Into the labyrinth: Here’s why it’s so difficult to invade Gaza

As the Israeli Defense Force begins ground operations in the Gaza Strip, the primary goals laid out by the Israeli leadership are somewhat vague and not precisely defined. Nevertheless, they seem to encompass both the dismantling of Hamas’s governance and the neutralization of its military capabilities.

The Gaza Strip, one of the world’s most densely populated regions, spans roughly 140 square miles, stretching 26 miles in length and varying in width from a maximum of 7.5 miles to as narrow as 3.7 miles. This condensed region houses over 2 million people. Within this tight space, the Israeli military, including infantry, engineering corps, armored divisions, and artillery, backed by specialized units and close air and naval support, would have to conduct their ground operations.

Hamas has been methodically preparing for an IDF ground incursion over the years. Their military strategy takes into account the asymmetrical balance with Israel and seeks to mitigate their military shortcomings. Hamas’s goal is to disrupt Israeli daily life, inflict damage on essential infrastructure, prolong combat situations, and draw Israel into military actions that could subject it to global scrutiny.

To that end, Hamas employs tactics that involve positioning military assets within civilian areas, putting civilians at risk by using them as human shields. Hamas has been known to carry out operations from within homes and public structures, to use civilian ambulances for transporting military personnel and arms, and to launch rockets and mortars towards populated areas in Israel.

The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades is the military wing of Hamas, responsible for maintaining the group’s control in the Gaza Strip and preparing for external confrontations, especially with Israel. Smuggling activities, primarily through tunnels connected to Egypt, have enhanced the Brigades’ capabilities. Many operatives have received advanced training in such countries as Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, covering a wide range of military tactics and techniques. Within the Gaza Strip, extensive training sessions on various military skills are conducted for new recruits.

Drawing inspiration from Hezbollah, Hamas’s defense strategy heavily relies on the extensive use of underground tunnels. These tunnels serve a dual purpose: They counter the aerial advantage of the Israeli Air Force by providing a tactical combat advantage, and they offer a haven for its operatives.

Hamas has constructed various types of tunnels: There are cross-border tunnels that extend into Israeli territory, designed to threaten both Israeli civilians and the IDF. Although the IDF’s technological advances have allowed them to detect and eliminate many of these tunnels, concerns about undetected tunnels persist, especially considering that these tunnels could threaten IDF’s logistical operations. Command and movement tunnels facilitate the covert movement of militants. Should the IDF launch a ground operation, these tunnels allow militants to discreetly navigate underground, emerge from camouflaged exits (often located within residential or public buildings), ambush IDF units, and then rapidly retreat.

Booby trap tunnels are equipped with explosives and are intended to detonate beneath advancing IDF units in the Gaza Strip. Finally, there are sea tunnels. These tunnels, rumored to crisscross the Gaza Strip shoreline, are believed to assist Hamas’s naval units in discreetly accessing the sea and subsequently infiltrating deeper into Israeli territory to conduct attacks on civilians and infrastructure.

Hamas’s military wing aims to inflict significant casualties on the IDF, drawing them into urban zones laden with traps such as explosive devices, booby-trapped pits, tunnels, sniper positions, and suicide attackers. Recognizing Israel’s aversion to military losses, Hamas’s strategy is to maximize IDF casualties, so as to curtail duration of hostilities, wound Israeli morale, and challenge any perceived victory for the IDF.

Furthermore, in recent years, Hamas has developed several strategic military assets that they plan to utilize in the event of ground combat.

First, equipped with some of the world’s top-tier diving gear, Hamas’s naval commando unit can dive to varied depths for long periods. This specialized team, comprising trained and determined operatives, is designed to leverage the maritime domain for potential strategic actions against Israel. There’s intelligence suggesting that Hamas might aim to strike the power plant chimneys in Ashkelon using sophisticated anti-tank missiles. Success in this endeavor could give Hamas enough visual evidence to proclaim a symbolic triumph. It is further postulated that this unit might operate between Ashkelon and Ashdod, discreetly nearing the coastline to fire missiles at commercial vessels anchored in Ashdod’s port, thereby hindering Israel’s maritime trade during hostilities.

Hamas also has a range of aerial tools at its disposal — mainly unmanned drones equipped with improvised explosives and surveillance features. These drones can cover vast areas beyond the Gaza Strip, including the Greater Tel Aviv area (Gush Dan) and regions to its north. The potential for these drones to be used as explosive “kamikaze” devices raises substantial concerns, especially in civilian regions. Additionally, Hamas has demonstrated the ability to employ paragliders for operations, as evidenced in the Oct. 7 attack, capable of dropping bombs or even penetrating enemy territories.

Rocket arsenals remain a significant strategic component of the terrorist groups’ capabilities in Gaza. The IDF estimates that, prior to the current conflict, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad jointly held between 18,000 to 20,000 rockets, a mix of self-produced units and standardized ones smuggled into Gaza with assistance from Iran and Hezbollah. While the IDF has targeted rocket stockpiles, the exact number of rockets destroyed remains undetermined. Israeli security assessments suggest that 12,000 to 14,000 rockets could still be in their possession. It’s also noteworthy that Hamas has set up a rocket production system tailored to wartime conditions.

To support continuous rocket attacks, Hamas has innovated diverse launch techniques. They’ve constructed launch pits for subterranean rocket placement and an intricate system of tunnels to enable sequential rocket launches, even when facing attacks. Often, these rockets are launched remotely, ensuring the safety of operators, who can be located far from the actual launch site.

Finally, Hamas has developed capabilities in both cyber warfare and electronic warfare, as evidenced during the Oct. 7 attack. These measures are designed to disrupt IDF communications, hinder intelligence-gathering processes, and potentially carry out cyberattacks on essential infrastructure deep within Israel.

Neither side in the conflict retains the element of surprise, particularly after Hamas used it to project a horrific image of victory. However, Hamas has an advantage with its familiarity with the terrain — notably, vast and densely populated urban areas.

The IDF recognizes the challenges of a ground incursion into Gaza. They will likely execute the ground maneuver with intensive fire support, proceeding deliberately and cautiously. The IDF might also seek to catch Hamas off guard by employing special forces, naval units, and close air support. Beyond the anticipated human toll, such a move could notably prolong the conflict.

Currently, the dominant sentiment among the Israeli public supports decisive action against Hamas, prioritizing this over the return of those abducted through military efforts or prisoner exchanges. The somber fact that dozens of Israelis, including children and the elderly, remain hostages in Gaza has not deterred considerations for a ground offensive, in spite of the escalated risks to both Israeli forces and the hostages.

Shay Hershkovitz is a professor at Virginia Tech’s Center for Environmental Security and a Senior Research Fellow, at the Intelligence Methodology Research Center. He is author of The Future of National Intelligence: How Emerging Technologies Reshape Intelligence Communities.