Taiwan’s security on hold

At a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) asked Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte for a status report on arms sales to Taiwan. Mr. Negroponte responded that since Taiwan’s legislature approved substantial defense funding in 2007, the U.S. has not taken steps to advance Taiwan arms sales. He added that prior to moving forward, the U.S. will first “await developments there.”

But when Mr. Negroponte suggested that U.S. arms sales were stalled due to the political transition underway in Taiwan, he neglected to mention that his department is currently sitting on an unprecedented seven Taiwan arms sales notifications (valued at $11 billion) ready for informal review by Congress.

In April 2001, President Bush released a significant package of weapons to Taiwan to aid it in its military modernization efforts. This show of support for Taiwan’s security, consistent with U.S. obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), was welcomed on both sides of the Pacific.

But Taiwan’s then-President Chen Shui-bian miscalculated in his attempts to secure funding for the package, and the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) concluded that opposing U.S. weapons purchases would aid its domestic political fortunes. Thus, the long-held security consensus in Taiwan broke down, and the U.S. offer sat dormant for four years. In June and December of 2007, however, the domestic political impasse broke and Taiwan passed funding for all of the items released in 2001.

It is difficult to gauge why the Bush administration is delaying congressional notification on these sales. Perhaps they feel that cross-Strait relations are at a sensitive time and the U.S. should avoid provoking China, or that Taiwan needs to undergo a period of responsible behavior to reestablish trust.

Nevertheless, the United States has an obligation under the TRA to provide Taiwan with articles in support of its national defense, maintaining a balance of power across the Taiwan Strait. Further delays to Taiwan’s military modernization efforts would contribute to the military imbalance, not engender better security.

Taiwan’s new president — Ma Ying-jeou, sworn in on May 20 — was elected on a platform of improved relations with China. Many in Taiwan hope that Ma’s election will mean a reduction in political tensions and a surge in China-driven economic growth. Yet Ma consistently calls for a strong commitment to defense and security. He knows that his ability to engage China on an equal footing is conditional on the Chinese viewing Taiwan as committed to its own sovereignty and having the means to defend it.

In his inauguration address, Ma reiterated that it was his government’s intention to “acquire the necessary weaponry to form a solid national defense force.” So why would the Bush administration work at cross purposes to this goal by slowing arms sales and undermining the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan at the very time President Ma needs unequivocal support to engage the Chinese?

China has no intention to scale back its own massive investment in military modernization in response to President Ma’s election victory and the possibility of improved cross-Strait relations. The imbalance across the Strait is growing. They see America’s security relationship with Taiwan as a threat and do not deal in degrees on the matter; they oppose all arms sales without distinction.

At the hearing, Sen. Murkowski also mentioned an October 2007 letter she wrote to National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley on Taiwan’s attempts to submit a Letter of Request (LOR) to purchase 66 F-16 aircraft. It remains unanswered. Mr. Negroponte responded that “there are no present plans to offer the F-16 to Taiwan.”

Make no mistake; Taiwan needs F-16s urgently and has been attempting to submit an LOR since 2006, only to be greeted by different rebuttals each time. Their Vietnam-era fighters are no match for China’s large fleet of modern planes, and American technical officials in Taiwan, Pacific Command (PACOM), the Department of Defense, and other U.S. government agencies all share this assessment.

There is confusion within the Bush administration over distinguishing between the difficulties with President Chen and legacy responsibilities in the bilateral relationship between Taiwan and America.

These two issues became one, and as a consequence serious damage continues to be done to our interests in Taiwan.

In both instances — the congressional notification delays and the F-16 matter — the military and strategic imperatives for Taiwan are real and urgent. The TRA gives Congress a unique role to play in guaranteeing America’s commitment to Taiwan. President Ma requires unambiguous U.S. support at a critical time in Taiwan’s relationship with China.

If we fail to show the necessary resolve, the Chinese will view the nascent Ma government as vulnerable, which may result in miscalculation. More importantly, it would mean missing a significant opportunity to improve cross-Strait peace and security, a vital U.S. interest.

Hammond-Chambers is president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council.