‘No deal, no crisis’ is no plan for Iran

In Western policy circles, U.S. policy toward Iran is often reduced to a slogan: “No deal, no crisis.” The idea is to keep Iran off President Biden’s desk by avoiding either a politically damaging diplomatic settlement or an escalation that risks conflict — a tenuous tightrope. 

The mantra is half right. There is indeed no Iran nuclear agreement, nor the prospect for one. The 2015 deal’s original signatories — the U.S., United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, the European Union, and Iran — tried to revive it in 2021 and 2022. The effort came close in March and September last year but ultimately failed, and Iran’s intransigence, combined with its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and its domestic repression, has drained any remaining Western enthusiasm. In essence, we are in a gray area: Neither the West nor the Islamic Republic is willing to pursue an agreement, although neither is yet willing to declare it dead.

But the other half of the motto is an illusion, as events over the past week have underscored. A drone linked to Iran attacked a U.S. base in Syria on Thursday, killing an American contractor and setting off several strikes and counterstrikes between American and Iranian-linked forces in Syria. More broadly, the West is in the middle of a steadily escalating nuclear crisis, even if policymakers are reluctant to admit it. Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single bomb in about two weeks — as close as it has ever been — and given the current inspections regime, the international community might not find out until it’s too late. 

Moreover, Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified on Thursday that after Iran produces enough nuclear fuel, it could fashion it into a bomb in “several more months” — a much faster timeline than even senior Israeli officials have stated publicly. 

Iran has pushed the envelope in two additional ways over the past two months. In late January, Iran reconfigured advanced IR-6 centrifuge cascades at the underground Fordow site without notifying inspectors in advance, violating its obligation to do so. The technical switch likely makes it easier for Iran to produce uranium enriched to 90 percent U-235, the common threshold for weapons grade. (Once Iran crosses this threshold and begins accumulating weapons-grade material, the prospect of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon drops.) After taking samples, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determined that Iran had produced small amounts of uranium enriched to 83.7 percent U-235 in those cascades.

Iran claims there was no foul on the cascade reconfiguration and that the presence of the 83.7 percent particles was incidental — a temporary bump that can happen during centrifuge operations. It is conceivable that the production of the 83.7 percent material was a fluke or not the result of a political decision; there is no consensus among Western governments on this issue. But the intricacies of the episode matter less than the response. If the U.S. and E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) had delivered a strong, united reaction to the provocation, it could have helped to deter Iran from taking these risky activities in the future. The perfect opportunity came at the IAEA’s Board of Governors, whose quarterly meeting in early March was scheduled only weeks after these actions were publicized.

But the U.S. and E3 disagreed about what to do. The E3 pushed for a resolution — a formal act of condemnation by the board. Two such resolutions had passed over the past year. The U.S. opposed this step, reportedly worried that Iran would only escalate further in response. The Iranians eventually gave the U.S. a way out: In the lead-up to the board meeting, Iran made vague commitments regarding monitoring and some longstanding nuclear investigations. This undermined any unified action. There was no resolution, and for the first time in a year, the U.S. and E3 did not agree to a joint statement at the board, underscoring the transatlantic divide. 

Tehran probably took solace from this episode. Nuclear experimentation that brushes against Western “red lines” and violates its international obligations will go unpunished. It might draw the conclusion that producing weapons-grade uranium will meet a similar response. Producing 90 percent U-235 almost certainly would lead the European powers to pursue snapback at the U.N. Security Council, terminating the 2015 deal. But Tehran may be less sure about this consequence than a month ago.

Iranian leaders have reasons to be optimistic. Although its brutal response to nationwide protests all but guarantees renewed turmoil in the future, Tehran enjoys some financial flexibility, with its crude oil exports at a four-year high. Iran re-established diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia under Chinese auspices, piercing its regional isolation. Relations with Moscow are at their strongest in years. Washington is distracted with Russia and China, Europe is fully focused on supporting Ukraine, and Israel is consumed with unprecedented domestic turmoil. Although Tehran continues to face substantial economic challenges, the rial has benefitted from these recent headlines.

The West is practically letting Iran set the pace. It needs a new strategic approach, taking into account the full range of Iranian nuclear and non-nuclear behavior, including the consistent threat to U.S. forces in the region. But given the state of Iran’s nuclear advances, the West unfortunately needs to also think short term and tactically to avoid a further deterioration, with an eye toward laying the strongest groundwork for future diplomatic options. Diplomacy with Iran has only ever succeeded through a combination of collective, escalating pressure (economic, political and military) and a diplomatic off ramp, and the West should recreate this framework.

First, the U.S. and E3 should take diplomatic steps aimed at deterring further Iranian nuclear provocations. While the West may have deterred Iran from producing 90 percent to date, it should not assume that Iranian calculations are static. Western governments should demonstrate a commitment to triggering sanctions snapback at the U.N. Security Council, should Iran cross the 90 percent threshold, by preparing the legal and political case for this step. The justifications for snapback are voluminous, and Western governments should start briefing other Security Council members to ensure maximal support. 

Similarly, Western governments should clearly communicate to Iran that any unannounced reconfigurations or backtracking on its commitments to the IAEA would lead to an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA’s board. And the U.S. and E3 should build the credibility of a military option by issuing a joint statement reaffirming the need to use all necessary means to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

The U.S. should back up such a statement by continuing an aggressive tempo of training exercises with Israel and Gulf partners. The Juniper Oak exercises in January with Israel were an important step and could be a model for future drills: held on short notice, using a wide spectrum of capabilities, and intensively messaged to the Iranians. 

The U.S. should intensify enforcement of sanctions on Iranian energy exports, an economic  lifeline for the regime. Measures should especially target Chinese recipients and facilitators in the United Arab Emirates and southeast Asia. Washington has started to ramp up the frequency of sanctions announcements in recent weeks. It should keep up this pace, both to complicate oil sales and make it harder for the regime to claim that a nuclear accord is imminent, one of its strategies for propping up the rial. These steps are especially important to counter the idea that Iran has managed to reduce its isolation with the Saudi deal. 

Global consensus has always been an essential feature of successful negotiations with Iran. France, Germany and the UK should lean on regional states to send messages to Moscow and Beijing, warning Iran away from further nuclear escalations. Israelis, Emiratis and Saudis have better working relations with Beijing and Moscow than do the U.S. or E3. In turn, Moscow and especially Beijing have leverage over Iran and could encourage restraint. In theory, Beijing has even more incentive to persuade Iran to avoid a major escalation that would endanger the Saudi deal, although there are many reasons to be skeptical that China intends to play the role of guarantor.

Finally, the U.S. and Europe should bet that the regime doesn’t want to be completely ostracized, an aspiration the Iran-Saudi deal and the increasing cooperation with Russia and China have once again demonstrated. To that end, they should keep the prospect of a diplomatic off-ramp alive — focusing not just on reducing downside outcomes but leaving the door open to more constructive ones. The prospect of some type of smaller or informal deal remains dim at present, as does reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. But signaling to Iran that a “way out” exists is important. The U.S. and Europe should develop common parameters for alternative diplomatic paths, should they become more viable in the future.

In the past several months, Western policies aimed at avoiding a crisis have risked provoking one, potentially giving Iran the impression it can escalate with impunity. Meanwhile, Tehran is consolidating ties with global and regional powers, undermining efforts at isolating it, all with limited Western response. The U.S. and Europe should take the initiative to avoid sleepwalking into a major escalation.

Henry Rome is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute. Louis Dugit-Gros is a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute and a diplomat with the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. The views expressed here are strictly personal.