The Commission on the National Defense Strategy proposed in a recent report significant entitlement cuts and tax increases to drastically increase military spending. But they refuse to say by how much.
The report complains that the American people “have been inadequately informed” about the threats the country faces. But if they wish to be taken seriously, the commissioners will need to spell out what Americans will be expected to pay to sustain the sprawling force they claim is necessary.
Congress established the commission to review the 2022 National Defense Strategy, its implementation and the state of the global strategic environment. Lawmakers probably knew the conclusion before a single word was written. Half of the members of the 2022 National Defense Strategy Commission participated in a previous iteration back in 2018, including Amb. Eric Edelman, whom Republicans selected to serve as vice chair. Democrats chose former Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.) as chair.
Given its makeup, the 2022 National Defense Strategy Commission largely echoes the sentiments expressed in 2018. That panel argued that the U.S. was unprepared for “great power competition” and recommended that lawmakers increase defense spending by 3 to 5 percent above inflation annually. The 2022 National Defense Strategy Commission advocates for more spending in fiscal year 2027 and beyond, even while noting that real growth in defense spending in 2023 exceeded 6 percent. Apparently, 5 percent isn’t enough for the commissioners after all.
Commissioners call for spending to put the country on a “glide path to support efforts commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.” The commission neglects to explain what this means, pointing instead to a graph of Pentagon spending as a percentage of gross domestic product from 1952 to 2028. For reference, defense spending ranged from 4.9 to 16.9 percent of GDP during the Cold War.
Nowhere in their 132-page report do the commissioners explicitly state what level of Pentagon spending as a percentage of GDP is appropriate. They do not explain how quickly the U.S. should reach such a target. They are similarly reluctant to put the costs in terms understandable to normal human beings: dollars and cents.
So we did the math.
From 1951 to 1990, defense spending (“budget authority,” to nerds) averaged 7.3 percent of GDP. In 2023, Pentagon spending as a portion of GDP was 3.2 percent. Assuming lawmakers gradually increase the Department of Defense’s budget to reach 7.3 percent of GDP by 2034, they would add about $10 trillion in additional spending over that period.
A more conservative effort to bring Pentagon spending to about 5 percent of GDP — the lower end of Cold War spending — would still cost taxpayers around $5 trillion more between now and 2034, on top of the more than $9.3 trillion that the Pentagon is already projected to spend over that period.
The commission justifies significantly higher defense spending by making the case for an “all elements of national power” approach to integrated deterrence, which involves greater integration throughout the government and military, as well as with American allies and partners. Commissioners write that integrated deterrence relies on better coordinating military power with “diplomacy, economic investment, cybersecurity, trade, education, industrial capacity, technical innovation, civic engagement, and international cooperation.” However, the commission never spells out the relative importance of different elements of national power to integrated deterrence.
A fair-minded reading of their report would have you believe that annual Pentagon spending could exceed $3 trillion by 2034. They also call for higher budgets for Departments of State, Commerce and Treasury. The Department of Homeland Security would also get more. How much will be left for everything else? They don’t say, but they do acknowledge that the “ballooning U.S. deficit also poses national security risks.”
So, how much will taxes need to increase and other spending be cut? They don’t say. The report is more explicit about what a military posture for integrated deterrence would look like, proposing a “multi-theater force construct” to preserve influence worldwide. Such an approach reflects an unwillingness to prioritize among competing U.S. national interests. But prioritization is the essence of strategy; a larger military footprint would render the U.S. strategically insolvent and thus less secure.
However you interpret the commission’s report, its authors advocate for increasing defense spending by trillions of dollars in the next decade. Their argument is that “deterring war by projecting [military] strength” is “far preferable to and less costly than war.”
What remains unclear is why the commission assumes that Pentagon spending should grow as the U.S. economy does. Americans’ economic output does not determine the level of defense spending necessary to protect national interests or deter attacks against the U.S. or its allies.
Imagine a billionaire who insists on spending at least 5 percent of his net worth on housing. But just because he can spend $50 million on a house doesn’t mean he must — or should. A rental, or a much cheaper house, will shelter him from the rain. There are a range of options under the $50 million price tag that will fill the billionaire’s housing needs.
The same principle applies to national defense. The 2022 commission report argues for a new Cold War without telling the American people how much it would cost, despite acknowledging that drastic increases to defense spending would require public support. The least they can do is be honest about the price tag — somewhere between $5 to $10 trillion in additional Pentagon spending. That should give anyone sticker shock.
The U.S. is better off prioritizing its national interests and investing in non-military tools of statecraft. The future requires smarter defense spending, not more.
Christopher Preble is senior fellow and director of the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center. Julia Gledhill is a research associate for the National Security Reform Program at the Stimson Center.