Will Putin risk World War III?

The Ides of March have come and gone at the Kremlin, and Russian President Vladimir Putin remains standing. He is now free of domestic distractions. 

Washington and Brussels should be alarmed.

Brutus, in the form of Yevgeny Prigozhin, is dead, killed last August when his private jet exploded. Putin’s chief political rival and most outspoken critic, Alexei Navalny, died last month at the high security penal colony in Yamal near the Arctic circle, where he had been imprisoned. He allegedly died during a walk.

Putin may soon be at his most dangerous vis-a-vis the short- and long-term security of eastern and central Europe, after winning a fifth sham presidential election. A recently disclosed classified German intelligence report suggests that Russia could attack a NATO country — possibly the Baltic countries or Finland — as early as 2026.

Other Red Team scenarios should be considered as well, given that NATO is tattering at the edges in Hungary and Slovakia, while the U.S. increasingly is distracted by fractious election-year politics. 

Meanwhile, neither French President Emmanuel Macron nor Poland and Estonia are ruling out Western troops in Ukraine. Macron upped the ante by declaring the Russia-Ukraine war as “existential.” Coupled with Czech President Petr Pavel’s efforts to secure funding for 800,000 rounds of artillery, the Kremlin’s window of opportunity to win may be closing.

The question is whether Putin could respond by escalating the war. Might he attack the Baltic States or Moldova? Or elsewhere?

NATO must anticipate a strike against one of its members, and Putin clearly sees the Baltic States as NATO’s weakest link.

Putin could conduct a limited strike outside of Ukraine for several reasons — to expedite victory or retain control of the Donbas and Crimea in the midst of impending defeat. Either way, he would challenge what he considers to be a divided NATO to make a critical decision: Defend NATO, or defend Ukraine? 

Russia’s advantage in artillery and its ability to sustain relentless ‘meat assaults,’ proved decisive in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s decision to tactically withdraw in February from Avdiivka. Consequently, Putin has scoffed at the notion of negotiating with Zelensky “just because [Ukraine] is running out of ammunition.” Nonetheless, this “advantage’ has only bought Putin a few kilometers, not the hundreds he needs to defeat Ukraine.

To break the stalemate, Putin must change NATO’s calculus and willingness to continue supplying Ukraine’s war effort. Putting NATO in a defensive posture by striking targets with conventional weapons in the Baltic States could be one way of shifting the NATO effort away from Ukraine, even though it would risk a comprehensive response by the alliance. 

Escalating conflict to deescalate is an oft-used Russian diplomatic and military tactic, known as the Gerasimov Doctrine. The idea is simply to create chaos and then take advantage of it. Putin could deploy the tactic to create pandemonium in Brussels and to counter Macron’s bold declaration that he is willing to send French troops to Ukraine

During his presidential election victory speech on Sunday, Putin said, “It is clear to everyone that this conflict between Russia and NATO will just be one step away from World War III.” Putin cannot back down, as this would bring humiliation upon him and Russia, as well as his own downfall. This speech suggests he is willing to escalate outside of Ukraine in order to win inside Ukraine.

NATO needs to be ready for this.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin and newly installed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. C.Q. Brown, Jr. attended the 20th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Ramstein Germany on Tuesday. Fifty nations participated in the summit, yet its scope is no longer sufficient.

Austin noted that “Ukraine’s survival is in danger.” Yet, should Putin strike, NATO’S survival could be in peril too.

NATO allies must begin actively planning for the defense of Europe from any potential Russian aggression, and they must do so for two parallel timeframes. 

The first is in the near term, while the war in Ukraine is still being fought. The second is for a resumption of combat operations ten to twenty years after its conclusion.

NATO is already making urgently needed progress in the long war. Sweden’s formal accession has strengthened the alliance’s defenses in the Baltic Sea and Arctic, and Brussels is transforming the 57th Air Base in Mihail Kogălniceanu, Romania into what will become the largest NATO base in Europe.

Yet, this is only a start. Far more defensive capabilities will be needed in Poland and the Baltic States. 

Ukraine is just Putin’s opening act. He wants more and he has said so. Crimea was not enough in 2014 to sate his appetite for dominance once again of the Black Sea, and Ukraine will not be enough if he wins.

Putin, regardless of wishful thinking, is not going away. Every day, his propaganda media talking heads remind us that Moscow is intent on rebuilding its empire. Sergey Mardan was the latest. As Julia Davis, a Russian media expert, noted on X, Mardan recently asserted “that the dissolution of the USSR was meaningless and did not provide legitimacy to the nations that used to be a part of it.”

Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia are therefore the most likely candidates, should Putin opt to escalate against NATO to de-escalate. Potentially Poland too. NATO must be vigilantly and proactively on guard. 

Meanwhile, NATO must contend with its own would-be ‘Brutuses.’ Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico are likely to add to or at least prolong any chaos Putin causes. Both NATO member state heads are Putin apologists and have parroted Russian propaganda against Kyiv. Fico even claimed in January that, “Ukraine is not an independent and sovereign country.”

The Baltic States and Poland are under no such delusions. Their shared memories of Soviet repression are likely the reason Putin will have miscalculated if he strikes them. Warsaw, as a military near-peer to Russia, would likely lead in taking the fight militarily to a weakened Russia. 

Putin’s calculus could be that Washington and Brussels are unwilling to risk World War III by fulfilling their NATO obligation to defend the Baltic States. In that regard, he might prove right, or at least create considerable chaos inside of NATO as the alliance seeks consensus on how to respond.

Washington, London, Paris and Brussels must fully disabuse Putin of that notion. The West must make it clear to Putin that any attempt to escalate the war in Europe will only result in swift and decisive escalation by NATO.

Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy. Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Sweet served 30 years as a military intelligence officer.