The visa tightening program

Washington has gotten very good at naming things in recent years.  Nowadays, no one would ever introduce a bill without first giving it a great-sounding name even if the ideas could never live up to the billing.  The Affordable Care Act, The Dream Act, No Child Left Behind – how can anyone object to affordable dreams and educating children? 

What’s in a name?  Apparently a lot.  I fear that is why the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) is taking flack.  What chance does a smart program have of surviving with a name that suggests it waives visas?  Once you understand what VWP actually does, which is to help our security and economy, it is hard to understand how anyone could object.

{mosads}The unhealthy buzz surrounding this misleadingly named program is due to the very real threat from ISIS, whose efforts to enlist recruits from Europe are well-publicized.  A few critics in Congress labor under the misapprehension that because some of these misguided souls have Western passports, they could use VWP to board planes to the U.S. without thorough security checks.  While the threat of ISIS is still relatively new, the threat of radicalized individuals attacking our homeland is not, especially to our intelligence professionals. 

Programs that promote international cooperation between security and intelligence officials must become the norm if we have any chance of managing complicated and evolving threats from a growing list of countries.  The congressional hand-wringing over VWP is just the latest example of how we are edging toward policies that restrict our ability to learn and understand the plans and intentions of those who would do us harm.  The most potent tool in fighting terror is staying on offense, and utilizing information and intelligence is the only way to do that.

Since its inception in the 1980s, VWP has been reformed and shaped into the tool it is today.  Despite its name, this program actually tightens the security standards to enter the U.S.  VWP partner nations are by definition strong security allies who have agreed to and are required to meet rigorous conditions in order to be part of the program.  These include shared databases and strict standards for passport security, such as embedded microchips containing biometric data and other measures to prevent their counterfeiting or fraudulent use.  These stringent security measures are continually confirmed through audits of participating countries’ counterterrorism, law enforcement, border control, aviation and travel document security standards.

VWP has resulted in member countries strengthening their security protocols to standards approved by the U.S.  For example, Greece, home of a legendarily corrupted passport system, fixed the related security vulnerabilities due in part to its desire to become a VWP member.  To obtain admission to the VWP club, Greece canceled every passport it had issued in favor of a document that is far less susceptible to mischief. 

Another example of the positive collaboration under VWP is the number of countries providing volumes of information to U.S. authorities about lost and stolen passports via our shared databases.  Knowing about a stolen passport can provide a wealth of information to an intelligence analyst, in addition to preventing these passports from ever being used. 

Yet, one thing was eliminated as part of VWP implementation – the consulate interview.  Yes, the short interview conducted by an overworked consulate staff member whose job is to get through a long line of potential travelers was eliminated in favor of a vastly more sophisticated screening apparatus. 

No one can credibly suggest our best line of defense against a determined terrorist is a consulate interview.  Security experts are in near-unanimous agreement that the intelligence gathered and extra security layers associated with VWP are at least as effective as those interviews and more valuable as a long-term security tool.

Moving away from offensive programs that provide valuable information is not a formula to keeping us safe.  We cannot fall captive to a “gates, guards and guns” mentality and retreat to fortress America in the midst of an increasingly global community.  If we implement policies that discourage tourism, international business and the exchange of ideas that occurs when people visit our great nation, we are weaker and send a clear signal that the ISIS propaganda machine is working.

Evaluating and improving the policies that safeguard our homeland is a process that should never cease.  There is legislation in Congress entailing several useful updates to VWP.  For example the JOLT Act (H.R. 1401) would tighten passport requirements, and direct the secretary of Homeland Security to evaluate the program for further strengthening measures.

The obvious first order of business for proponents of the program is to re-educate—and more importantly, to re-brand.​  One measure of the proposed legislation would do just that, re-designate the VWP as the Secure Travel Partnership (STP) program to more accurately reflect its purpose and effect.  Perhaps, with a more accurate name, we would be talking about the good it does.   

Goss served as the director of CIA in the George W. Bush Administration.  During his fifteen-year career as a Republican congressman for Florida, he spent seven years as the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Goss resides on Sanibel Island, Florida.