Fill the military’s ‘holes in the yard’

“Holes in the yard” were the words former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker often used when he talked about the shortfall in Army capabilities and equipment at the start of the war on terrorism. They were his shorthand for the effects of a long-standing mismatch between the military requirements of the national military strategy and the actual forces and capabilities available to meet those requirements. Among the biggest “holes” was the one resulting from the so-called procurement holiday taken as a peace dividend in the 1990s that left the Army alone $56 billion short of required equipment.

The results of our failing to meet those shortfalls were a military force that was undermanned, improperly equipped, and ill-prepared to meet the challenges of anything other than conventional warfare. In fact, the successes we have seen to date in the extended war on terror are largely a result of the remarkable accomplishments of the men and women who wear our country’s uniform, not the on-paper readiness our recent policies produced to fight the current battles in Afghanistan and Iraq.  

Today, the shortfalls in military capability extend across all services.  While the last seven years have allowed us to fill some of the gaps, if we are to counter the looming threats of the future we must continue to build and sustain our military capabilities.

It is fair to say the current administration, in conjunction with the Congress, has increased defense spending dramatically — to a high of around $607 billion in fiscal year 2008, including supplemental funding. Unfortunately, this might well represent the high water mark of defense resourcing for the near future. In fact, if viewed in constant dollars, the Department of Defense base budget from 2010 onward is scheduled to shrink at a time when our current reliance on massive supplemental funding bills for basic defense needs is simply an unsustainable model for long-term success.

Indeed, our dependence on supplemental funding masks the true costs of a myriad of factors such as active end-strength growth and the rising price of fuel.  Additionally, the use of supplementals to pay for basics like equipment modernization, flying hours and recruiting only compounds the inadequacy of our baseline defense budget.

At the present time, we are facing dramatically escalating costs of maintaining readiness and alarming trends in equipment condition and availability. Aging fleets of aircraft, ships and vehicles across the services are driving up maintenance budgets, reducing reliability and putting missions at risk. The recent groundings of all Air Force F-15s and the Navy P-3 fleet should put us on notice that recapitalization programs and modernization efforts are not a luxury; they are a necessity — one we are not meeting.

By way of example, the Army requires a considerable force resetting to allow for the absorption of the scheduled end-strength increases and provide the ability to field new weapons systems that adapt to the revolving realities of asymmetric warfare.

The Navy’s 313-ship program — the figure set by the Navy for their minimum force requirement — will require a doubling of the total shipbuilding budget, a goal that even if met will fail to get us to 313. In fact, given the competing priorities that are stretching our already underfunded budget, we might well be looking at a 275-ship Navy, a particularly troubling reality when one considers countries such as China are building a formidable blue water capability. In short, we need to learn how to establish real requirements based on the real needs of the future.

In today’s threat environment, faced with determined but shadowy enemies, we must be able to better meet the challenges of the future, as well as the threats of today. Right now, the strategic environment is defined by a global struggle against violent extremist movements that seek to overturn the international state system. Combating these violent groups, along with rogue states like Iran and North Korea, all the while confronting emerging powers, will require long-term and innovative approaches.  

We need to more effectively integrate “soft power” into our country’s defense strategy. Being prepared takes more than a conventional military and a stockpile of weapons. It requires a “whole-of-government approach” that enables non-military efforts to work in concert with the DoD. We must target where economic and/or humanitarian assistance could make the difference between open warfare and peace. Successfully identifying where to build the civil and military capacity of foreign partners can make a positive impact on international order.

Today and in the future, U.S. national security requires the integration of all elements of our national power, including defense, diplomacy, development assistance and democracy promotion efforts.

Considering these challenges, our success or failure in the 21st century will be determined by our capacity to avoid the mistakes of the 20th century — a time when our repeated attempts to collect a “peace dividend” left our national defense lacking. We must better align our strategic posture with the full spectrum of threats. It is clear that the DoD’s top line budget, even with supplementals, will fail to meet our nation’s perceived security requirements — particularly after 2010. We, as a nation, must come to terms with this fact and muster the clarity and courage to accurately assess the risks we take if we fail to increase baseline defense spending and enact true interagency reform. In the end, we need to get it right. Repeating the mistakes of the past, leaving “holes in the yard,” on the back of nearly a decade of direct combat operations, would be both unforgivable and, ultimately, unsurvivable.

McHugh is ranking member on the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel.