60 years later, the Gulf of Tonkin’s shadow looms over the Middle East

This week marks the 60th anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that committed the United States to fighting and then losing the Vietnam War. 

On Aug. 2, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox was attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats that wrongfully believed Maddox was part of a South Vietnamese strike group delivering a hit-and-run raid on the north.  

Two days later, the Maddox and USS Turner Joy were ordered back on patrol off the North Vietnamese coast. Both reported being attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats.

But those attacks never took place. President Lyndon B. Johnson, however, used the pretext of those attacks to present the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to Congress, authorizing the commander-in-chief to respond with force. 

On Aug. 7, 1964, with only two dissenting votes in the Senate, Congress passed the resolution. The U.S. was at war in Vietnam.

That resolution would not be the only time a U.S. president was given the authority to go to war for unproven allegations. On Oct. 16, 2002, George W. Bush signed the resolution that led to the Iraq War on the grounds of eliminating Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out and despite assertions that “we know where the weapons are,” none were ever found, because prior military action and United Nations programs had destroyed whatever capabilities might have remained.

With tensions rising in the Middle East and Persian Gulf over Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza and the assassinations of a Hezbollah leader in Lebanon and a senior Hamas official in Tehran, is the world closer to another regional war ignited by a potential Gulf of Tonkin-like crisis? And how might this happen? 

Iran is considering whether and how it will retaliate against what it considers Israel’s flagrant violation of international law in ordering an assassination on Iranian territory. Yet this is not even the first time: From 2010-2020, five Iranian nuclear scientists were killed allegedly by plots coordinated by Mossad.

Iran has proxies throughout the region in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Hamas in Gaza. Some of those proxies have attacked U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria more than 100 times. 

Suppose Iran reasoned that making the U.S. pay a price for its support of Israel could be an effective part of any retaliation to weaken American aid for its ally. Authorizing the Houthis to target U.S. warships in the Red Sea could be one option. Thus far, U.S. defenses have been impressive.

But suppose the Houthis hit a U.S. warship. Or perhaps a successful suicide attack was made against a U.S. warship in port or at anchor, such as the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 in Yemen. And even if these attacks failed to strike their targets, would that affect the scope and magnitude of U.S. reactions or retaliations as it did in August 1964?

Further, suppose Hamas and Hezbollah were directed to strike U.S. targets in the Mediterranean. In October 1983, the Marine barracks in Beirut were destroyed by a suicide truck driver, killing 241 Americans. 

If a successful attack were to occur, would America be forced to retaliate? If so, how?

The politics of America in 1964 could not have been more different from today. Johnson was exceedingly popular and was in the process of passing landmark legislation for voting rights, education and home ownership. Vietnam was in its earliest stages when there was the possibility of a light at the end of the tunnel.

Sixty years later, American politics have been tossed topsy turvy by extremes of left and right. An attack on U.S. forces or installations would exacerbate this political upheaval. And a terror attack at home is no longer out of the question. Either Republicans or Democrats could easily conclude that a rush-to-justice retaliation is essential as a show of strength.  

As in 1964, “ready, fire, aim” could ensue. And, surely states wishing America ill could not be blind in exploiting how a crisis could divert America and thus be useful in challenging and diluting its influence and possibly trapping it in an unwinnable or costly conflict. Will this happen?

In another context, the “Guns of August” presaged World War I. With so many crises and hot spots, an actual or fabricated attack against the U.S. could easily provoke an overreaction similar to Israel’s after Oct. 7.  

Let us hope that if this were to happen, the memories of the Tonkin Gulf and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were not forgotten.

Harlan Ullman Ph.D. is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” military doctrine. His 12th book is “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD:  How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large.”.