As Washington argues about the chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal — pointing fingers across the aisle and debating whether to blame President Biden or former President Trump — the heart of the catastrophe is slipping from sight.
Was it Biden’s failure? Trump’s? Or should we call it what it truly was: An American-led NATO disaster, the consequence of two decades of broken promises and muddled policies?
The recent House Foreign Relations Committee report, titled “Willful Blindness,” shines light on some of the mistakes, but much of what matters remains in the dark. This is where the report fails, and where I seek to reveal what it has left unsaid.
Afghanistan had been a ticking time bomb long before the U.S. troops began their exit. After the scandal of General Petraeus, the country was destined for turmoil — there was never going to be a perfect exit. No matter how it played out, the Afghan people, the veterans who bled on the battlefields and those invested in rebuilding a fractured nation were never going to be satisfied. The hard truth is, no matter how it was spun, Afghanistan was lost well before the planes left the runway at Bagram Airfield.
The report describes chaos, failed planning and bureaucratic paralysis that gripped Washington during the first two weeks of August 2021. This dysfunction is accurate, but the narrative is incomplete.
Afghanistan — a land where decisions must be swift, not dragged out for months — was ruled by Washington’s slow machinery for 20 years. A system like that was doomed to fail in a place where hesitation means defeat.
But perhaps the most obvious omission from the report is its dismissal of the Afghan government itself. There are countless references to the Afghan Security Forces, but the Afghan government was more than just its military wing. America’s disregard for Afghanistan’s leadership — corrupt and inept as it may have been — helped destroy its legitimacy. A government dismissed is a government diminished, and in the end, it vanished under the weight of Washington’s indifference.
As America walked away, it handed more than just power to the Taliban — it left behind billions of dollars in American military equipment. The Pentagon estimated that $7.1 billion worth of defense articles were abandoned. This not only empowered an extremist group but also betrayed millions of Afghans — those who lost family members in the conflict and those who, for two decades, naively believed in America’s empty promises.
From Aug. 6 to Aug. 15, 19 provinces fell to the Taliban. There were moments — brief as they were — when the U.S. could have reevaluated its disastrous withdrawal strategy. The collapse didn’t begin on Aug. 15 with the fall of Kabul. It began in the provinces that resisted, places like Herat, Panjshir and Helmand, where battles were still ongoing. These pockets of resistance gave Washington time, which it wasted.
By the time Kabul was crumbling, Afghanistan had already been written off. A lost cause, abandoned by those who had promised to protect it. The signs were there. Biden could have paused the withdrawal when it became clear the Taliban would not honor its commitments. Diplomats had the evidence; they knew what was coming. But Washington, caught up in its own inertia, chose to look the other way.
Then there’s the decision to appoint Zalmay Khalilzad to lead American negotiations with the Taliban. Khalilzad, an Afghan by birth, was expected to resonate with the Afghan people while representing U.S. interests. He failed on both fronts. His mission was threefold: to facilitate a safe U.S. military withdrawal, to ensure that Afghanistan wouldn’t become a terrorist haven and to guide intra-Afghan negotiations. He achieved none of these.
The Doha Agreement, signed in early 2020 and touted as a roadmap for peace, had nothing to do with the Afghan people or government. It was a calculated move by the U.S. to justify its departure under the guise of “intra-Afghan talks.”
The report highlights how the Taliban blatantly violated its commitments. But what consequences did it face? None. This agreement was never about the future of Afghanistan — it was about washing America’s hands of a conflict it no longer wished to fight.
What the U.S. failed to see, and what this report neglects, is that NATO forces weren’t just fighting the Taliban — Iran, China, Russia and Pakistan all had a stake in Afghanistan’s future. The U.S. was caught in a web of global interests, some of which quietly cheered the fall of Kabul, knowing it would weaken America’s position on the world stage.
While much of the report is geared toward the American public, it is important to acknowledge that Afghanistan’s downfall wasn’t solely the result of American-led NATO failure. Afghan society, too, bears its share of the blame.
Despite 20 years of immense international support and opportunities for development, the Afghan people — whether through internal divisions, corruption or the inability to break free from deep-rooted power structures — failed to seize those opportunities fully. The burden of responsibility is shared, and this truth, while uncomfortable, cannot be ignored.
Finally, the report fixates on tactical errors but misses the greater failure: The U.S. never truly prepared Afghanistan’s forces for independence. The war effort was privatized — civilian contractors replaced soldiers, costing more while fostering corruption. In the end, it wasn’t just a military failure — it was a systemic one. A system the U.S. built, propped up and ultimately abandoned.
The House report tells a story of chaos and failure. But it’s an incomplete one. The true failure wasn’t tactical, but moral, strategic and diplomatic. And it’s a failure that will haunt not just Afghanistan but America for years to come.
Saboor Sakhizada is a former advisor and translator for the U.S. military in Afghanistan. Originally from Afghanistan, he now resides in Syracuse, N.Y., where he works with veteran and military families.