What Biden gets wrong in his rationale for Afghanistan withdrawal

President Biden’s decision to implement the Trump Doha agreement, and unconditionally and hastily withdraw all US forces from Afghanistan, was a strategic, high-risk mistake. The rationale with which the President defended himself on Aug. 16 is riddled with misleading assertions.

With Afghanistan in Taliban hands, humanitarian disaster is looming, the terrorist threat to the U.S. and our allies will likely expand, stability in a region with two nuclear-armed adversaries is endangered and American credibility has suffered a serious blow. Nothing about this dismaying outcome was inevitable.

Complicated realities get obscured by labels. We are not ending a “forever war,” but imperiling American security and credibility, including by the loss of an Islamic Republic partnered with us in attacking Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

If asked, “should U.S. forces remain in an endless war in Afghanistan?” the majority of Americans will answer “no.” A better question is, “should a small number of U.S. forces remain until they can withdraw without increasing the security risk to America and sacrificing the progress we have made?”.

The president said we went to Afghanistan with clear goals: to attack the perpetrators of 9/11, and to ensure that Al-Qaeda could not use Afghan territory to again attack the U.S.

He said that job is done, and any further threat from Afghanistan can be detected, and countered, from afar. That is wishful thinking, as are most of the “continued U.S. commitments” made to stand by the Afghan people, especially women, after the U.S. leaves. There is no realistic prospect for U.S. basing in the region. U.S. intelligence will suffer, and counterterrorism options will be remote, limited and inefficient.

The president asserted that Afghanistan is one of many places with terrorist threats. But Afghanistan was not a failed state, although it may become one, and holds a special place in the Jihadi world. It is the “homeland” of ISIS ideology, and the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are closely linked. Some 20 Islamist terror groups form a toxic mix brewing in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a threat to Afghanistan’s neighbors and the West.

Now that jihad has “liberated” Afghanistan and restored the Islamic Emirate, those Islamist terrorists driven by ideology to attack the West are likely to draw renewed energy and recruitment.

The president concluded that further engagement in Afghanistan is fruitless. In fact, up until the Trump Doha agreement on U.S. withdrawal, wrapped in vague thinking about negotiations and isolation of Al-Qaeda, the strategic goal of supporting the Afghan forces in the fight and combatting terrorists with a small number of U.S. forces, was being met. We had an insurance policy in place against instability in the region and a resurgent terrorist threat at a sustainable low cost. In 2019, before Doha, there were more deaths in the U.S. military from training accidents than from combat in Afghanistan.

The president’s argument that the Afghan security forces had all they needed but were not willing to resist the Taliban is terribly misleading. Since the major U.S. drawdown in 2014, the Afghans have done the overwhelming majority of the fighting — and dying. The U.S. and NATO took on a support and training role, with a U.S. counterterrorism component. We trained the Afghan army to fight with critical air, logistics and intelligence support from U.S. forces and contractors as they made the long-term effort to develop their own. They struggled but were fighting and holding.

Many observers, including the congressionally mandated Afghanistan Study Group (ASG) in February, warned that if U.S. support were withdrawn, the Afghan forces risked collapse. The ASG recommended maintaining a military presence sufficient to provide needed capabilities (which came at low cost) and focusing on a genuine peace negotiation. It warned, “the probability of maintaining some sort of stability in Afghanistan after a prompt withdrawal of troops and a substantial reduction in aid is minimal.”

Yes, Afghan leaders bear their share of responsibility. But sadly, there is a direct line between the Trump Doha agreement, through Biden’s April 14 decision and the U.S. military’s rush for the exits, to the fall of Kabul on Aug. 15.

The Trump Doha elevated the Taliban, undercut the Afghan government and fed the erosion of Afghan confidence. With all the problems the Afghan forces faced from their own side — the failure to be paid, the corruption, problems with lack of leadership — the U.S. presence had bolstered the Afghan will to fight, with confidence in U.S. assistance when needed.

As U.S. forces withdrew after the Trump Doha and then flooded out after April, the reality of U.S. abandonment set in as the Taliban advanced and reinforcements, food and air support for beleaguered troops in the field failed to arrive. Still many Afghans continued to resist. We now know, from excellent reporting, how skillfully the Taliban managed a psychological campaign to persuade Afghan forces to lay down their weapons and go home or face the prospect of death in unsupported combat.

Biden’s claim that his choice was withdraw or send thousands of new troops to “bear the brunt of the fighting” on behalf of Afghans unwilling to fight for themselves is a distortion, to say the least. He could have avoided the predictable security and humanitarian debacle by explaining in April that the Taliban had failed to implement the Trump Doha agreement and were not interested in peace; that American interests in preventing terrorist attacks, as well as stability and security in a region with nuclear weapons, require the insurance policy of a continued small U.S. force. And done so partnered with a larger NATO mission, to pursue stability, keep ISIS and Al-Qaeda at bay and support pursuit of a political settlement of the conflict.

That is a decision that would have kept faith with our interests and commitments, at low cost and risk, including political risk. It is the decision that most, perhaps all, our allies and partners around the world, who shared the burden in Afghanistan and are appalled by the U.S. departure, wanted.

James B. Cunningham is a former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Israel and the UN   as well as a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.