How the Navy can solve its submarine shortage

One of the key provisions in the Australia-U.S.-U.K. (AUKUS) agreement is for America to sell Australia between three and five Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines beginning in 2032. As part of this arrangement, Canberra has committed to contribute $3 billion to support the American submarine industrial base, with an initial payment of $2 billion in 2025 and an additional $100 million for each of the 10 following years.

The Navy plans for Australia’s cash infusion to be directed toward expanding and improving America’s shipyards, reducting, if not eliminating, the current two-to-three year delays in deliveries of the Virginia-class submarines. But even this large infusion of Australian funds may not eliminate the current backlog.

Instead of delivering two boats a year on average, workforce shortages at the shipyards and suppliers have led to the delivery of no more than 1.4 boats on average annually for the past several years. As a result, the Navy’s submarine force level has remained stagnant; it has not been able to operate more than 50 boats for the past decade despite its announced plans for a force of 66 submarines.

In order to meet its commitment to Australia, as well as recover from its own submarine production shortfall, the U.S. must deliver an average of 2.33 boats a year. Only by doing so can it reach its own submarine force goal by 2028. Given ongoing uncertainty about the availability of key shipyard and other workers, however, the Navy may not meet its targets.

It is noteworthy that as late as 1990 the Navy operated over 90 nuclear powered submarines; anything close to that number is clearly out of reach for the foreseeable future. Yet even if the Navy were to meet its 66-submarine force goal, that is still insufficient for supporting operations not only to confront the growing Chinese military threat but also ongoing instability in the Middle East and Russian aggression in Europe. To meet these demands — which are unlikely to diminish for the remainder of this decade or for the next one — the Navy must supplement its force with non-nuclear alternatives.

The Navy is exploring variants of unmanned submarines of various displacements. Smaller unmanned variants are envisaged to carry intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance payloads and electronic warfare systems. On the other hand, a large unmanned submarine, for example the Manta Ray boat, is meant to carry long-range attack weapons, notably the Tomahawk cruise missile. The Navy estimates the cost of a large unmanned undersea vehicle to total about $500 million. In other words, the cost of one of these systems will amount to only one-eighth that of a Virginia-class submarine.

Although it is critical that the Navy procure these boats as quickly as possible, it has already delayed procurement of the first boat for two years, to fiscal year 2027. Further delays cannot be ruled out.

While the unmanned submarine program indicates that the Navy has at last accepted the need for a supplement to its nuclear-powered force, it continues to resist a second potential supplement to that force: diesel-electric submarines. Ever since it began to acquire nuclear-power submarines in the 1950s, the Navy has resisted procuring new diesel-electric variants.

The most modern of these non-nuclear subs have far greater endurance than the conventionally-powered submarines that the Navy once operated. A modern diesel-electric sub, such as the German Type 212, can remain submerged for 30 days and transit about 500 nautical miles. If equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles, these submarines, like the unmanned boats, would pose a major additional offensive threat to China and other aggressors. And because they are extremely quiet, they would be exceedingly difficult to target. These submarines would cost about one-fifth or less than the cost of a nuclear-powered boat.

The ongoing Middle East crisis demonstrates that there has been no diminution in the global threats America confronts. Submarines continue to be a critical deterrent, and potent threat, to those that would oppose both American interests and those of its allies.

Put simply, the Navy needs more submarines, and needs them urgently. If it cannot produce considerably more nuclear-powered subs any time soon, it does have non-nuclear alternatives available, and it should pursue both unmanned and manned variants as rapidly as possible.

In addition, America’s allies in both Europe and Asia should increase their own submarine force levels. The AUKUS agreement is a major step in that direction, but it is just one step. Far more has yet to be done if China and other malevolent actors are to be deterred from pursuing their aggressive objectives.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.