Biden’s ‘just enough’ strategy in Ukraine is not nearly enough to defeat Putin
The Biden administration’s policy of “just enough” is proving to be insufficient to win in Ukraine.
Minimalist in construct, the strategy only reductively and reactively addresses critical battlefield requirements when they threaten Ukraine’s survival. U.S. military support to Ukraine has become subordinate to White House fears of not further antagonizing Russian President Vladimir Putin. Intended to avoid escalation, in practice, it is resulting in just that.
Alarmingly, Biden’s “just enough” policy is ceding the initiative to Russia on the front lines. Ukraine’s armed forces are already spread a mile wide and an inch deep.
Getting Biden’s permission to play whack-a-mole every time the Kremlin changes conditions on the battlefield is no way to fight a war. Yet the White House insists on controlling the use of the weapons and munitions it provides Ukraine.
In an interview with ABC News anchor David Muir in Normandy, France on the 80th anniversary of the D-Day landings, Biden said, “We’re not authorizing strikes 200 miles into Russia and we’re not authorizing strikes on Moscow, on the Kremlin….They’re authorized to be used in proximity to the border when they’re being used on the other side of the border to attack specific targets in Ukraine.”
Of course, President Volodymyr Zelensky never said or implied that ATACMS would be used by Kyiv to strike Moscow or the Kremlin. Zelensky wants to use them to strike only Putin’s troops staging on the Russian side of the border.
Ukraine needs U.S. weapons to take out Russian weapons systems firing artillery, ballistic missiles and drones on Ukrainian cities. The target was never going to be St. Basil’s Cathedral, the Bolshoi Theater or Lenin’s mausoleum in Moscow.
Ukraine must win the interdiction war if it is ever to win the close fight. But Biden’s national security team remains gripped by an increasingly contagious escalation paralysis. Belgium is now following Washington’s lead in regard to its delivery of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo announced on May 29 that military aid from his nation could only be “used by the Armed Forces on Ukrainian territory.”
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz continues to deny deployment of the Taurus cruise missile to Ukraine. He did at least authorize the deployment of additional self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and air defense systems.
All are welcome capabilities that Zelensky has asked for since day one of the war. But until Ukraine is able to defeat weapons systems, as opposed to individual missiles on a daily basis, Kyiv will remain stuck in a bloody war of attrition that it cannot afford.
Biden’s strategy of defending Ukraine and weakening Russia is not working. Allowing Putin to dictate where battles are fought is not working. Containing the carnage within the borders of Ukraine is not working. Affording Russian forces sanctuary inside Russia is not working.
Biden’s advisors need to brush up on the lessons that General George Patton learned during World War II: “Nobody ever defended anything successfully. There is only attack and attack and attack some more.”
Biden’s D-Day remarks in France, while Reaganesque, fell short — not on its content, but on the looming and unfavorable comparison of allied support to Ukraine.
He described D-Day as “the “Great Crusade” to free Europe from tyranny.” And it was. But it was not won from defensive positions in Great Britain. It was won on the beaches, the hedgerows and the skies over France. It was won by striking targets deep inside Germany to defeat the Nazis’ ability to sustain the war, by striking V2 rocket launch sites, by defeating the German Luftwaffe over the skies of Great Britain, France, and Germany. It was won by bombing the airfields from which the planes were launched and by interdicting German Panzer formations as they tried to reposition on the battlefield to counter the invasion.
World War II in the European theater was won by taking offensive action — not by placing restrictions on weapons, not by partisan politics, and not by getting overwhelmed by competing theaters of operation.
National Security advisor Jake Sullivan’s announcement that the Biden Administration had finally authorized U.S weapons to attack targets within Russia was a very small step in the right direction. But it was a minimalist solution to an imminent threat to Kharkiv and Ukraine. Fear of NATO countries — France, Poland, the Baltic States — committing troops to defend Kyiv likely played a bigger role in the decision.
The decision, and Ukraine’s immediate action, likely stalled the Russian Kharkiv offensive. But in a world of action, reaction, counterreaction, the Russians have adapted to the latest concession by the White House.
The Institute for the Study of War has observed that Biden’s “limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use U.S.-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. U.S. policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia’s ground sanctuary — territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS.”
When the Biden administration made its announcement, the Russian military simply moved forces back beyond Ukraine’s permitted reach, then shifted forces away from Kharkiv, returning to the Donbas region and placing Chasiv Yar and Ivanivske in their sights.
The U.S. needs to get back into the business of winning. It must give Ukraine full authorization to attack Russian targets that present a “clear and present danger” to Ukraine’s military and its citizens. This is the same right afforded to U.S. forces in the Middle East — to conduct self-defense strikes against imminent threats.
Biden needs to find the courage that he eloquently spoke of on June 6 when he said, “Ukrainians are fighting with extraordinary courage, suffering great losses, but never backing down.”
Interdiction is key to defeating the Russians and winning this war. It is time for the Biden administration to get out of Ukraine’s way, because “just enough” is not nearly enough.
Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Sweet served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy.
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