This weekend’s Munich Security Conference will be haunted by the shadow of Donald Trump. His outrageous comment that while president he had told NATO leaders that if they did not fulfill their financial obligations to NATO, he would “encourage them [Moscow’s leaders] to do whatever the hell they want” sent a chill up the spines of already worried European leaders, especially those of smaller countries bordering Russia. In fact, as NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has pointed out, contrary to Trump’s assertions, “last year we saw an unprecedented rise of 11 percent across European allies and Canada” in defense spending.
Trump’s visceral isolationism has placed heretofore internationalist stalwarts like Sen. Lindsey Graham in an exceedingly awkward position. Earlier this week, the senator from South Carolina announced that he would no longer attend the Munich conference. The announcement marked a stunning turnaround for a man who had been a leading member of the American congressional delegation for more than a decade.
Nevertheless, despite Trump’s fulminations and Graham’s absence, the conference will still be a major venue for critical security discussions. As in the past, it will boast a formidable American as well as European presence. Moreover, senior ministers and officials from East Asia, the Middle East and Africa will also participate in the conference’s deliberations. For this reason, it is imperative that the increasing importance of biotechnology, and especially its national security ramifications, should be among the issues that are foremost on the participants’ minds.
Biotechnology development, applications and manufacturing are emerging rapidly, with a speed that replicates the stunning growth of artificial intelligence during the past decade. And like artificial intelligence, biotechnology has major and as yet untapped defense applications. A report recently issued by the congressionally mandated National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (where, full disclosure, I am a commissioner) pointed out that “we can imagine a future in which our warfighters are fed, fueled, equipped, protected, and healed on the battlefield, all thanks in part to biotechnology.” The report added for emphasis, “this is not science fiction; the research is happening today.”
Biotechnology and biomanufacturing can increase supply chain resilience and lower dependence on unfriendly states by offering an alternative means of producing chemicals and materials that warfighters employ on a daily basis. In addition, biotechnology offers the promise of creating products and materials that will be far more effective and efficient than their current counterparts. These include biomaterials for rocket fuels and next generation explosives; advanced materials such as spider silk that can be woven into stronger yet more flexible body armor; biological sensors; and more personalized and effective medicines for warfighters.
It is noteworthy that China is pouring billions of dollars into biotechnology research and development specifically designed to grant its forces unique advantages on the battlefield. Beijing has mobilized both its military and non-military sectors, blurring the lines between military and civilian biotechnology applications, much as it has in so many other fields. Beijing has created a host of new companies specifically devoted to further its advances in biotechnology, and it has no compunction about building massive databases of personal genetic information to support its research.
China is not alone in its pursuit of advances in biotechnology. Other potential adversaries, including non-state actors, could misuse biotechnology, especially if combined with artificial intelligence, to intensify their threats to American and allied forces and interests.
In response to accelerating advances in biotechnology, on Jan. 31 the Department of Defense launched the Distributed Bioindustrial Manufacturing Investment Program (DBMIP), which “seeks to strengthen domestic supply chains and sustain America’s global prominence in biotechnology.” The program “will execute investments through the Defense Industrial Base Consortium (DIBC) Other Transaction Agreement (OTA), which helps lower barriers to allow DoD to work more expeditiously with small, non-traditional, and large businesses.”
For its part, NATO has created a Defense Innovative Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) which likewise seeks to invest in innovative technologies such as biotechnology. These investments will address both defense and security challenges and, equally important, help shape global standards on how these technologies are used. The EU has also begun to work on its own roadmap for biotechnology development.
For the time being, the United States remains the leader in biotechnology research and development, but that lead is exceedingly tenuous — hence the urgency of the DPMIP. Indeed, in some areas America is behind some of its European allies, for example in manufacturing new biotechnology products at scale. In this regard, the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology is evaluating ways both to increase biomanufacturing infrastructure and capacity and shifting the infrastructure that underpins biotechnology manufacture from large, single production facilities to smaller, regional, more flexible facilities.
Biotechnology’s applications have the potential to alter geopolitical dynamics significantly. China has understood this reality for some time. Yet despite its lead in actual biotech research and development, America has only recently come to understand biotechnology’s implications both for its own national security and that of its allies and partners.
It is imperative that the DoD’s initiatives — as well as similar efforts that are taking shape throughout the U.S. government, together with those of NATO, the EU, their constituent nations and other allies and partners, all of whom will be represented in Munich this weekend — work in coordinated fashion. Only then can they collectively ensure that this emerging technology will enhance their collective national security, both by preventing its misuse and by capitalizing on its promise for a more efficient and effective common defense.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.