It comes as no surprise that the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, which Russia backs, has expressed support for Moscow’s recognition of the two breakaway “republics” in eastern Ukraine, and that the Iranian foreign minister described the conflict in Ukraine as “rooted in NATO provocations.” But for the most part, America’s Middle Eastern allies also have made it clear that they are not about to support the U.S. and its European allies in imposing sanctions on Russia, or even to openly criticize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Saudi Arabia has indicated that it will not increase oil production to bring down oil prices that have spiked because of the crisis; it intends to stick with the output agreement it made with Russia in the OPEC+ format. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), along with China and India, abstained on a U.S.-backed UN Security Council resolution deploring Russia’s actions. The emir of Qatar has called for “all parties to exercise restraint” without casting blame on Russia. Qatar also pointed out that it simply cannot increase its liquefied natural gas (LNG) output or significantly redirect its LNG exports to Europe, either. Egypt’s main concern is that conflict in Ukraine might interrupt its supplies of Russian and Ukrainian wheat through the Black Sea and Turkish Straits; to the extent that Egypt cannot import grain from Ukraine, its dependence on Russian wheat may actually increase.
The Israeli foreign minister did condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine. But Israel wishes to continue its deconfliction agreement with Russia over Syria, whereby Moscow tolerates Israeli strikes on Iranian and Hezbollah targets there — especially since the Russian foreign ministry spokesperson brought this into doubt when she called upon Israel to halt these attacks. Turkey is the one U.S. ally in the Middle East that has not only condemned the Russian invasion but also has actively supported Ukraine. Also a Black Sea littoral country, like Russia and Ukraine, Turkish security interests are most affected by this conflict.
These moves reflect that America’s many allies sometimes prioritize threats differently from the U.S. — and from each other. While the Russian invasion of Ukraine is seen as highly threatening to the U.S. and its NATO allies, many of America’s Middle Eastern allies see Iran as far more of a threat to them than Russia. In addition, they fear that cooperating with the U.S. could lead Russia either to support or not act to restrain Iran. And if, as they fear, the U.S. is less committed now to defending its Middle Eastern allies because of its increased focus on China, and now Russia, they believe the risks of condemning Russia far outweigh any benefits of doing so.
America’s Middle Eastern allies may also calculate that their actions accommodating Russia will not hurt their ties to America — either out of the conviction that America needs them more than they need America, or because of their belief that there is strong American domestic support for them despite any cooperation with Russia. And indeed, there are voices in Washington who call for “understanding” the position of its Middle Eastern allies, and urging the U.S. to do more for them vis-à-vis Iran.
But if America’s Middle Eastern allies do not cooperate with the U.S. in sanctioning Russia for its actions in Ukraine, the question that inevitably will arise is: If our Middle Eastern allies won’t support America and the West in dealing with Russian aggression, just how much should the U.S. help them vis-à-vis Iran?
The U.S. obviously is not about to help Iran against any of them. But at some point, America’s European allies are going to point out that if Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar cannot or will not increase petroleum exports to Europe to replace the Russian exports Washington wants them to cut back on, then buying oil and gas from Iran will look increasingly attractive to them. Just as America’s Middle Eastern allies do not consider Russia to be much of a threat to them, America’s European — and Asian — allies do not consider Iran to be a threat to them, either.
If nothing else, America’s European and Asian allies may well call on the U.S. to show the same tolerance for their dealing with Iran as Washington is showing to its Middle Eastern allies in their dealing with Russia.
Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.