The Longer Telegram: What it means for US-China relations

Washington and many capitals around the world are abuzz over an anonymously authored new report on China that was issued under the auspices of the Atlantic Council. Entitled “The Longer Telegram: Toward a New American China Strategy,” the report is modeled on George Kennan’s famous “Long Telegram” of Feb. 22, 1946, and his “X” article, which he published in Foreign Affairs in July 1947. Kennan described the Soviet Union’s objectives and weaknesses and laid out the case for a policy of “containment” that, to a significant degree, both Republican and Democratic administrations pursued throughout the course of the Cold War.

The Longer Telegram asserts that the United States has no real long-term strategy for dealing with an ever more assertive China. It claims that what has passed for strategy in recent years is a series of catchphrases and buzzwords that have no operational underpinnings. As the author (or perhaps authors) puts it, “Political declarations do not equal a strategy.” Actually, the Trump administration’s 2018 U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific — which National Security Council staffer Matthew Pottinger classified and presumably authored, and which was declassified in the administration’s waning days in office — does just that. It might be argued that the strategy is flawed, or more accurately, incomplete, but it certainly outlines action items to support each element of the strategy, often in greater detail than does The Longer Telegram.

In some respects, The Longer Telegram echoes the Trump administration’s China strategy; in others, it does not. The Pottinger paper, together with a State Department report that the policy planning staff produced after the November 2020 election, focuses on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and outlines the importance of differentiating between the CCP and the Chinese people; the areas where the CCP seeks to undermine American economic, technical, military and moral leadership; and how America must respond to that challenge.

On the other hand, the anonymous author of The Longer Telegram argues instead that the focus should be on Xi Jinping and his cronies, with a view toward magnifying schisms not only between them and the Chinese people, but also with their many critics inside the CCP itself. Significantly, the author postulates that Xi’s successor would, almost by definition, be more moderate and cautious than the Chinese dictator.

There is no reason to expect any change in CCP behavior once Xi departs from the scene. The Soviet example would indicate otherwise. Joseph Stalin’s death only temporarily created a “thaw” inside the USSR. By the mid-1950s, Nikita Khrushchev had ousted the more moderate Georgy Malenkov, Stalin’s immediate successor. Although the Soviet leadership no longer carried out Stalin-style murderous purges, it did not tolerate open dissent, and forced labor camps continued to absorb prisoners throughout the Leonid Brezhnev era. Much the same is likely to happen in China: repression in Tibet preceded Xi and is unlikely to end when he is gone.

The Trump administration’s strategy document did not mention Xi at all, however, no doubt because the president seemed enamored of the Chinese dictator, as he was of so many others. Likewise, it noted neither the importance of immigration nor that of free trade to the strength of America’s economy and society — again no doubt because of the president’s predilections. The Longer Telegram rightly emphasizes that both of these critical elements have underpinned American leadership.

But, whereas The Longer Telegram outlined a series of “red lines” that Washington should inform Beijing would trigger a powerful American response, including military action, the Pottinger paper wisely avoided doing so. The Obama administration’s error in drawing a red line over Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons against Syrian rebels should give policymakers pause. Once a red line is drawn, either it will prompt an automatic response, including war, that negotiation might otherwise have enabled both sides to avoid, or, if there is no response, it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, which could lead to even more brazen Chinese aggressiveness.

Both the Policy Planning Report and The Longer Telegram identify not only China’s strengths, but also its structural weaknesses, notably in the social and economic realms. The Pottinger paper does not do so; it is heavily oriented toward dealing with military challenges not only from China but from North Korea as well.

All three documents emphasize the importance of both a whole-of-government approach to dealing with China and of doing so in coordination with America’s allies and friends. None goes into great depth as to how to wean those allies off a growing dependence on Chinese trade and investment. For example, none makes much, if any, mention of the Chinese-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which includes many European states but not the United States, as founding members. Nor does any make clear how exactly the United States will wean the allies off their dependence on Huawei’s 5G networks, given both its quality and its lower cost.

Whatever their shortcomings, however, taken together the three papers offer a holistic strategic approach to dealing with China as it continues to challenge American leadership. In particular, The Longer Telegram has spurred an important debate — both regarding how to ensure that a China strategy, about which there is a growing American and allied consensus, can be sustained over the next several decades and, equally important, how it should be implemented. 

Hopefully, President Biden’s senior policymakers not only will take notice, but will amplify, sharpen and act upon many of its recommendations.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was under secretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy under secretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.