and Russia appearing it may no longer have in interest in complying with or replacing this treaty, we may find ourselves back in the midst of a nuclear arms race, along with the inevitable standoffs and accidents that will follow. Despite Russia’s claims that it wishes to preserve the treaty, its actions say otherwise.
New START inspections have been on hold since 2020, originally due to COVID, and then by Russia actively blocking attempts to set a schedule for new inspections. In November 2022, Russia was a no-show for a scheduled meeting of New START’s Bilateral Consultative Commission. Last week, House Republicans asked the Biden administration for a report on Russia’s compliance. Ambassador Bruce Turner, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, has urged Russia to allow access to U.S. weapons inspectors, and the State Department has noted that despite Russia’s claims, there is nothing preventing Russian inspectors from traveling to the U.S. On Friday, NATO called on Russia to fulfill its obligations.
As Russia is noncompliant, the options to resolve this are limited. Conventional wisdom dictates that if Russia will not be bound by the restrictions of the treaty, then the U.S. should no longer be bound either, and House Republicans are encouraging the Biden administration to prepare for a Russian nuclear build-up. The U.S. could activate the treaty’s withdrawal mechanism and then build and deploy as many strategic nuclear weapons or launchers it wanted, even beyond Cold War levels. Some may argue this threat of nuclear build-up is what keeps Russia in compliance, as Russia sees a level of comfort in nuclear parity with the U.S., particularly considering its conventional inferiority. The Trump administration even used the threat of a build-up in its failed efforts to negotiate a wider nuclear treaty with Russia.
Though there is potential validity in this mindset, it represents outdated thinking. Nuclear deterrence through mutually assured destruction needs only to be achievable once, rather than several times over.
Instead of giving in to the temptation of a nuclear arms race in order to outspend or outbuild Russia if the treaty dies, the U.S. should independently determine what it needs for an effective nuclear deterrent and maintain that level. Based on the 1,550 limit in New START, it’s clear this is sufficient, if not more than sufficient to deter both Russia and China, regardless of how many nuclear weapons either chooses to build.
For now, Russia’s true intent is unclear, but it has flailed nuclear threats around since the beginning of the Ukraine war and would appear to be threatening the future lapse of New START as a means of weakening American and European commitment to Ukraine out of fear of nuclear escalation.
To be clear, New START has proven to be a major benefit to U.S. national security by capping the size of Russia’s deployed strategic nuclear arsenal, allowing access to it, and reducing the risk of nuclear war.
It is worth making a concerted effort to preserve or replace it. Without a strategic nuclear treaty, the U.S. must retain the ability to make its own defense decisions independently of what Russia wants, rather than unnecessarily spending potentially hundreds of billions on inherently unusable nuclear weapons in order to match Russia’s arsenal.
With limited resources, the United States is spending significantly on transfers of extremely effective weapons and resources to ensure that Ukraine is able to maintain its freedom from Russia. It is also spending money to replenish its own inventory, and to modernize its aging nuclear delivery vehicles. In the event New START fails or sunsets, allowing Russia to goad the U.S. into a level of unnecessary spending on superfluous nuclear weapons that distract from what’s needed would be unwise.
Matthew Wallin is chief operating officer with the American Security Project. Follow him on Twitter @matthewrwallin