A lot can change in 10 months

The 1994 midterm model

The last two midterms in which one-party control was tested were 1994 and 2006, when both houses of Congress switched parties. In both cases, the losses for the majority were larger than anticipated. For Democrats, these recent experiences are omens of what can happen when voter anger is turned against one party. In 1994, No Republican incumbent in the House, Senate or a governor’s mansion was defeated. In 2006, no Democratic incumbent in the House, Senate or governorship was defeated. Voter anger was directed across the board at the majority party. 1966 exhibited similar characteristics, with the GOP picking up 47 House seats — not enough for control, but a shellacking.

{mosads}Today, the anger in the electorate is among Republicans and conservatives, who have higher motivation to turn out. The Democratic “surge” voters are asleep, and independents voted 2-1 Republican in both Virginia and New Jersey. At a minimum, the Democrats have their hands full, are on defense and are subject to the ebb and flow of events they cannot control. However, there are two other historical models for midterms with executive/legislative majorities that serve as some hope for Democrats.

The 1978 midterm model

With Democrats firmly in control of both houses and Jimmy Carter in the White House, 1978 was tailor-made for GOP pick-ups. Democratic “Watergate Babies” were nearly uniformly reelected in 1976, so many Democrats sat in GOP-leaning districts. The final results: Republicans gained a net 18 seats in the House. They picked up eight Senate seats held by Democrats, but lost five seats held by Republicans for a net pick-up of three. In governorships, Republicans picked up four and lost four.

GOP gains should have been better, but party-branding from Watergate hurt the party’s chances for a cleaner comeback (which came in 1980). A bitter aftertaste from Watergate scandals gave independent voters some hesitancy to go full-tilt for the GOP. Also, the intra-party battles within the GOP cost it seats and resources (Clifford Case’s defeat in New Jersey by Jeff Bell in the primary, for example). Eight incumbent senators were defeated (either in primaries or generals) but both parties were victims of voter anger. Finally, the inability of Republicans to draw distinct lines from Democrats on potent issues (like the Panama Canal) made it harder for voters to distinguish between an elephant and a donkey.

Democrats held strong financial advantages in key races, but controversial issues saw a bipartisan complicity that probably blurred party differences to some voters.  Perhaps failure to polarize the electorate against the party in power led to a bipartisan spanking administered by angry voters.

The 1962 model

In 1962, Democrats controlled the political map. The South was largely one-party and the administration was under siege for their healthcare plans and foreign policy (Bay of Pigs fiasco), and spending policies. Republicans had great recruits to top state tickets (Nixon, Scranton, Romney, Rhodes, Love and Domick).

1962 was also a reapportionment year that saw five seats (all Democratic) added in California. But Republican gains were stymied in October by the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought on national unity at the political level and froze the electorate during the last month of the campaign season. Whatever hopes the Republicans had of capitalizing on voter anger were swamped by a national security crisis, and GOP gains were minimal.

2010?

None of these models completely parallel what is happening today. However, victories in New Jersey and Virginia, followed by the Scott Brown victory in Massachusetts, illustrate that a wide-awake Republican can hoist his sail and catch the wind blowing against Washington (personified by the Democrats, who own both Houses and the presidency), even in the bluest of states. This conforms to the 1994 model. But, Republicans having 41 senators potentially leaves them open to some responsibility in decision-making (or, more aptly, decision-stopping).

A lot can change in 10 months. For Republicans, their hope lies in the most recent models of 1994 and 2006, where voter anger was directed against the party in power. For Democrats, they understand that the Republican Party still has an image problem and a potential “share of power,” and they must exploit that to independents who may want to “balance power.” Then again, a national security episode, a la 1962, can throw all of the game plans out the window and refocus the electorate in an instant. These national security events do not always benefit the party in power (the Spain train explosion, for example), but they move politics in unpredictable directions.

Republicans have focused their strategy on drawing hard lines in the sand on domestic public policy issues. This positions them to court the grassroots Tea Party movement, and give angry voters a choice for “change.” But 10 months is an eternity in politics, and as unpopular as congressional Democrats appear, Republicans rank even lower. At the end of the day, unemployment levels, the Mideast wars, and how both parties conduct themselves, as well as surprise events, will dictate which model 2010 will follow.

Davis, who served in Congress from 1995-2008, was chairman of the Republicans’ congressional campaign committee from 1998-2002.