Oil spill commission pulled back slide on risky BP decisions

A smaller number of the time-saving and risky decisions were made by rig owner Transocean Ltd., and Halliburton, which did the cementing work on BP’s ill-fated Macondo well.

The slide was prepared for a presentation by investigators at the Nov. 8-9 hearing of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling.

But it was not included in chief counsel Fred Bartlit’s presentation at the hearing this month. It was posted on the commission’s website but later removed.

A spokesman for the spill commission said the panel stands by findings in the slide, and noted that it summarizes information that was already revealed in its hearings.

“Each of the 11 points in the slide was made in presentations throughout the course of the just-completed public hearings. The one slide was put up on our website mistakenly in that it had not yet been reviewed by the full Commission, which is a requirement, and we are awaiting more information,” spokesman Dave Cohen said in a prepared statement Tuesday.

“However, both the slide and the information in it again will be made public in the future as we move forward with reporting our findings. The Commission continues to stand behind those findings,” he said.

The leaders of the spill panel have faulted the companies involved for their decision-making in the disaster. Co-Chairman William Reilly on Nov. 9 that “each company is responsible for one or more egregiously bad decision,” while the other co-Chairman Bob Graham said, “Leaders did not take serious risks seriously enough.”

But the slide encapsulates the string of risky decisions that saved the companies time on the costly project, and presents a damning picture ahead of the commission’s final report to the White House expected in January.

The document notes time-saving decisions by BP such as not waiting for more centralizers for the well and the failure to install additional plugs and barriers.

It notes Halliburton saved time while increasing risks by failing to reevaluate its cement slurry design, while also faulting decisions by Transocean (possibly in concert with BP) on the rig that may have contributed to the catastrophic blowout.

A key issue is the extent which the panel will consider if any risky, time-saving decisions were made to save money, especially because the slide notes that several of the BP and Halliburton decisions were made “on shore.”

Bartlit’s presentation at the hearing this month noted that there was “no evidence at this time to suggest that there was a conscious decision to sacrifice safety concerns to save money.”

But Bartlit and Reilly subsequently emphasized that the conclusion was focused on decisions made on the Deepwater Horizon rig itself. “All I’m saying is human beings did not sit there and sell safety down the river for dollars on the rig that night. That’s the sole point,” Bartlit said Nov. 8 after his initial comments provoked a flurry of news stories.

Here’s Reilly on Nov. 9: “Our investigative team did not ascribe motive to any of those decisions and reported that they found no evidence that those flawed decisions were made to save money. They didn’t rule out cost, just said they weren’t prepared to attribute mercenary motives to men who cannot speak for themselves because they are not alive.”

Bartlit, on Nov. 9, appeared to make reference to the slide when noting that questions about cost-savings are still under review.

“The fact is that we have a list. The list shows that there are occasions where a decision was made that there was a choice of ways to make the decision, and the decision was made in a way that saved time. We know that under these circumstances, time can be money,” Bartlit said.

“So my point is not that this issue is resolved, all I said is that the men on the rig that night, these guys did not sit there and said, well . . . we blew up the rig, but we’ll make the guys in London some money,” he added.