Iran may want revenge for Soleimani, but it may need restraint instead

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has promised “hard revenge” for the killing of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. We don’t know whether, in Shia Islam, revenge is a dish best served cold — but it would be foolish not to expect an early response. 

The oil market signaled fears of interruption, with Brent crude hitting a six-month high of $69 per barrel and U.S. crude climbing marginally less in percentage terms. Last September’s devastating attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq processing plant is an indication of what Iran can do.

The response, so far, of the Gulf states has been understandably cautious. They are the closest geographically to Iran and, in several cases, have significant Shia minority populations — for example, in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called, without apparent irony, for restraint against anything that could lead to a deterioration of the situation. The statement did not mention that, last weekend, Saudi security forces, showing their usual reputation for ruthlessness, shot dead two Shia militants and seized weapons and explosives.

In neighboring Bahrain, where the U.S. Fifth Fleet is based and 10,000 American service personnel live ashore, the U.S. embassy has issued a security alert, calling for Americans to show a heightened sense of awareness “in light of regional events.” One hopes the subtle tone is emulated by the behavior of the local security forces. Elements of Bahrain’s Shia, a majority of the population, long ago gave up trusting the ruling Sunni royal family, which itself is split between moderates and hardliners.

A word or two of caution on the imagination needed to think of possible Iranian responses is needed. First, Iran may not target Americans as such. After all, it probably wants to demonstrate, from its point of view, the folly of siding with Washington, so a U.S. ally is just as valuable a target. Additionally, President Trump’s red line seems to be “don’t kill Americans,” so, by this logic, if none are killed, Washington may not respond.

Second, Iranian revenge may not be identifiably Iranian or take place in the Middle East. Everyone will know Tehran was responsible but clear blame may be hard to pin down. Iran’s reach is global and, at least in the past, has been ambitious. I can remember being told 20 years ago by an indiscreet British security official that elements of an Iranian sleeper cell had been monitored observing a British nuclear facility.

The future course of this crisis is so uncertain that there is, perhaps, room for a note of possible optimism. Despite the initial outrage from Tehran, is the assassination of Soleimani perhaps a game-changer? Will Khamenei and his advisers consider that their meddling in the Middle East has been too ambitious, to the extent it is jeopardizing the domestic stability of the Islamic revolution?

The recent widespread protests against the regime, and the open criticism of the clerical leadership, have been contained but with a significant loss of life. The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war came to an end after the U.S. mistakenly shot down an Iranian airliner and the then-leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, realized that the Iranian people were exhausted by war. He agreed to a ceasefire but said he had “drunk the poisoned chalice.”

To the extent we can observe them, events in Tehran may be as important to watch as the tensions across the region.

Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Bernstein Program on Gulf and Energy Policy at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Follow him on Twitter @shendersongulf.