The West’s next challenge: Russian spy ops beyond Ukraine

After one year of war in Ukraine, the West’s exposure and the arrest of Russia’s spies are having an effect on the Kremlin’s ability to conduct espionage and covert operations. This counterintelligence campaign should not let up as Russia’s military, economic and political weakness will likely lead to an increase in its security and intelligence activities, not a decrease. 

Russia’s security services will need to demonstrate their value and utility in the wake of their failure in Ukraine, and these activities will remain one of the few tools with which Russia can effectively signal or escalate. 

From the outset of the war, the United States and Europe expelled nearly 600 Russian “diplomats” or suspected intelligence officers from across the continent. This materially degraded the country’s ability to conduct traditional espionage and sharply limits its ability to carry out “active measures” and other forms of “hybrid war.” This increased awareness of, and efforts to counter, Russia’s intelligence activities also marks a notable break with the pre-Ukraine efforts. Prior to the war, European counterintelligence activities were notably weaker and less coordinated. The West must, however, avoid becoming complacent in this effort as Russia is likely to increasingly turn to covert operations as the war progresses and as Russia’s material position weakens.  

Recent weeks have demonstrated the continued threat of Russian intelligence operations across the continent. President Maia Sandu of Moldova said that Moscow was attempting to overthrow her government. Intelligence officials in the Netherlands warned that Russia may attempt to sabotage North Sea energy infrastructure. A senior officer within Germany’s foreign intelligence service was arrested on charges of espionage for Russia after a long-running investigation. A British guard working at the country’s embassy in Berlin was sentenced to 13 years in prison for spying for Moscow. Norway, for its part, is seeing signs of increased activity of so-called “illegals” or spies without official diplomatic cover.  

This increased awareness of, and efforts to counter, Russia’s intelligence activities marks a notable break with the pre-Ukraine efforts. Prior to the war, European counterintelligence activities were notably weaker and less coordinated.

Russia will find covert operations more attractive in the months and years ahead for several reasons. First, the Russian security and intelligence services will need to demonstrate their value and worth in the eyes of Putin following their appalling performance ahead of the invasion of Ukraine. According to reports, the FSB — the state security service — was tasked with ensuring the decapitation of the regime in Kyiv, which it clearly failed to do. It provided overly ambitious assessments of the weakness of the country and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s regime. These same assessments were shared by the GRU — Russia’s military intelligence — and are undoubtedly responsible for the military’s poor performance.  

While this reflects systemic weaknesses within the Kremlin and under Putin’s leadership — not the least of which is an unwillingness to speak truth to power — it suggests that the security and intelligence services are on the back foot and likely will want to reassert their position of importance. This then suggests that a return to the bread-and-butter of intelligence operations is in order. 

Successful operations — perceived or in practice — will help improve the services’ political capital at a time when it is arguably at a nadir. It is possible, and indeed likely, that Russian security and intelligence may become more risk tolerant in their efforts — an alarming prospect given their record of attempted assassinations, hacking and attacks on munition depots.  

Second, covert operations are comparably more resource efficient, especially at a time when Russia’s other forms of power are far more circumscribed than prior to the war. The West’s severing of economic ties with Russia, multiple rounds of sanctions and embargoes and efforts to politically isolate Moscow leave the country with relatively fewer tools to assert its influence or signal its interests — fewer, but not none. It is important to caveat that this is a very Western-focused assessment. Whereas anything with the label “Russian” is politically unpalatable in Europe or the United States, this is not the case in the Global South, with India, Turkey or China.  

Covert operations are a useful means of signaling to the West that Russia can still act in its near abroad and further afield. While intelligence operations carry with them not insignificant risks, the utility of these activities will likely outweigh the downsides of exposure, especially as Moscow becomes an increasing pariah in the eyes of European capitals. 

Early signs of this turn to covert activities may have already appeared. In November and December, six letter bombs were dispatched to diplomatic targets in Madrid, Spain. American and European intelligence officials believed these were sent from white supremacist groups, directed by Moscow. The burning of the Quran in Stockholm outside the Embassy of Turkey in Stockholm, Sweden, is believed to have been funded by a journalist with links to Moscow-backed media.  

Yet, the West would do well to avoid seeing Russian spies behind every bush or shrubbery. There was a tendency to see Moscow’s hand behind every misdeed and malign event across Europe and the United States. This was almost certainly welcomed by the Kremlin — making their officers seem far more effective and efficient than they were — and risked draining attention away from bread-and-butter counterintelligence operations. Connections and links may exist, but do not necessarily mean actions were directed or ordered. Investigating these linkages and exposing them if proven is a critical part of countering and confronting Russia’s intelligence operations, but the West must also be wary of ascribing too much capability or agency to the Kremlin.  

In the months and years ahead, Europe and the United States must double down on their counterintelligence efforts. Exposing plots and spies will help undermine a tool Russia will see as increasingly useful in a time of constrained capital. The West should also look to use these operations to its advantage, learning more about the operations and structure of Russia’s security and intelligence services, their networks (official and otherwise), and potentially recruit would-be agents. 

The longer the war progresses and the more painful the economic and political situation becomes, the greater the opportunity for Western intelligence success. Maintaining pressure on Russia’s security and intelligence services is as important as supplying arms to Kyiv, not just for the war in Ukraine, but for the longer-term Euro-Atlantic security architecture.  

Joshua C. Huminski is director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress, and a George Mason University National Security Institute Fellow. He can be found on Twitter @joshuachuminski.