How the Afghanistan War Commission aims to learn from our longest conflict

Two years ago in August, the 20-year U.S. intervention in Afghanistan came to a sudden and devastating end. On August 23, the independent and bipartisan Afghanistan War Commission began its crucial work to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. government decisions on Afghanistan between June 2001 to August 2021. 

Over the next three years, the commission will delve into the various aspects of the conflict, including the fight against the Taliban, counterterrorism efforts and state-building endeavors. Given the magnitude and duration of this engagement, along with the lives and resources invested, the nation deserves a comprehensive and unflinching examination of government choices, their execution and the insights they may offer for future leaders.

The commission’s undertaking is formidable, and its approach will be crucial in determining the success and value of its work. The goal is to provide a clinical and impartial assessment of the decisions and their implementation, documenting and explaining the past to enhance government performance in the future. Rather than assigning blame or engaging in political point-scoring, the commission is committed to a rigorously nonpartisan inquiry. 

The complexities of war and state-building in Afghanistan have challenged four administrations from two different parties, and no one administration can bear sole responsibility for the ultimate outcome. In an atmosphere of intense partisanship and growing skepticism toward government, the commission prioritizes decency, respect, consultation and transparency in its review of individuals and institutions.

The commission is determined to let facts guide its investigation and will resist the urge to rely on preconceived notions or conventional wisdom. It is essential to approach the decision-makers and those responsible for executing those decisions with empathy, recognizing our hindsight bias that comes with knowing the ultimate outcome of the war. Critical decisions must be examined in the contemporary context in which they were made, evaluating the information and alternatives available at the time. 

Nonetheless, the commission will be unwavering in its candor. We owe a greater debt to those who served and sacrificed than to the sensitivities of those who might be uncomfortable with a thorough examination of their wartime decisions.

The ultimate standard for the commission’s work will be its practical utility. The focus must be on what future policymakers and leaders can learn from this experience. Can the hard-earned lessons from Afghanistan be retained and applied to future interventions? How can similar missteps be avoided in the future? We seek to offer valuable insights to informed citizens and public servants, providing a better understanding of the stakes, dilemmas, costs and risks involved in future engagements.

The commission faces three distinct tasks, each more challenging than the last. 

First, it must write an official history of the engagement, studying the decisions made and their consequences, presenting it in a manner accessible to both expert and general audiences. Second, it aims to derive foresight from hindsight, extracting the lessons learned from this 20-year project. Identifying insights that can be applied to future interventions in different contexts presents a more formidable challenge. Third, and most difficult, is the call for recommendations, identifying changes in government structure and processes that can enhance U.S. performance in future interventions and avoid the pitfalls we encountered in Afghanistan.

Some may argue that the most evident lesson from Afghanistan is to avoid similar interventions altogether. However, given the likelihood of facing comparable situations in the future, it is essential to take a forward-looking perspective. A thorough examination of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan serves as a critical foundation for improving future performance, avoiding mistakes and achieving U.S. goals at an acceptable cost. This is the minimum we owe to both the fallen and the living. 

The commission wholeheartedly embraces this mission, eagerly anticipating the opportunity to provide the public and the government with a comprehensive and fair account of America’s longest war.

Shamila N. Chaudhary and Colin F. Jackson, Ph.D. serve as the co-chairs of the Afghanistan War Commission, a congressionally-mandated independent and bipartisan commission tasked with conducting a comprehensive review of the 20-year U.S. intervention in Afghanistan.