All eyes and ears seem to be focused on the Battle for Bakhmut and the coming Ukrainian counteroffensive. Ukrainian success there matters, of course, but battles and campaigns have meaning only if they contribute to strategic success. Victory in any war goes to the side that attains its strategic objectives, not necessarily the one that wins the most battles. In the Russia-Ukraine War, it’s not clear which side that will be.
The stakes of all involved are high; given the mutually exclusive goals of Russia and Ukraine, the war will not end quickly. Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his illegal and unjustified aggression to turn Ukraine into a Russian vassal, but if he cannot do that, he’ll slowly strangle Ukraine politically and economically. Even with its military’s weakness, ineptness and battle losses, Moscow is in a relatively good position to do just that. Ukraine just wants to preserve its self-determination — political sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic viability.
The U.S. seems to have four aims: strengthen and defend NATO, assist Ukraine’s success without widening or escalating the war, reinforce the rules-based order by ensuring that naked aggression does not pay and enhance U.S. leadership. NATO is aligned with the first two U.S. aims, but maybe less so with the latter two. It’s worthy of note that America can achieve those aims only if the Ukrainians achieve theirs.
How long a war goes on is a function not only of strategic aims but also of capacity: that is, which side can sustain its fighting ability, its supplies and logistics, its funding, and its political and social will the longest. Right now, Putin is counting on being able to stay in the fight longer than Ukraine and its supporters. But it’s unclear whether Putin’s assessment is correct.
He himself is committed. However, it’s an open question whether the Russian military forces and logistics will hold up or if the Russian government and people will hold together. Ukraine’s will — military, political and social — is unquestionable, but funding and logistics are almost completely in the hands of the U.S., NATO and other allies and partners. Any faltering of support plays into Putin’s hands. The Biden administration seems fully committed, but congressional support remains uncertain, and the American people, without proper leadership, could lean more isolationist than does the administration.
Success in the coming counteroffensive, therefore, is important, both on the battlefield and in the capitals of Ukraine’s supporters. Battlefield success will increase political and social support for Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky and diminish Putin’s in Russia. Although Ukraine preparations are extensive, success in the coming campaign is not a foregone conclusion.
There is little surprise as to the geographic locations of the offensive, though the exact time, place and method remain shrouded under the blanket of operational security. Putin’s forces have had time to prepare defensive positions, which even troops with morale as low as the Russians’ could use effectively. The terrain, which includes rivers, cities and defensive obstacles, is complex. And while the Ukrainian forces will throw a strong, combined arms punch at the outset of the campaign, it’s not clear whether their allies have supplied them sufficiently to both provide air cover and maintain the momentum necessary for full success of a multi-phased counteroffensive and maintain pressure on Russian forces in other areas across the country.
Even if the counteroffensive is not, by itself, militarily decisive, it may be successful enough to regain sufficient territory to guarantee Ukraine’s self-determination and economic viability. And it might threaten Russia’s hold on the territories it seized illegally in 2014. Seeing the possibility of this loss could be enough to bring Putin to the negotiating table.
But negotiations, when they start, are not likely go smoothly, and neither Ukraine nor its allies should view formal talks as the end of the conflict. Putin will throw sand in every diplomatic gear, he’ll continue to skirmish while negotiations go on, he’ll threaten a return to fighting, he’ll hold onto the Americans he has taken hostage, and he’ll use any trick to prevent a return to normalcy. This is Russian negotiation tactics 101.
The U.S., NATO, and the other allies to Ukraine can increase the probability of success by staying together, following through on their support commitments, preparing for the inevitable Putin threats to escalate or widen the war — the alleged drone strike on the Kremlin may turn out to be just such an action — and entering negotiations, if they start, with realistic expectations. The allies must also employ other measures to squeeze Putin, his cronies and the Russian economy, and further isolate Russia diplomatically; they can leverage a successful Ukraine counteroffensive to reduce Putin’s supporters, for instance, and they can crank up the legal pressure on Putin and his political and military subordinates who are guilty of insidious and extensive war crimes that Europe hasn’t seen since World War II. These measures will not, by themselves, lead to victory, but they are important supporting tools.
The outcome of the Ukraine war is not foreordained. All wars come down to a test of will. What happens in the coming weeks may well indicate where the strongest will lies and, therefore, which direction the war will go. Neither Ukraine’s will nor its allies’ can falter. The Ukraine counteroffensive must succeed. And the allies’ support must be complete.
James M. Dubik, Ph.D., a retired lieutenant general of the U.S. Army, is a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. He served in military command and operational roles in Bosnia, Haiti and Iraq, and helped train forces in Afghanistan, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Honduras, and many NATO countries.