Don’t expect much from Taliban

Reconciliation is the new watchword in U.S. strategy for Afghanistan. Since the $117 billion a year counterinsurgency strategy failed to defeat the Taliban, the administration now says it will negotiate with the Taliban and so pave the way for a graceful exit from Afghanistan.

This is easier said than done. How do you negotiate with an enemy who has no known address and an opaque leadership structure in circumstances where your military strategy is to kill any leader you identify?

{mosads}The first problem is to figure out with whom to talk. Many have claimed to speak for the Taliban but it is not clear who, if anyone, actually does. Last year, the British flew a Pakistani shoe-maker masquerading as a Taliban interlocutor from the Pakistani city of Peshawar to Kabul for secret talks. And, while NATO denies that it paid the charlatan, Afghan watchers suspect he collected generously on his “expenses.” According to press reports, low-level administration officials have talked with a Dubai-based aide to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. While there is no question of the man’s authenticity, there is a question as to whether he speaks for — or even in is in contact with — the elusive Taliban leader.

Then there is the question of who, if anyone, speaks for the Taliban. The Taliban have two, and possibly three, leadership councils — the Quetta shura headed by Mullah Omar, the Miranshah shura for the Haqqani network, and possibly a Peshawar shura controlling the insurgency in parts of the East. Do these councils (or shuras) coordinate with each other? Is there a hierarchy? Do the shuras — all named for places in Pakistan — control Taliban fighters in the field in Afghanistan? U.S. intelligence and Afghan watchers can make educated guesses, but the fact is that no one really knows. U.S. military strategy has successfully targeted Taliban commanders in the field. As more seasoned commanders are killed off, they are replaced by homegrown Taliban who might be less responsive to the Pakistan-based Taliban leadership, thus complicating any negotiations.

Then there is the issue of what to negotiate. So far, U.S. and Afghan officials have focused on the “reconcilables” — Taliban who are prepared to lay down their arms and accept Afghanistan’s constitution. It is uncertain how many (if any) reconcilables exist, but the U.S. problem in Afghanistan is with the irreconcilables.  

In theory, military success should enable the administration — and its Afghan allies — drive a better bargain in any peace negotiations with the Taliban. U.S. military commanders say they have dealt the Taliban a severe blow, having driven them out of strongholds in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. But, the Taliban almost certainly does not see the military situation the same way as the U.S. generals. In order for the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy to succeed, it must have an Afghan partner who can win over the population. The corrupt, ineffective and illegitimate Karzai government — and the predatory power brokers allied with it — has not and cannot win support from the people. The Taliban know the Americans will eventually pull out and assume they can move back in. If negotiations do take place, each side is likely to enter them thinking it has the upper hand. 

The Taliban insurgency is an almost entirely Pashtun movement and, for most part, the war has been fought in Afghanistan’s Pashtun-inhabited south and east. Afghanistan’s other ethnic groups — who comprise slightly more than half the population — despise the Taliban. The non-Pashtuns worry that a peace agreement between the Taliban and Afghanistan’s Pashtun-led government will come at their expense; depending on the nature of the deal, they could resist violently. By making peace with the Taliban, the U.S. risks trading an intra-Pashtun civil war for an even larger conflict that pits Afghanistan’s Pashtuns against its Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks.

The Obama administration should base its decisions on Afghanistan on whether the interests at stake justify the $117 billion in annual expenditures and the hundreds of lives and on whether the counterinsurgency strategy can work in the absence of an Afghan partner. Negotiations with the Taliban are worth exploring but, given the remote prospect of an agreement, should not be basis of an exit strategy. 

Galbraith served as deputy special representative of the secretary general of the United Nations in Afghanistan in 2009.